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1. Purpose and Scope of the Report
This report seeks to show how Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—five
member countries of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program referred to in the report as
the Central Asian republics (CARs)—can increase the gains from participation in international trade through regional
cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit.
The CARs are all relatively small economies. Therefore, they need to promote trade and closely integrate into
the international trading system to achieve sustainable economic development. Regional cooperation in trade policy can
help them do this. In particular, reciprocal trade liberalization under regional trade agreements (RTAs) can help the
CARs liberalize trade policy at relatively low costs, reduce the risks of protectionist measures by trading partners, create
new trade, and improve social welfare. However, it can also divert existing trade and worsen social welfare in the CARs
and hinder their full integration into the international trading system, depending on the design of the RTAs and the
context in which they are implemented.
In contrast, regional cooperation in transport and customs transit is unambiguously beneficial for the CARs.
Moreover, it is essential if the CARs are to overcome disadvantages and exploit advantages of their location, fully
integrate into the international trading system, and achieve sustainable development.
Given their landlocked status, the liberalization of trade policy and regional cooperation in transport and customs
transit are closely interlinked for the CARs. Progress in any of these areas will have a limited positive impact on trade
if there is no progress in the others. For example, liberalization of trade policy by a CAR and its nonadjacent trading
partner will not boost their bilateral trade much if movements of transport equipment and goods through connecting
countries remain difficult or impossible due to deficiencies of transport infrastructure or restrictive transit systems in
those countries.1 Likewise, improvements in transport infrastructure and transit systems in neighboring countries will do
little to closely integrate a CAR into the international trading system if its trade policy remains restrictive. If combined,
however, regional cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit can make a major contribution to the
expansion of trade and economic development in the CARs.
Taking into account the importance of and the synergy between regional cooperation in trade policy, transport,
and customs transit for the CARs, the report treats regional cooperation in Central Asia in these areas in a holistic
manner. It attempts to quantify costs of the lack of cooperation and potential benefits of improved regional cooperation
1 This is evidenced by the experience of the Kyrgyz Republic, which significantly liberalized its trade policy in the first half of the
1990s and gained better access to markets in many nonadjacent countries through its accession to the World Trade Organization
in 1998, but was not able to expand its trade with those countries considerably due to poor transport links with non-former Soviet
Union countries and difficulties with transit of goods and transport equipment through neighboring countries.
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in the three areas for the CARs. The report is intended to inform policymakers in the region and contribute to the
ongoing dialogue on regional economic cooperation in Central Asia.
2. Recent Trade Performance of the Central Asian Republics
The recent merchandise trade performance of the CARs has been characterized by (i) rapid expansion of trade;
(ii) continuing dominance of a few primary commodities in exports; and (iii) concentration of trade in a small number
of countries.
Following sharp fluctuations in the late 1990s caused by swings in world commodity prices and the 1998 Russian
financial crisis, both merchandise exports and imports expanded considerably in all of the CARs in 2000–2004. By
2004, the overall level of trade—as measured by the ratio of merchandise exports plus imports to gross domestic product
(GDP)—in all the CARs was higher than what one would expect given their size, location, and per capita GDP.
However, a handful of primary commodities (such as crude oil, metals, and cotton fiber) continued to dominate
the CARs’ exports. Indeed, the rise in world prices for these commodities was a major factor that contributed to the
rapid growth of the CARs’ exports in 2000–2004. At the same time, the participation of the CARs in global production
networks (GPNs) and related trade in manufactured products remained very limited.
Furthermore, exports and, to a lesser extent, imports of the CARs were concentrated in a small number of
countries. These are mostly large countries with which the CARs have close historical and cultural links and/or that are
located closely to them (e.g., the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russian Federation, and Turkey). Others are
distant countries to which most exports of primary commodities from the CARs go often to be reexported to other
countries (e.g., Bermuda, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates). Still, others are developed countries from
which the CARs import large quantities of machinery and equipment (e.g., Germany, South Korea, and the US). An
analysis based on the gravity model suggests that there is a significant unrealized potential for trade between the CARs
and most East and South Asian and Western European countries.
Heavy reliance on exports of a few primary commodities makes the CARs vulnerable to abrupt swings in volatile
world prices for these commodities and complicates economic management. Their limited participation in GPNs and
related trade in manufactured products means that the CARs derive relatively little benefits from trade in terms of
attracting foreign direct investment, gaining access to advanced technologies, and fostering sustained economic development.
The concentration of trade in a small number of countries makes the CARs vulnerable to changes in import demand in,
and possible trade sanctions by, those countries.
3. Barriers to Trade in Central Asia
The recent merchandise trade performance of the CARs has been adversely affected by the presence of trade
barriers pertaining to trade policy, transport, and transit systems in the CARs, their trading partners, and transit
countries. Some of these trade barriers (such as additional transport costs and transit times needed for international
shipments to and from the CARs due to their landlocked location and difficult topography) are beyond their control
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while others (e.g., policy barriers created by the CARs and their trading partners) can be reduced by the CARs
through unilateral or collective action.
The CARs had very similar trade policy regimes at the time of their independence, but these have diverged
significantly since then. Today, trade policy regimes in the CARs vary widely from the very liberal in the Kyrgyz
Republic to fairly liberal in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, to quite restrictive in Uzbekistan.
Tariffs are fairly low and uniform in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan has a rather
complex tariff schedule with a large number of tariff bands and a high maximum tariff rate although its nonweighted
average tariff rate is not high. Uzbekistan has a complex tariff schedule and a relatively high nonweighted average tariff
rate. A serious problem with tariffs in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan is that changes in tariff
schedules are rather frequent and unpredictable. Also, there is an escalation of tariffs—i.e., a rise in tariff rates with a
degree of processing—in all the CARs.
In addition to explicit tariffs, some imports to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are subject to implicit
tariffs in the form of taxes levied on imported goods but not on domestically produced goods or have higher rates for
imported goods than for domestically produced goods. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan also impose explicit taxes on exports
of certain commodities.
All the CARs prohibit or license exports and/or imports of certain goods to protect national security, public
health, and environment. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan do the same also to ensure the availability of certain
goods in the domestic market at relatively low prices.
There are significant barriers to trade in Central Asia induced by trade policy of countries outside the region. In
particular, exports of agricultural products from the CARs to developed countries face relatively high tariffs. Large subsidies
that developed countries provide to their farmers further impede exports of agricultural products from the CARs.
Other significant barriers to trade in Central Asia are high transport costs and long and unpredictable transit times for
international shipments to and from the CARs. This is not only due to the landlocked and remote location of the CARs and
their difficult topography but also to deficiencies of the CARs’ transport networks, and high costs and low quality of transport
and logistics services in the region. In addition, there are difficulties with movements of goods and transport equipment across
borders and through the territories of the CARs and neighboring countries. For example, the actual transport costs for
shipments by road from Istanbul, Turkey to the CARs are about 2.0–3.0 times as expensive, while the actual transit time is
1.5–2.0 times as long as those in the “ideal world” (i.e., a world with balanced transport flows, competitive markets for
transport services, smooth border crossing, low transit fees, and no visa problems and unofficial payments).
The costs of these trade barriers for the CARs are quite high. Notably, they have adversely affected the recent
trade performance of the CARs in several ways. First, they have constrained the growth of trade in Central Asia and
deprived the CARs of the benefits of foregone trade. Second, they have hindered the reorientation of trade in Central
Asia from FSU to non-FSU countries. Third, they have limited the participation of the CARs in GPNs and related
trade in manufacture products, and skewed the structure of their exports towards primary commodities.
4. Regionalism and Multilateralism in Central Asia
In an effort to expand trade and closely integrate into the global economy, the CARs have been pursuing both
memberships in RTAs (regionalism) and accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (multilateralism).
Since 1991, they have joined several regional organizations that involve or seek to reach a multilateral RTA. In
addition, they have entered into numerous bilateral RTAs with other member countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States. The Kyrgyz Republic has also joined the WTO while the other CARs are at different stages of
the accession process.
The RTAs involving the CARs generally have a narrow coverage and complex rules of origin and most of them
have remained agreements on paper only. Consequently, their impact on the trade policy regime and the pattern of trade
in the CARs has so far been limited. If fully implemented, however, the concluded and planned RTAs involving the
CARs, such as the customs union of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), may cause considerable trade
diversion and have significant adverse effects on the CARs.
An analysis based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of Kazakhstan suggests that implementing
the EAEC customs union with a rise in Kazakhstan’s external tariffs would substantially slow down the growth of real
GDP in Kazakhstan. The cumulative shortfall in real GDP over ten years would exceed 31% of GDP in the base year.
Implementing the EAEC customs union even with a reduction in Kazakhstan’s external tariffs would slow down the
growth of real GDP. However, its adverse effects on economic growth would be much smaller than in the previous
scenario.
In contrast, the potential benefits of WTO membership for the CARs are considerable. First, accession to the
WTO can help the CARs liberalize trade policy at relatively low costs and expand trade rapidly due to improved access
to markets in a large number of countries that are already WTO members. Second, since many countries with which
CARs “under-trade” (including most developed countries and emerging market economies in East and South Asia)
are WTO members, accession to the WTO can also help the CARs fully realize their bilateral trade potential vis-à-vis
these countries and diversify trade in terms of geographical distribution. Third, WTO membership can help the CARs
reduce their vulnerability to possible protectionist measures by trading partners and make trade liberalization irreversible.
This in turn makes the policy environment more predictable and conducive to trade, investment, and growth. Fourth,
accession to the WTO also strengthens the CARs’ bargaining power in trade negotiations, especially with countries
seeking WTO membership. Finally, WTO accession can help the CARs strengthen their capacity for policy management
and improve the quality of institutions.
WTO membership does not preclude regional cooperation in trade policy. In fact, there are several options for
such cooperation that the CARs can pursue within the multilateral framework. First, the CARs may want to liberalize
trade policy in a coordinated manner and on a nondiscriminatory basis. Second, the CARs that are not yet WTO
members may want to coordinate their negotiating positions in the accession process with each other and with other
countries seeking WTO membership. Third, once they become WTO members, the CARs may want to join issue-
specific coalitions within the WTO, such as the groups of developing countries pressuring for changes in WTO rules on
agriculture and elimination of agricultural subsidies in developed countries.
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The potential benefits of WTO membership for the CARs have increased significantly with the accession of the
PRC in 2001. They will increase further as more of their neighbors (including the Russian Federation) join the
organization. Acceding to the WTO is, however, not enough for the CARs to realize the benefits of WTO membership.
As the experience of the Kyrgyz Republic shows, good transport links with other WTO member countries and easy
transit through neighboring countries are also necessary.
5. Transport Sector in Central Asia
The CARs inherited highly integrated transport networks from the former Soviet Union (FSU), which were
built with little regard for their then administrative borders and mostly oriented towards the Russian Federation. At the
same time, their transport links with non-FSU neighboring countries—such as Afghanistan, PRC, India, Iran, Pakistan,
and Turkey—were poorly developed. Since the break-up of the FSU, the CARs have sought to improve their transport
links with non-FSU countries. Yet, a lack of financial resources and poor coordination of national transport infrastructure
projects have been slowing down progress in integrating their transport networks into international transport networks.
Simultaneously, the CARs have built a number of new roads and railways primarily to avoid transit through a
neighboring country. While these new roads and railways have had certain positive impact on the development of the
CARs that built them, it is not obvious that their construction would have been justifiable if the use of existing transport
networks had not been beset by difficulties with cross-border movements of people, transport equipment, and goods. A
better use of limited financial resources would have been the development of international transport corridors and the
rehabilitation and maintenance of existing networks. The CARs possess extensive transport networks but many of them
are in poor condition and require rehabilitation. Other elements of transport infrastructure—with the exception of air
transport infrastructure in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan—are also underdeveloped and in poor condition.
Although the CARs have made considerable progress in establishing a legal and regulatory framework for the
transport sector since independence, much remains to be done. The existing frameworks are weak and nontransparent.
National transport legislation and regulations of the CARs differ significantly and create serious obstacles to cross-
border and transit traffic.
The availability, quality, and costs of transport services in the CARs compare unfavorably with many other
countries. Lack of competition is one of the main reasons for the low quality and high costs of rail, air, and international
road transport services. Competition is stiff in the market for domestic road transport services. The cost of these services
is relatively low, but the quality is not high either. The availability of multimodal transport operations is limited and the
costs of international transport services for small cargo are relatively high due largely to the underdevelopment of
logistics infrastructure and services.
There have been a number of regional cooperation initiatives aimed at removing the deficiencies of transport
infrastructure and services and facilitating cross-border and transit traffic in the CARs and neighboring countries.
Notably, the CAREC member countries have recently agreed on the Regional Transport Sector Road Map, which
formulates the strategic priorities for regional cooperation in the transport sector and addresses most of the deficiencies
of road and rail transport in Central Asia. The CARs and other CAREC member countries now need to develop and
Executive Summary      xiii
carry out a detailed time-bound action plan to implement the Road Map. They should also consider extending the
Road Map to address deficiencies of air transport in Central Asia.
6. Road Transit Systems in Central Asia
Since the CARS are all landlocked and, in various degrees, serve each other as transit countries, the transit
systems in place in the CARs have a significant effect on international trade in Central Asia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan’s transit systems also affect domestic trade in at least one neighboring CAR.
Indeed, certain aspects of the transit systems in the CARs do impose constraints on cross-border movements of goods by
rail and road. These are, however, not crucial for cross-border movements of goods by rail for which transport-related
factors are a binding constraint. In contrast, inadequacies of the road transit systems impose a binding constraint on
trade in Central Asia.
The main deficiency of the national road transit systems of the CARs is that they cover only one country and do
not provide a “chain guarantee.” Hence, a transport operator undertaking customs transit under the national transit
systems has to submit separate transit documents and provide separate guarantees in the country of origin, the country
of destination, and each of the transit countries. This can be time-consuming and costly. In addition, there are difficulties
in providing a guarantee in any form. In the absence of a guarantee, customs transit under the national transit systems
usually requires convoying which also can increase transport costs and transit time substantially. That is why the variable
costs of the national road transit systems in the CARs are quite high.
The most important international road transit system used in the CARs is the Transport International Routier
(TIR) system—that is, the international transit system based on the TIR Convention. Created more than 50 years ago,
the TIR system has proven to be very effective in facilitating customs transit by road, especially when it involves crossing
multiple borders. However, the fixed costs of the system (i.e., the cost of transport equipment that meets the requirements
of the TIR Convention and the cost of insurance guarantee that the TIR system provides) are too high for most
transport operators from the CARs. Moreover, the benefits of the system are not always realized in the CARs due to
border infrastructure problems, noncompliance by customs, and corruption. Even if the benefits of the TIR transit
system had fully been realized, it would have not been suitable for short-distance customs transit due to its high fixed
costs.
The CARs have been trying to establish regional transit systems that could be used for intraregional customs
transit by road and would be less costly than the TIR and the national road transit systems. To this end, they have
signed numerous transit agreements with each other as well as with other countries. These agreements have, however,
had a very limited effect on customs transit in the CARs for a variety of reasons. Some of them have not entered into
force while those that have entered into force have not been implemented or have not reduced the costs of customs transit
significantly due to an inadequate design.
Consequently, the need remains for the CARs and their neighbors to develop an effective and relatively
inexpensive regional transit system for short-distance customs transit by road. Given the success of the TIR system,
it could serve as a blueprint for the regional transit system. But the design of the TIR system would have to be
modified to reduce its fixed costs. Since negotiating multiparty agreements is relatively difficult, several bilateral
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transit systems could initially be set up as an intermediate step towards the regional transit system. However, these
bilateral transit systems would have to be compatible and similar to the TIR system in order for them to become
stepping stones for the regional transit system.
Parallel to developing the regional transit system, the CARs need to ensure full implementation of the TIR
Convention on their territories. Although the TIR Convention is a multilateral agreement, the CARs could use regional
cooperation mechanisms to put peer pressure on those countries which have signed the Convention but do not fully
adhere to it. They could also use regional cooperation mechanisms to encourage the PRC to join the TIR Convention
as soon as possible.
7. General Equilibrium Analysis of the Effects of Regional Cooperation in Trade Policy, Transport, and
Customs Transit on the Kyrgyz Republic
Quantitative estimates based on a CGE model of the Kyrgyz Republic suggest that the CARs would reap
considerable benefits from regional cooperation in trade policy within the multilateral framework and increased regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit. A reduction in cotton subsidies and a resulting rise in world cotton prices
(that regional cooperation in trade policy within the multilateral framework could bring about) and reductions in transport
costs (resulting from increased regional cooperation in transport and customs transit) would substantially accelerate
economic growth in the Kyrgyz Republic. If world cotton prices rose by 35% in 2006, the cumulative growth of real
GDP in 2006–2015 relative to 2005 would be 33.4% higher than in the baseline scenario. If the estimated reductions
in transport costs due to increased regional cooperation in transport and customs transit took place in 2006, the cumulative
growth of real GDP would be 112.3% higher than in the baseline scenario. If both events occurred in 2006, the
cumulative growth of real GDP would be 150.2% higher than in the baseline scenario. By comparison, a 50% unilateral,
nondiscriminatory, and uniform (across products) reduction in tariffs would speed up the cumulative growth in real
GDP over the decade by a relatively modest 27.6%.
While similar estimates for the other CARs are not yet available, some general qualitative assessments can be
made. In particular, one can expect unilateral nondiscriminatory trade liberalization to have greater positive effects on
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and especially, Uzbekistan because their tariffs are, on the average, higher than
those of the Kyrgyz Republic. Tajikistan is likely to benefit even more than the Kyrgyz Republic from increased regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit. The reason is that high transport costs and long and unpredictable transit
times are a particularly serious trade barrier for Tajikistan. Although the benefits of increased regional cooperation in
transport and customs transit for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are likely to be smaller than those for the
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, one can still expect them to be considerable. Finally, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are
likely to gain more from a reduction in cotton subsidies in developed countries than the Kyrgyz Republic since cotton
accounts for a larger share of their exports and GDP than those of the Kyrgyz Republic.
8. Overall Conclusions
Although the CARs have been able to expand trade considerably in recent years, they derive relatively little
benefits from, and pay relatively high costs for, participation in international trade. This is because their exports are
dominated by a handful of primary commodities; they take very limited part in GPNs and related trade in manufactured
products; and their trade is concentrated in a small number of countries.
Executive Summary      xv
The presence of numerous trade barriers pertaining to trade policy, transport, and transit systems in the CARs,
their trading partners, and transit countries have constrained the growth of trade in the CARs. It has also limited their
participation in GPNs and related trade in manufactured products, skewed the structure of their exports towards
primary commodities, and hindered reorientation of their trade from FSU to non-FSU countries. Hence, regional
cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit can help the CARs increase the gains from participation in
international trade and reduce the associated costs inasmuch as it reduces these trade barriers.
However, regional cooperation in trade policy in the form of preferential trade liberalization under RTAs is
unlikely to do so in itself. The numerous RTAs that the CARs have signed since independence have not been effective
in reducing the barriers to trade in Central Asia in part because many of them have not been implemented. Moreover,
some of them may have significant adverse effects on the CARs if they are fully implemented with their current design.
Therefore, the CARs need to prioritize accession to the WTO and pursue regional cooperation in trade policy within
the multilateral framework. To fully realize the benefits of WTO membership, they also need to improve regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit.
Increased regional cooperation in transport and customs transit would help the CARs reduce transport costs and
make transport times shorter and more predictable for international shipments. This would in turn help the CARs
expand trade, especially with distant countries; take more active part in GPNs and related trade in manufactured
products; and diversify trade in terms of both geographical distribution and commodity composition. Facilitation of
cross-border movements of goods and transport equipment would also help the CARs avoid the construction of new
bypass railways and roads; allocate more resources for the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing transport networks;
their closer integration with international transport networks; and become a land bridge for rapidly expanding trade
between East and South Asia and Europe.
Accordingly, deep regional economic integration that involves not only preferential trade liberalization but also
increased regional cooperation in transport, customs transit, and other areas of trade facilitation can be beneficial for the
CARs. The positive effects of increased regional cooperation in transport and trade facilitation can more than offset the
negative effects of preferential trade liberalization. This is more likely to be the case when preferential trade liberalization
is accompanied by broad-based trade liberalization resulting in fairly low nonpreferential policy barriers to trade.
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1
Introduction
1.1 Benefits of International Trade
International trade generally improves social welfare
and stimulates economic growth.1 Trade enables countries
to specialize in line with their comparative advantages and
achieve economies of scale that would not be possible
without specialization. This improves the allocation of
resources and social welfare in the short to medium term.
Trade also improves social welfare in the short to medium
term by increasing the variety and improving the quality of
goods available to consumers. In the medium to long term,
trade leads to higher rates of economic growth and sustained
improvements in social welfare by enhancing competition,
disciplining policy makers, and increasing investment in
both physical and human capital. In developing countries,
trade fosters economic growth and improves social welfare
also by helping them attract foreign direct investment (FDI)
and acquire modern technologies available in developed
countries through imports, FDI inflows, and participation
in global production networks (GPNs).2 Economic growth
and improvements in social welfare in turn reduce poverty
inasmuch as they raise income and improve the welfare of
the poor and increase resources available for social security,
primary health care, education, water supply, and other
basic services. Accordingly, openness to international trade
is widely regarded as a necessary, albeit not sufficient,
condition for any country—particularly a small one—to
achieve sustainable economic development.
There are, however, three caveats to this general
rule. First, participation in international trade has certain
costs. Most notably, it makes a country vulnerable to
fluctuations in world prices and possible protectionist
measures by trading partners. This vulnerability is
1 Theoretically, the impact of trade on social welfare is always positive in the absence of market failures and policy-induced
distortions, but may or may not be negative in the presence of market failures or policy-induced distortions (see, for example,
Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan [1998]). Likewise, there are theoretical models in which the impact of trade on economic
growth is positive and models in which it is negative. Empirically, a large body of evidence suggests that trade stimulates
economic growth, although there are several conceptual and technical difficulties in establishing a link between trade and
growth. See Berg and Kruger (2003) and Winters (2004) for a survey of the recent empirical literature on the relationship
between trade and economic growth.
2 Participation in global production networks (GPNs) requires participation in international trade. It also increases the gains from
trade for developing countries by enabling them to specialize in the labor-intensive stages of manufacturing processes (which,
overall, might be technology or capital intensive) and helping them gain better access to markets in developed countries,
attract foreign direct investment (FDI), acquire modern technologies, boost manufactured exports, and climb the value-added
ladder. At the same time, participation in GPNs poses certain risks for developing countries. See ADB (2003) and Memedovic
(2004) for a more detailed discussion of opportunities and challenges GPNs represent for developing countries.
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particularly high when a country’s exports and/or imports
are dominated by primary commodities, the prices of which
tend to be more volatile than those for manufactured
products, and when its trade is concentrated in a small
number of large trading partners, for which trade with the
country concerned is relatively insignificant.
Second, in the presence of market failures and
policy-induced distortions, trade may have an adverse
impact on social welfare and economic growth. For example,
trade between two countries generated by imposing artificial
specialization on them with little regard for their comparative
advantages—as was the case with inter-republican trade
in the former Soviet Union (FSU)—can worsen social
welfare and hinder economic growth in both countries.
Exports of products that are kept competitive in
international markets through neglect of negative effects of
their production on environment, use of forced cheap labor
or mandatory procurement at low domestic prices—as is
the case with cotton in some FSU countries—are likely to
have a negative impact on social welfare in the exporting
country. Similarly, an increase in the volume of exports
through a reduction in the export price may result in
“immiserizing growth,” that is, output growth accompanied
by a worsening of social welfare.3 If there is a so-called
“infant” industry—i.e., an industry that is not competitive
at present but will become such if protected from foreign
competition for a certain period—temporary protection of
this industry from foreign competition may improve social
welfare compared with free trade.4
Third, to be able to participate in and benefit from
international trade, a countr y must have policies,
institutions, and infrastructure that support and promote
trade. These include liberal trade policy, sound
macroeconomic and competition policies, favorable foreign
exchange and tax regimes, rule of law, well-functioning
financial and marketing institutions, good transport and
communication infrastructure, efficient transport and
logistics services, and customs administration and border
management that facilitate, rather than obstruct, trade.5
Adopting some of the trade-conducive policies is, however,
not costless; building trade-supporting institutions is a
relatively long process; and developing good infrastructure
requires substantial financial resources. Notably, liberalizing
trade policy leads to painful reallocation of resources with
output declines, lower wages, and layoffs in previously
protected import-competing sectors. This may increase
poverty in the short term, depending on which sectors the
poor are mostly employed in, how these sectors are affected
by trade liberalization and several other factors.6 In addition,
trade liberalization usually increases imports more than
exports in the short term. This creates/increases the trade
deficit and often necessitates a depreciation of the real
exchange rate with negative consequences for inflation,
macroeconomic stability, output growth, and poverty.7
3 Bhagwati (1968).
4 It is worth noting, however, that protecting an “infant” industry from foreign competition improves social welfare compared with
free trade only under certain circumstances. And even when it does so, it is a second-best policy intervention compared with
targeted subsidization aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of the “infant” industry. Furthermore, for “infant” industry
protection to improve social welfare compared with free trade, it must be set at the correct level for the correct period and
applied only to those industries that need temporary protection to become competitive. This is almost impossible to do in
practice, which largely explains the failure of import-substitution strategies in many countries. Baldwin (1969)  shows that trade
policy is not an appropriate tool to support an “infant” industry. Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978, 1995, and 1997), among
others, discuss reasons for the failure of import substitution strategies.
5 See World Trade Organization (WTO) (2004) for a discussion of the relationship between international trade, on the one hand, and
macroeconomic policies, infrastructure, market structure, and institutions, on the other; and World Bank (2006a) for an analysis
of the effects of the trade regime, trade facilitation infrastructure and institutions, domestic competition, and governance in the
group of 27 countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union on their recent trade performance.
6 See Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004) for a discussion of channels through which trade liberalization affects the poor and
for a survey of evidence on the impact of trade liberalization on poverty.
7 Using panel data and times series/cross section analysis for a sample of 22 developing countries, Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall
(2004) find that trade liberalization stimulates export growth but raises import growth more, leading to a worsening of the
balance of trade and the balance of payments.
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1.2 Role of Regional Cooperation in Trade Policy,
Transport, and Customs Transit in Increasing




Regional economic cooperation can help countries 
adopt policies, build institutions, and develop infrastructure 
they need to expand trade. It can also help increase the gains 
from participation in international trade and reduce the 
associated costs. In particular, regional cooperation in trade 
policy in the form of reciprocal preferential trade liberalization 
under a regional trade agreement (RTA) can help the 
participating countries liberalize trade policy at relatively low 
costs, reduce the risk of possible protectionist measures by 
trading partners, boost intra-regional trade, and overcome 
domestic political resistance to broader trade liberalization. 
Insofar as it leads to broad-based trade liberalization in 
individual countries, an RTA contributes to multilateral trade 
liberalization and complements the multilateral trading system 
that the World Trade Organization (WTO) represents. 
However, an RTA not only creates trade between 
member countries but also diverts trade between member and 
nonmember countries. Consequently, its net effect on social 
welfare in member countries and the world as a whole is 
theoretically ambiguous. Moreover, an RTA can give rise to 
vested interests in partial trade liberalization, which will oppose 
broader trade liberalization and make it politically more difficult 
to carry out. Because of its discriminatory nature, an RTA 
can also weaken the multilateral trading system, which is based 
on the principle of nondiscrimination. Whether a particular 
RTA improves or worsens social welfare, facilitates or hinders 
broad-based trade liberalization, and complements or weakens 
the multilateral trading system depends on a number of factors, 
including the design of the RTA and the context in which it is 
implemented (see Box 1.1). 
Yet, regional cooperation in trade policy need not 
involve an RTA. Instead, it can focus on a policy dialogue 
aimed at promoting nondiscriminatory unilateral trade 
liberalization—as has been the case with the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC)—or coordination of 
positions in multilateral trade negotiations—as is being done 
by the group of 20 developing countries (referred to as G- 
20) in the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations under the auspices of the WTO. Such forms of 
regional cooperation in trade policy can help reduce policy- 
induced trade barriers and distortions not only in the 
participating countries but also in their nonparticipating 
trading partners. 
Other important areas in which regional economic 
cooperation can help countries expand trade, increase the 
gains from participation in trade and reduce the associated 
costs are transport and customs transit. Regional cooperation 
in these areas in the form of coordinated development and 
closer integration of national transport networks with each 
other and with international networks, reciprocal liberalization 
of trade in transport services, harmonization of transport 
regulations, facilitation of customs transit, etc. can substantially 
reduce transport costs, make transit times shorter and more 
predictable and boost not only intra-regional, but also inter- 
8 Here and in the rest of the report, the term “regional cooperation” refers to coordinated or joint actions by a group of countries, 
which are not necessarily located in the same geographical region. “Trade policy” refers to taxes as well as quantitative and 
administrative restrictions directly aimed at affecting levels, commodity composition, and/or geographical distribution of trade. 
These include tariffs and other taxes on imports, export taxes and subsidies, quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, 
restrictions on access to foreign exchange for imports, and antidumping measures. Taxes and restrictions (such as taxes on 
domestic consumption that are equally levied on both imported and domestically produced goods and restrictions on domestic 
distribution of exportable and imported goods) the primary objective of which is not to affect trade are not considered as instruments 
of trade policy though they may affect trade. “Transport” refers to transport infrastructure and services as well as legal and 
regulatory framework for the transport sector. “Customs transit” refers to transportation of goods without paying duties and taxes 
due on domestic consumption. A distinction is made between external and internal customs transit. “External customs transit” 
refers to transportation of goods through a transit country. “Internal customs transit” refers to transportation of goods from the 
point of customs clearance to the point of border crossing in the exporting country or from the point of border crossing to the point 
of customs clearance in the importing country. A set of rules and procedures under which customs transit is carried out is 
referred to as a “transit system.” 
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Box 1.1: Regional Trade Agreements
A regional trade agreement (RTA) is an agreement among several countries (not necessarily belonging to the same
geographical region), whereby they give each other trade preferences on a reciprocal basis. An RTA can be bilateral (involving
two countries) or multilateral (involving more than two countries). Regional integration arrangements involving an RTA are
commonly divided into the following five basic categories according to the degree of integration they provide:
1. A Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), whereby the member countries lower, but not fully eliminate, policy barriers
to trade with other member countries;
2. A Free Trade Area (FTA), in which member countries fully eliminate policy barriers to trade with other member
countries, but are free to maintain different policy barriers to trade with nonmember countries;
3. A Customs Union, in which member countries fully eliminate policy barriers to trade with other member countries
and adopt common tariffs on imports from nonmember countries;9
4. A Common Market, in which member countries set up a customs union and remove policy barriers to movements
of factors of production, including labor and capital; and
5. An Economic Union, in which member countries set up a common market, adopt a single currency, and conduct
common macroeconomic policies.
The greater the degree of integration an RTA provides, the more difficult it is to negotiate. In particular, custom unions
are more difficult to negotiate than PTAs and FTAs because a customs union requires agreements on common external
tariffs and on how tariff revenue is to be divided among the members. PTAs and FTAs do not require such agreements, but
must be supported by rules of origin to prevent deflection of trade, i.e., the routing of imports from a nonmember country to
a member country through another member country, which has lower tariffs on imports from the nonmember country.
Three important issues concerning an RTA are:
(i) whether it improves or worsens social welfare in the member countries and the world as a whole;
(ii) whether it facilitates or hinders broad-based trade liberalization in the member countries; and
(iii) whether it is a “building block” or a “stumbling block” of the multilateral trading system.10
As first pointed out by Viner (1950) in the case of a custom union, the net effect on an RTA on social welfare in the
member countries and the world at large is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, an RTA creates trade between
member countries by displacing relatively inefficient production in one member country by more efficient imports from
another member country. This improves social welfare in both member countries and has no impact on social welfare in
nonmember countries. On the other hand, an RTA is likely to divert trade between member and nonmember countries by
displacing relatively efficient imports from a nonmember country by less efficient imports from a member country. This
worsens social welfare in the importing member country and the nonmember country imports from which are displaced.
Therefore, with competitive markets and other things being equal, preferential trade liberalization under an RTA is inferior to
nondiscriminatory broad-based trade liberalization, at least as far is its effect on social welfare is concerned.
The net effect of an RTA on the political feasibility of broad-based trade liberalization in the member countries is also
theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, an RTA can help a member country liberalize trade policy at relatively low costs
and overcome domestic political resistance to broad-based trade liberalization by gaining better access to markets in the
other member countries (in return for giving them better access to its markets) and liberalizing trade policy gradually. On the
other hand, an RTA can give rise to vested interests in partial trade liberalization that will oppose broad-based trade liberalization
and make it politically more difficult to carry out.
Despite their discriminatory nature, RTAs are legal under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Article XXIV of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permits free trade areas and customs unions in merchandise trade. Article V of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services permits RTAs in services. The 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favorable
Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (“Enabling Clause”) allows for the special treatment of
9 In practice, countries rarely fully eliminate policy barriers to trade even within free trade areas and Customs Unions. They usually
maintain policy barriers to trade in certain products.
10 The terms “building blocks” and “stumbling blocks” are due to Bhagwati (1991).
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developing countries. RTAs are, however, contrary to the principle of nondiscrimination, which is fundamental to the multilateral
trading system that the WTO represents. The principle requires that countries do not discriminate between their trading partners.
The ambiguity of the net effect of an RTA on social welfare and the political feasibility of broad-based trade liberalization
in the member countries and the contradiction between the discriminatory nature of an RTA and the principle of
nondiscrimination on which the multilateral trading system is based, have led to a big debate in economics literature.
Proponents of RTAs argue that RTAs generally improve social welfare, facilitate broad-based trade liberalization, and complement
the multilateral trading system.11 Opponents of RTAs argue that RTAs generally worsen social welfare, hinder broad-based
trade liberalization, and undermine the multilateral trading system.12
International experience with RTAs suggests that a particular RTA is more likely to improve (rather than worsen) social
welfare, facilitate (rather than hinder) broad-based trade liberalization, and complement (rather than weaken) the multilateral
trading system under the following conditions:·
• The member countries are not involved in many, possibly, overlapping and inconsistent RTAs;·
• The RTA has a broad product coverage, and is effectively implemented and open to new members; ·
• Preferential trade liberalization under the RTA is undertaken in conjunction with comprehensive structural reforms
aimed at promoting trade and enhancing the competitiveness of the economy, and is accompanied by broad-based
trade liberalization resulting in fairly low nonpreferential policy barriers to trade;
• The rules of origin are nonrestrictive if the RTA is a PTA or an FTA and, especially, if member countries are involved
in several such RTAs; and
• Preferential trade liberalization under the RTA is part of efforts by the member countries to lower not only policy-related
but also institutional, technical, and other barriers to intra-regional trade and achieve deep regional economic integration.
Sources: Devlin and Giordano (2004), Pal (2004), Schiff and Winters (2003), World Bank (2005a), and the authors.
regional trade.13 In doing so, regional cooperation in
transport and customs transit can help the participating
countries diversify their trade in terms of geographical
distribution. It can also help the countries attract FDI,
increase their participation in GPNs and related trade in
manufactured products, and diversify their exports in terms
of commodity composition.
Regional cooperation in transport and customs
transit aimed at reducing trade costs is particularly
important for landlocked countries. This is because
landlocked countries heavily rely on transportation by land
through the territories of neighboring countries for
international trade.14 Poor transport infrastructure and
restrictive transport and customs transit regulations in
neighboring countries can increase transport costs
considerably and make transit times long and unpredictable
for landlocked countries. Goods can lose a substantial
proportion of their value during transportation if transit times
are long.15 This is especially true of perishable goods (such
11 See, for example, Ethier (1998), Krugman (1991), and Summers (1991).
12 See, for example, Bhagwati (1995), Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), Krishna (1998), Krueger (1993), Levy (1997), and Panagariya
(1996).
13 Nordas and Piermartini (2004) conclude that the quality of infrastructure in two countries has a significant and relatively large
impact on their bilateral trade. Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2003) find that raising the quality of seaport and airport infrastructure
and improving the customs environment in the below-average Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member countries to
the APEC average would increase intra-APEC trade by about US$128 billion or 11.5%. World Bank (2006a) estimates that if the
group of 16 countries of Eastern Europe and the FSU improve their customs regimes and port efficiency halfway to the average
of the EU-15 (i.e., the 15 countries that comprised the European Union until its expansion in 2004), their trade with each other
would increase by almost US$45 billion and trade with the rest of the world would expand by about US$81 billion.
14 See Faye et.al (2004) and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific  (UN ESCAP) (2003) for a
discussion of difficulties that landlocked countries face in accessing world markets and integrating into the global economy.
15 Hummels (2001) finds that each day in travel is worth an average of 0.8% of the value of a product for United States (US) trade in
manufactured products.
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as fresh fruits and vegetables) or those subject to frequent
changes in consumer preferences (such as high fashion
apparel). Unpredictable transit times necessitate larger
precautionary inventory holdings and thus increase costs
of production.16 Consequently, unpredictable transit times
preclude “just-in-time” business practices, which reduce
costs of production by minimizing inventory holdings and
require timely delivery.
High transport costs and long and unpredictable
transit times undermine competitiveness of exports of
landlocked countries in world markets, make their imports
more expensive and limit their participation in
international trade. Landlocked countries find it
particularly difficult to export time-sensitive products, such
as perishable goods, to compete with coastal countries in
manufactured export activities, where imported inputs
account for a large proportion of the value of output and
profit margins are small, and to participate in GPNs,
which often employ “just-in-time” business practices.17
In turn, small volumes of trade make it more difficult for
landlocked countries to exploit economies of scale in
transport and reduce transport costs. Many developing
landlocked countries are, therefore, trapped in the vicious
cycle of small trade volumes keeping transport costs high
and high transport costs constraining trade, economic
growth, and development.18 Regional cooperation in
transport and customs transit can help landlocked
countries break this vicious cycle and overcome the
disadvantage of their location.19
Moreover, liberalization of trade policy and regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit are closely
interlinked for landlocked countries. Progress in any of these
areas will have a limited positive impact on trade if there is
no progress in the others. For example, reciprocal trade
liberalization by a landlocked country and its nonadjacent
trading partner will not boost their bilateral trade much if
movements of transport equipment and goods through
connecting countries remain difficult or impossible due to
deficiencies of transport infrastructure or restrictive transit
systems in those countries. Likewise, improvements in
transport infrastructure and transit systems in neighboring
countries will do little to integrate a landlocked country
into the international trading system if its trade policy
remains restrictive. If combined, however, regional
cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit
can make a major contribution to the expansion of trade
and economic development in landlocked countries (see
Figure 1.1).
16 Gaush and Kogan (2001) find that inventory holdings in the manufacturing sector in developing countries are two to five times
higher than in the US, and estimate that cutting inventory levels in half would reduce the unit cost of production by over 20%.
17 Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2006) find that, on average, each additional day spent on moving containerized products from a
factory gate to a ship reduces trade by at least 1%. Delays have an even greater impact on exports by developing countries and
exports of time-sensitive goods, such as perishable agricultural products. In particular, a one-day delay reduces a country’s
relative exports of time-sensitive to time-insensitive agricultural products by 7%. Hummels (2001) estimates that each additional
day in ocean transit reduces the probability that a country will export to the US by 1.0% for all products and 1.5% for manufactured
products. Limao and Venables (2001) find that a representative landlocked country has transport costs 46–55% higher and
trade volumes about 60% lower than a representative coastal country.
18 Radelet and Sachs (1998) find a strong relationship between shipping costs and economic growth. Their results imply that
doubling shipping costs is associated with slower annual growth of more than 0.5%. Other things being equal, a landlocked
country with shipping costs 50% higher than a similar coastal country grows at a rate 0.3% lower than the coastal country.
Overman, Redding, and Venables (2001) find that access to foreign markets [which landlocked countries have difficulties with]
explains some 35% percent of cross-country variation in per capita income. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
(2004) classifies 12 out of 30 developing landlocked countries as “low human development,” with 9 of the 14 countries with
the lowest human development index being landlocked.
19 Limao and Venables (2001) estimate that, if a representative landlocked country and its neighbors all improve their infrastructure—
as measured by the lengths of roads, paved roads and rail per square kilometer of the country area, and the length of telephone
lines per person—from the median level to the level of the 75% percentile in the corresponding group, the transport cost
penalty for the landlocked country falls from 46–55% to 31–33%. APEC (2002) finds that customs-related trade facilitation
would reduce trade transactions costs by 2.9–7.4% in industrialized APEC economies, 5.3–10.7% in newly industrialized APEC
economies, and 6.6–14.8% in industrializing APEC economies.
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1.3 Purpose, Scope, Approach, and Structure of
the Report
This report seeks to show how Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan—five member countries of the Central Asia
Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program
referred to in the report as the Central Asian republics
(CARs)—can increase the gains from participation in
international trade and reduce the associated costs through
regional cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs
transit among themselves and with other countries—in
particular, the other CAREC member countries.20 The
CARs are all relatively small economies and need to
promote trade and closely integrate into the international
trading system to achieve sustainable economic development
(see Table 1.1). It is this consideration that partly motivated
the CARs to conclude numerous RTAs and seek new
20 The other member countries of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program are Afghanistan,  People’s
Republic of China (PRC), and Mongolia. More information about the CAREC Program can be found at http://www.adb.org/carec/
.
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RTAs among themselves and with other countries. As
noted above, involvement in RTAs can improve or worsen
social welfare in the CARs. Further, it can help the CARs
closely integrate into the international trading system or
prevent them from doing so. Despite the importance of
the issue, few studies analyze the consequences for
CARs of involvement in an existing RTA or a proposed
new RTA.21
Unlike regional cooperation in trade policy, regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit is
unambiguously beneficial for the CARs. Moreover, it is
essential if the CARs are to overcome disadvantages and
harness advantages of their location, fully integrate into
the international trading system, and achieve sustainable
development. On the one hand, the CARs are all
landlocked and situated far from seaports and developed
countries. This constrains their trade with developed and
other distant countries. On the other hand, the CARs are
located at the crossroads between East and South Asia
and Europe and close to some of the world’s largest and
fastest growing emerging markets, such as the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), India, and Russian Federation.
Furthermore, the CARs have inherited highly integrated
transport networks from the FSU, which crisscross their
national borders but are not yet fully integrated into
international transport networks. Moreover, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan each have exclaves in
the territory of the other two.22 Movements of people,
transport equipment, and goods from the exclaves to the
other parts of the country they belong to inevitably involve
transit through another country. In varying degrees, the
CARs also serve each other as transit countries in
international trade.
Regional cooperation in transport and customs transit
is needed for the CARs to utilize their existing transport
networks effectively and closely integrate them with
21 To our knowledge, the only published study on the subject is Tumbarello (2005), which analyzes how the implementation of the
customs union of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) (then consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian
Federation, and Tajikistan) would affect the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, and Tajikistan to the WTO.
Using a partial equilibrium analysis, it also estimates the welfare effects of the implementation of the customs union before
and after the accession to the WTO.
22 Exclave or enclave is a piece of the territory of one country within the territory of another country. The piece is an exclave for the
country to which it belongs and an enclave for the country within which it is located.
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international transport networks. Combined with measures
to gain better access to their markets, regional cooperation
in transport and customs transit would enable the CARs to
take advantage of rapid economic growth and concomitant
increases in import demand in the neighboring countries
and boost exports to those countries. It would also help the
CARs expand trade with more distant countries and
become, once again, a land-bridge for trade between East
and South Asia and Europe, which the region used to be
during the period of the Silk Road. Moreover, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan need to cooperate
with each other in transport and customs transit to facilitate
movements of people, transport equipment and goods
between their exclaves and the other parts of the country.
A number of recent studies have looked into trade
barriers pertaining to transport, customs administration and
border management in CARs and neighboring countries
and their effects on trade in the region. Raballand, Kunth,
and Auty (2005) examine the impact of transport costs on
trade between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and the
European Union, on the other. World Bank has
commissioned audits of trade and transport facilitation in
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
and prepared a Tajikistan trade diagnostic study and a
policy note on trade and transport facilitation in
Azerbaijan.23 World Bank has also prepared a report on
trade and transport facilitation in Central Asia, which
analyzes land transport, customs operations, and border
management in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and their impact on trade
and transport facilitation in the region.24 World Bank
(2006a) discusses issues in the transport sector and trade
facilitation in a group of 27 countries of Eastern Europe
and the FSU, including the CARs, and estimates potential
gains from the strengthening of capacity for trade facilitation
in a subgroup of these countries. These studies, however,
do not analyze how regional cooperation can help the
CARs reduce trade barriers relating to transport and
customs transit—two areas in which regional cooperation
is crucial for trade and transport facilitation in the CARs.
This report differs from the other studies on regional
economic cooperation in Central Asia and trade and
transport facilitation in CARs on two essential aspects.
First, it treats regional cooperation in Central Asia in the
areas of trade policy, transport, and customs transit in a
holistic manner, taking into account the importance of and
the synergy between regional cooperation in these areas for
the CARs.25 Second, the report attempts to quantify the
costs of the lack of cooperation and the potential benefits of
improved regional cooperation in the three areas for the
CARs. At the same time, the report builds on and, to
some extent, synthesizes earlier studies on this and related
topics conducted or commissioned by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) as part of its efforts to promote
regional economic cooperation in Central Asia.
Some of the findings of the ADB study on Central
Asia regional cooperation in trade, transport, and transit
presented in this report are also presented in the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2005). The
report, therefore, overlaps with UNDP (2005) to a certain
extent. At the same time, it adds depth, detail, and new
data to UNDP (2005) with respect to regional cooperation
in trade policy, transport, and customs transit. In particular,
it provides a more in-depth analysis of the recent
merchandise trade performance of the CARs and presents
more rigorous estimates of the effects of  regional cooperation
in these areas on the Kyrgyz Republic. Like UNDP
(2005), the report is intended to inform policymakers in
23 NEA Transport Research and Training (2003a, 2003b, 2003c, and 2003d) and World Bank (2003 and 2006b).
24 World Bank (2005b).
25 The report does not, however, discuss other areas of policy management, institutional building, and infrastructure development
(such as macroeconomic management, financial sector reform, and development of communication infrastructure) that are
also essential for promoting trade in Central Asia and where there is room and need for regional economic cooperation. UNDP
(2005) discusses regional cooperation in some of these areas.
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the region and contribute to the ongoing dialogue on regional
economic cooperation in Central Asia.
The rest of the report is organized as follows. Chapter
2 reviews the recent trade performance of the CARs in
terms of levels, commodity composition, and geographical
distribution of merchandise exports and imports. Chapter
3 identifies the more important barriers to trade in Central
Asia that can potentially be reduced through regional
cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit.26
It also highlights the costs of these trade barriers, including
their negative effects on the recent trade performance of
the CARs. Chapter 4 reviews RTAs involving CARs and
assesses their effects on the CARs. In particular, it presents
estimates of the effects of implementing the customs union
of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) on
Kazakhstan, based on Kazakhstan’s computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model. The chapter then reviews the
status of the CARs’ accession to the WTO and discusses
the benefits and costs of WTO membership for the CARs
and options for regional cooperation in trade policy that
the CARs can pursue within the multilateral framework.
Chapter 5 reviews the transport sector in Central Asia,
identifies inadequacies of transport infrastructure, the legal
and regulatory framework for the transport sector, and
transport and logistics services in the CARs. It then discusses
the benefits of regional cooperation in transport for the
CARs and reviews recent initiatives in this area. Chapter
6 reviews the road transit systems in place in the CARs;
identifies their inadequacies; and discusses how the CARs
can facilitate customs transit through regional cooperation in
this area among themselves and with neighboring countries.
Chapter 7 presents estimates of the effects of regional
cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit
on the Kyrgyz Republic, based on its CGE model. Chapter
8 summarizes key messages of the report and presents its
recommendations.
26 Henceforth in the report, Central Asia refers to the region comprised of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan.





When they were a part of the FSU, the CARs
traded extensively with other FSU countries but little with
the rest of the world. Moreover, their trade with other FSU
countries was directed by central planners and conducted
at administered prices. It therefore contributed little to
improving social welfare and fostering sustainable economic
growth in the CARs and other FSU countries. Following
the breakup of the FSU in 1991, the CARs embarked on
transition from a centrally planned to a market-based
economy. As part of this process, they started introducing
market-based principles in trade with FSU countries and
opening up to trade with non-FSU countries. Their trade
levels declined sharply in the early 1990s, reflecting the
breakdown of trade links and payment mechanisms among
the FSU countries and difficulties in engaging in trade
with non-FSU countries. Since then, the CARs have made
considerable progress in expanding market-based trade with
both FSU and non-FSU countries and integrating into
the global economy.
This chapter reviews the trade performance of the
CARs in 2000–2004 in terms of levels, commodity
composition, and geographical distribution of merchandise
exports and imports.1 While doing so, the chapter compares
the trade performance of the CARs with that of the PRC
and Mongolia, other two CAREC member countries, as
appropriate.2 The chapter also compares actual trade in
the CARs with estimated potential trade in terms of the
overall level of trade and bilateral trade between the CARs
and their selected trading partners.
2.1 Levels of Trade
Following sharp fluctuations in the late 1990s caused
by swings in world commodity prices and the 1998 Russian
financial crisis, absolute levels of trade rose considerably in
all of the CARs in 2000–2004 (see Tables A1.1–A1.2
in Appendix 1). In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, exports
grew at an impressive 289% and 242%, respectively, in
2000–2004, boosted by an increase in the volume of oil
exports and a rise in world oil prices. Imports soared by
238% and 250%, respectively, driven by an increase in
imports of capital goods for oil sector development. In the
Kyrgyz Republic, exports grew by 58% due largely to an
increase in the volume of gold exports, a rise in the world
price of gold and reexports of kerosene for the refueling of
foreign military aircraft on the territory of the country.
Imports grew by 57%, with increases in imports of a wide
1 Preliminary data suggest that the merchandise trade performance of the Central Asian republics (CARs) in 2005 was similar to that
in 2000–2004.
2 Comparisons with Afghanistan, another member country of the CAREC Program, are not made because of the lack of reliable trade
statistics on Afghanistan.
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range of products. In Tajikistan, exports grew by 33% mostly
on account of an increase in the volumes of aluminum and
cotton exports and a rise in world prices for these
commodities. Imports grew by 107%, driven by an
expansion of imports of capital goods. In Uzbekistan,
exports continued to decline in 2000–2002, but rebounded
in 2003 and 2004, supported by devaluation of the national
currency, a rise in world commodity prices, and an
expansion of exports of energy products and transportation
equipment. Imports also increased substantially in 2003
and 2004, reflecting the introduction of current account
convertibility in late 2003 and significant increases in
imports of capital goods for state-supported investment
projects. In 2000–2004, exports grew by 46% while
imports grew by 19%.
Since the growth of exports and imports outpaced
the growth of GDP, the ratio of exports plus imports to
GDP at current prices—a relative overall level of trade
and a widely used measure of openness to international
trade—rose considerably in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
(see Figure 2.1). It more than doubled in Uzbekistan due
to a combination of an increase in exports and imports and
a decline in GDP in US dollars resulting from a devaluation
of the national currency. In contrast, the ratio fell slightly in
the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, as GDP in US dollars
increased more than the sum of exports and imports in
these countries. Nonetheless, Tajikistan remained the most
open among the CARs by this criterion.
2.2 Commodity Composition of Trade
In terms of commodity composition, the CARs’
exports remained highly concentrated in a handful of
primary commodities (see Tables A1.3–A1.22 in
Appendix 1). Crude oil accounted for 62.7% of
Azerbaijan’s exports in 2004, up from 42.6% in 1999
(see Figure 2.2). Likewise, the share of crude oil in
Kazakhstan’s exports rose to 56.8% in 2004 from 39.3%
in 1999. Gold and cotton fiber comprised 46.2% of the
Kyrgyz Republic’s exports in 2004, compared with 45.4%
in 1999. The combined share of aluminum and cotton
fiber in Tajikistan’s exports rose to 80.3% in 2004 from
57.4% in 1999. Although Uzbekistan has actively been
trying to promote exports of manufactured products,
primary commodities continued to dominate its exports.
Gold, cotton fiber, and natural gas made up 64.1% of its
exports in 2004, only slightly down from 67.7% in 1999.
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Indeed, the rise in world prices for primary
commodities was a major factor that contributed to the rapid
growth of exports in the CARs in 2000–2004. It is
estimated that 128 percentage points of the 289% increase
in Azerbaijan’s exports and 102 percentage points of the
242% increase in Kazakhstan’s exports were due to the
rise in world prices for crude oil; 20 percentage points of
the 58% increase in the Kyrgyz Republic’s exports were
due to the rise in world prices for gold; 17 percentage points
of the 33% increase in Tajikistan’s exports were due to the
rise in world prices for aluminum and cotton fiber; and 18
percentage points of the 46% increase in Uzbekistan’s exports
were due to the rise in world prices for gold and cotton fiber.
On the import side, machinery and equipment made
up a significant proportion of imports in all of the CARs.
This is especially true of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan—
imports of which are dominated by capital goods for oil
sector development—and Uzbekistan whose imports are
dominated by capital goods for state-supported investment
projects. Another major item in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz
Republic, and Tajikistan’s imports is energy resources.
Azerbaijan considerably increased imports of natural gas
and electricity in 2000–2004, while the Kyrgyz Republic
started importing large quantities of kerosene for refueling
of foreign military aircraft on its territory. Consequently,
the share of energy resources in imports of the two countries
rose substantially in 2000–2004. In contrast, Tajikistan
was able to reduce imports of energy resources in both
absolute and relative terms due to the expansion of the
domestic production of natural gas and the increased use
of domestically produced electricity. Mineral and chemical
products remained major items in the Kyrgyz Republic
and Tajikistan’s imports, even though Tajikistan sharply
reduced imports of mineral products in 2000–2004.
At the same time, the participation of the CARs in
GPNs and related international trade in manufactured
products remained very limited. One indication of this is
the relatively low degree of involvement of the CARs in
intra-industry trade. Figure 2.3 presents the Grubel-Lloyd
index for selected CAREC member countries.3 It indicates
that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and
Tajikistan were involved in intra-industry trade to a much
lesser degree than the PRC in 2000–2004. The degree
of participation of the CARs in intra-industry trade was
relatively high for resource-based, unskilled labor-
intensive products, but low for skilled-labor and
technology-intensive products.
2.3 Geographical Distribution of Trade
With respect to the geographical distribution of
trade, exports and, to a lesser extent, imports of the CARs
were concentrated in a few countries (see Table 2.1). These
are mostly large countries with which the CARs have close
historical and cultural links and/or that are located closely
to them (e.g., the PRC, Russian Federation, and Turkey).
Others are distant countries to which most exports of
primary commodities from the CARs go often to be
reexported to other countries (e.g., Bermuda, Switzerland,
and United Arab Emirates). Still, others are developed
countries from which the CARs import large quantities of
machinery and equipment (e.g., Germany, South Korea,
and US). It is worth noting that the Russian Federation
remains both a major export and import market for all of
the CARs, and the PRC became an important trading
partner for most of them.
The share of the CIS in exports continued to decline
in the CARs in 2000–2004 though the value of exports to
3 The Grubel-Lloyd Index measures the extent of intra-industry trade in a particular industry or an economy as a whole. The
Grubel-Lloyd Index, I, for industry k is equal to:
( )[ ] %1001 ∗+−−= mxmx kkkkI
where xk and mk are exports and imports, respectively, by industry k. The Grubel-Lloyd Index for an economy, as a whole, is an
arithmetic average of the index for individual sectors weighted by their share in the economy’s total trade. The index ranges
from 0% to 100%, with 0% meaning no intra-industry trade and 100% meaning maximum intra-industry trade (Grubel and
Lloyd, 1975).
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the other CIS counties increased substantially (see Tables
A1.23–A1.42 in Appendix 1). At the same time, imports
from the other CIS countries increased in both absolute
and relative terms in all the CARs with the exception of
Tajikistan whose imports from other CIS countries
increased in absolute terms but declined as a proportion
of total imports. The reason is that the devaluation of the
Russian ruble and the national currencies of many other
CIS countries in 1998–1999 made exports to non-CIS
countries more profitable and imports from the CIS
countries cheaper. Accordingly, the share of the CIS in
the total exports of the CARs fell from 28.5% in 1999 to
21.6% in 2004, while its share in the total imports rose
from 39.2% to 46.4%.
Intra-regional trade among the CARs remained
relatively small. Although it increased in absolute terms
from US$1.6 billion in 1999 to US$3.4 billion in 2004,
its share in total trade of the CARs fell from 8.4% to 6.6%.4
Intra-regional trade is quite important for the Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan,
but rather insignificant for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
Trade between state-owned companies often conducted
under intergovernmental agreements accounts for a
significant proportion of intra-regional trade. For example,
exports of electricity to Kazakhstan and imports of coal
from Kazakhstan under an intergovernmental agreement
accounted for 9.7% and 7.9%, respectively, of the Kyrgyz
Republics’ total export to and imports from Kazakhstan in
2004. Imports of natural gas from Uzbekistan under a
similar intergovernmental agreement accounted for 16.2%
of the Kyrgyz Republic’s total imports from Uzbekistan.
The sharp increase in trade between Azerbaijan and
Uzbekistan in 2004 was largely due to the sale of natural
gas by Uzbekistan’s state-owned oil and gas company to
Azerbaijan’s state-owned oil and gas company under an
intergovernmental agreement.
One reason for the small intra-regional trade among
the CARs is that the degree of their trade complementarity
is low.5 As Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show, the Kyrgyz Republic
and Tajikistan can potentially absorb only small fractions
of Azerbaijan’s exports and potentially supply small
fractions of its imports, given the value and structure of
exports and imports of the three countries.6 Although
Kazakhstan can potentially absorb a relatively large
proportion of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and
Tajikistan’s exports and supply a substantial proportion of
their imports, the latter can potentially absorb small fractions
of Kazakhstan’s exports and supply small fractions of its
imports. Further, there is a little overlapping between the
profile of the Kyrgyz Republic’s imports and the profile of
Tajikistan’s exports.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 further show that the degree of
trade complementarity between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan, on the one hand, and
Mongolia, on the other, is also low, whereas the degree of
trade complementarity between these countries and the
PRC is high. It should not therefore be surprising that
trade between the CARs and Mongolia remained small in
2000–2004, while trade between the CARs and the PRC
continued to grow rapidly. Total recorded trade between
the CARs and the PRC increased from US$0.7 billion
4 Since a relatively large proportion of intra-regional trade goes unrecorded due to smuggling and under-invoicing, the amount and
the share of the intra-regional trade in total trade of the CARs were most likely greater than the above numbers. However, even if
the unrecorded trade had been included, intra-regional trade would have remained relatively small.
5 Another reason is the existence of numerous trade barriers, some of which are discussed in the next chapter of this report.
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in 1999 to US$3.4 billion in 2004. If unrecorded trade
is taken into account, trade between the CARs and the
PRC was most likely much larger. One indication of this is
that the amounts of trade with the PRC reported by the
CARs are much smaller than the corresponding amounts
reported by the PRC. For example, the Kyrgyz Republic
reported that its exports to the PRC at f.o.b. prices
amounted to US$39.3 million in 2004, while the PRC
reported that its imports from the Kyrgyz Republic at c.i.f.
prices amounted to 109.5 million in the same year (see
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Table 2.4). The difference between the two numbers is
much larger than the difference between f.o.b. and c.i.f.
prices in trade between the Kyrgyz Republic and the PRC
that one would expect given the proximity of the two
countries. Similarly, Kazakhstan reported that its imports
from the PRC at c.i.f. prices amounted to US$758.3
million in 2004, whereas the PRC reported that its exports
to Kazakhstan at f.o.b. prices amounted to US$2,211.9
million in the same year. There are similar discrepancies in
the mirror statistics on trade between the CARs and
Mongolia, but these are relatively small.
Despite their geographical proximity, trade
between the CARs and South Asian countries remained
quite small .  Exports to Afghanistan increased
considerably but from a very low base and remained small
relative to total exports. Exports to India remained or
declined to less than 1% of total exports in all of the
CARs, with the exception of Uzbekistan whose exports
to that country increased from US$0.5 million (less than
0.1% of total exports) in 1999 to US$113.4 million
(2.7% of total exports) in 2004 due largely to the sale
of four airplanes. Imports from the South Asian
countries remained tiny relative to total imports in all
the CARs, even though they increased in absolute terms
in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
Trade between the CARs and Western Europe was
concentrated in a small number of countries that are major
importers of primary commodities from, or major suppliers of
machinery and equipment to, the CARs. Notably, Italy imports
large amounts of crude oil from Azerbaijan for refining;
Switzerland is a major intermediate destination for exports of
crude oil from Kazakhstan, and gold from the Kyrgyz Republic
and Uzbekistan; the Netherlands imports large amounts of
aluminum from Tajikistan; and Germany is a major supplier of
machinery and equipment to all of the CARs. Yet, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan’s imports from the EU-
15 (i.e., the 15 countries that comprised the European Union
until its expansion in 2004) declined in 2000–2004 as
depreciation of their currencies vis-à-vis the major European
currencies made imports from Western European countries
more expensive for them. At the same time, Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan’s imports from the EU-15 expanded considerably.
This was due largely to increased imports of machinery and
equipment for oil sector development, which are relatively
inelastic with respect to exchange rate movements.
2.4 Actual versus Potential Trade
A number of studies estimate potential trade in
CARs in the late 1990s and the early 2000s and compare
it with actual trade. They find that Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz
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Republic, and Uzbekistan “under-traded,” whereas
Tajikistan “overtraded” given their size, location, and other
characteristics. Actual trade in Kazakhstan was less or
greater than potential trade depending on how the latter is
estimated. Notably, Babetskii, Babetskaia-Kukharchuk, and
Raiser (2003) estimate the gravity model, using data for
82 countries (including the CARs) and six years (1997–
2002).7 They find that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, and Uzbekistan traded less than, while Tajikistan
traded as much as, the EU-15 given their size, GDP at
purchasing power parity-based valuation, distance from
trading partners, and exchange rate volatility. The European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
(2003) compares the actual level of trade in the transition
countries with the level predicted by the gravity model
estimated by Babetskii, Babetskaia-Kukharchuk, and
Raiser (2003). It finds that the actual level of trade in
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan was lower
than the predicted level; whereas, the actual level of trade
in Kazakhstan was greater than, and that in Tajikistan
equal to the predicted level.
Following Rodrik (1998) and using data for 149
countries (including the CARs) and the averages for 1994–
2001, Freinkman, Polyakov, and Revenco (2004) estimate
several equations with the ratio of exports of goods and
services to GDP and the ratio of exports plus imports of
goods and services to GDP as dependent variables and
the population size, GDP per capita and regional dummies
as explanatory variables. They find that in 2001 the actual
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP at current prices in
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan was lower
and that in Tajikistan was higher than the ratios predicted
by the models both with and without the regional dummies.
The actual ratio in Kazakhstan was higher than the ratio
predicted by the model without the regional dummies, but
lower than the ratio predicted by the model with the
regional dummies.
With the rapid expansion of trade in the CARs in
2003–2004, the question arises: How does actual trade
in the CARs now compare with potential trade? We
estimated two equations that express the ratio of
merchandise exports plus imports to GDP as a function
of the population size, per capita GDP and regional
dummy variables, using cross-section data for 173
countries and averages for 1995–2004.8 We then
compared the actual ratios of exports plus imports to GDP
in the CARs in 1999, 2002, and 2004 with the
corresponding ratios predicted by these equations. We
found that while the actual ratios of exports plus imports
to GDP were indeed below the predicted ratios in some
of the CARs in 1999 and 2002, they were above the
predicted levels in all the CARs in 2004 (see Table 2.5).
The realization ratios were particularly high in Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan because of relatively low per capita GDP
and thus low predicted ratios of exports plus imports to
GDP in these countries.9 Hence, all of the CARs appear
to have fully realized their trade potential in 2004 as far
as the overall level of trade relative to GDP is concerned.
7 The gravity model is an equation that expresses the level of bilateral trade between two countries as a function of their size, the
distance between them, and other factors that affect their bilateral trade. Although the choice of explanatory variables included
in the equation often appears ad hoc, the model has been quite successful in explaining levels and directions of actual trade
and is widely used in estimating levels and directions of potential trade.
8 The equations we have estimated are similar to those estimated by Rodrik (1998) and Freinkman, Polyakov, and Revenco
(2004). The theory underlying these equations is that, other things being equal, large countries trade less than small countries,
rich countries trade more than poor countries, and countries in certain regions tend to trade more than countries in other
regions.
9 One reason the ratio of exports plus imports to gross domestic product (GDP) in Tajikistan is the highest of the CARs and the actual
levels of trade in Tajikistan are consistently higher than the estimated potential levels is the difficulties the country faces in
exporting electricity directly. Tajikistan circumvents these difficulties by exporting electricity indirectly through the production and
exports of energy-intensive aluminum, which comprises the bulk of its exports. To be able to do so, Tajikistan also imports large
quantities of alumina, which accounts for a considerable proportion of its imports (World Bank, 2005b).
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Polyakov, and Revenco (2004) and World Bank
(2006a), we used the gravity model from Frankel (1997)
to estimate potential bilateral trade between the CARs
This does not, however, mean that the CARs have
fully realized their bilateral trade potential vis-à-vis all
their trading partners in 2004. Following Freinkman,
10 The gravity model that Frankel (1997) has estimated and Freinkman, Polyakov, and Revenco (2004), World Bank (2006a), and
we have used is given by:
Log (Tij) = - 12.146 + 0.930*log(Yi * Yj) + 0.128*log(Yi/Ni * Yj/Nj)
                         (0.469)    (0.018)                    (0.019)
- 0.770*log (Distij) + 0.445*(Adjij) + 0.768*(Langij) +  k*(Blockij)+uij
 (0.038)                    (0.157)            (0.090)
where Tij is the trade turnover between countries i and j, Y is gross national product (GNP) at current prices, Y/N is GNP at
current prices per capita, Dist is the distance between the main commercial centers (the countries’ capitals with a few exceptions),
Adj is the dummy variable for adjacency (equal to one if the countries are adjacent and zero otherwise), Lang is the dummy
variable for the common language (equal to one if the countries share the same language and zero otherwise), Block is the
dummy variable for the trade blocks (equal to one if the countries belong to the same trade block and zero otherwise), u is an
error term, and k varies from insignificantly different from zero for the EU to 1.766 for the North American Free Trade Agreement.
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and their selected trading partners in 2004 and determine
to what extent the former realize their bilateral trade
potential vis-à-vis individual countries or groups of
countries.10 Given the high sensitivity of estimates of
potential bilateral trade to the underlying assumptions,
we made two sets of estimates. While making the first
set of estimates, we assumed that the CARs did not
belong to any regional trading block but shared a
common language with the other countries of the CIS.11
While making the second set of estimates, we assumed
that the CIS and Economic Cooperation Organization
(ECO) were as effective trading blocks as the North
American Free Trade Agreement, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan shared a common language with Iran; and
all of the CARs shared a common language with the other
CIS countries as well as the PRC and Turkey.12 We then
compared our estimates of potential bilateral trade between
the CARs and their selected trading partners with the
corresponding actual bilateral trade flows.
We found that in 2004 the CARs “overtraded”
with most other CIS countries and several Western
European countries but “under-traded” with most East
and South Asian and Western European countries as
well as the US (see Table 2.6). Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan “overtraded” with the EU-15 on aggregate
due to “overtrading” with several EU member countries
by considerable margins. Actual bilateral trade between
the CARs and the PRC, Iran, and Turkey was in most
cases greater than the estimated potential trade if the
first set of estimates of potential trade is used, but less
than potential trade if the second set of estimates of
potential trade is used.13
2.5 Conclusions
The recent trade performance of the CARs has
been mixed. Their exports and imports expanded
considerably in 2000–2004 and they all appear to have
fully realized their trade potential in 2004 in terms of
the overall level of trade. At the same time, a handful of
primary commodities continued to dominate the CARs’
exports and their participation in GPNs and related
trade in manufacture products remain limited. Heavy
reliance on exports of a few primary commodities makes
the CARs vulnerable to abrupt swings in volatile world
prices for these commodities and complicates economic
management. The limited participation of the CARs in
GPNs and related trade in manufactured products
means that they derive relatively little benefits from trade
in terms of attracting FDI, gaining access to advanced
technologies, and fostering sustainable economic
development.
Furthermore, exports and, to a lesser extent, imports of
the CARs have been concentrated in a small number of countries.
11 The reason for assuming that the CARs do not belong to any trading blocks is that, as discussed in Chapter 4, the regional trading
agreements (RTAs) involving CARs have not been effective. The reason for assuming that the CARs share a common language with
the other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is that most people in the CIS countries speak Russian.
12 The reason for assuming that Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan share a common language with Iran is that Iran has a large
Azeri minority, Tajik is very similar to Farsi, and a substantial proportion of the population of Uzbekistan speaks Tajik. The
reason for assuming that the CARs share a common language with Turkey is that Azeri, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek and similar
to Turkish and many people in Tajikistan speak Uzbek. The reason for assuming that the CARs share a common language with
the PRC is that many people in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of the PRC, which plays a leading role in trade between the
CARs and the PRC, speak Uygur, which is similar to Azeri, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek.
13 These findings are broadly consistent with those of other studies that examine bilateral trade potential of the CARs. In particular,
Elborgh-Woytek (2003) finds bilateral trade between the CIS countries, including the CARs, and the EU-15 to be below its
potential. Freinkman, Polyakov, and Revenco (2004) find that actual trade between the CARs and other CIS-countries was, in
most cases, above its potential in 2001. The comparisons of actual and potential bilateral trade among a large group of
countries made by the International Trade Center suggest that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan “overtrade”
with the Russian Federation but “under-trade” with most developed countries in North America, East Asia, and Western Europe
as well as many emerging markets in South and East Asia.
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This has both pros and cons for the CARs. On the one hand,
it makes multilateral trade negotiations relatively easy for the
CARs. On the other hand,  it makes the CARs vulnerable to
changes in import demand in, and possible trade sanctions by, a
few trading partners. This in turn underscores the importance
for the CARs to place trade on a solid legal foundation that can
protect them from arbitrary sanctions by major trading partners.
Intra-regional trade among the CARs has remained
relatively small. One reason for this is that the degree of
their trade complementarity is low. In contrast, the degree
of trade complementarity between the CARs and the PRC
is high. That is why trade between the CARs and the
PRC increased substantially in 2000–2004. However,
trade between the CARs and South Asian countries
remained quite small despite their geographical proximity.
An analysis based on the gravity model suggests
that the CARs fully realized their bilateral trade potential
vis-à-vis most other CIS countries in 2004. At the same
time, their actual bilateral trade with most East and South
Asian and Western European countries as well as the
US was below the estimated potential trade. Whether
the CARs fully realized their bilateral trade potential
vis-à-vis the PRC, Iran, and Turkey depends on the
assumptions underlying the estimates of the potential
bilateral trade.




The recent merchandise trade performance of the
CARs has been adversely affected by the presence of
numerous barriers to trade in Central Asia—that is,
factors that obstruct exports from and/or imports to the
CARs. Some of these trade barriers (such as relatively
weak trade links between the CARs and non-FSU
countries) are a legacy of the FSU while others (e.g.,
barriers to cross-border movements of goods, people, and
transport equipment among the CARs) emerged after the
breakup of the FSU. Some of them—like additional
transport costs and transit times needed for international
shipments to and from the CARs due to their landlocked
location and difficult topography—are beyond their
control. However, others—such as policy barriers created
by the CARs and their trading partners—can be reduced
by the CARs through unilateral or collective action.
This chapter identifies some of the more important
barriers to trade in Central Asia that the CARs can
potentially lower through regional cooperation in trade
policy, transport, and customs transit.1 It also highlights
costs of these trade barriers, including their adverse effects
on the recent trade merchandise performance of the CARs.
3.1 Barriers Pertaining to Trade Policy
The CARs had very similar trade policy regimes at
the time of their independence, but these have diverged
significantly since then. The Kyrgyz Republic liberalized
its trade policy rapidly in the first half of the 1990s (see
Figure 3.1). Kazakhstan also made considerable progress
in trade liberalization in the first half of the 1990s, but this
was partly reversed in the late 1990s. Azerbaijan liberalized
its trade policy fairly fast after concluding a ceasefire
agreement with Armenia in 1994, as did Tajikistan after
the end of the civil war in 1997. Uzbekistan has made
relatively limited headway in trade liberalization, with a
significant reversal in the mid-1990s. Consequently, trade
policy regimes in the CARs vary widely today from very
liberal in the Kyrgyz Republic to fairly liberal in Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, to quite restrictive in Uzbekistan.
Tariffs are fairly low and uniform in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz
Republic, and Tajikistan (see Table 3.1). Kazakhstan has a
rather complex tariff schedule with a large number of tariff
bands and a high maximum tariff rate, although its nonweighted
average tariff rate is not high. Uzbekistan has a complex tariff
1 The chapter does not discuss the barriers to trade in Central Asia (such as difficulties with customs clearance of goods being
exported from or imported to the CARs and restrictions on domestic marketing of exportable and imported goods) that cannot
be reduced through regional cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit.
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schedule and a relatively high nonweighted average tariff rate.2
A serious problem with tariffs in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan is that changes in tariff schedules
are rather frequent and unpredictable. Also, there is an
escalation of tariffs—i.e., a rise in tariff rates with a degree of
processing—in all the CARs. This is more pronounced in
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan than in the Kyrgyz
Republic and Tajikistan.
2 In Uzbekistan, tariffs, the value-added tax, and excise taxes are levied on imports by legal entities only. Imports by individuals
are subject to a unified tax on imports, the rate of which is 26% for flour, 40% for other food products, and 70% for nonfood
products. The rate of the unified tax is lower than the combined rate of the tariff, the value-added tax, and the excise tax for
most food products, but higher than that for most nonfood products.
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In addition to explicit tariffs, some of the CARs
impose other taxes on imports that are not levied on
domestically produced goods or have higher rates for
imported goods than for domestically produced goods.3 In
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the coverage of excise taxes
on imported and domestically produced goods are identical,
but the rates of the former are considerably higher than
those of the latter for some commodities. In Uzbekistan,
excise taxes are levied on a wide range of imported, but not
domestically produced, consumer products. These include
ice cream (subject to a 200% excise tax), mineral water
(100%), most types of juices (70%), poultry meat (70%),
cheese (50%), yogurt (50%), plastic tableware and
kitchenware (50%), and soap (20%).4 Certain
commodities, such as construction materials, are subject to
the value-added tax (VAT) when imported, but exempt
from this tax when produced domestically.5 Furthermore,
nonfood products brought to Uzbekistan for commercial
purposes from neighboring countries without a certificate
of origin, but not necessarily originating in those countries,
are subject to a 20% surcharge.
Explicit taxes on exports are less common in Central
Asia than taxes on imports. In Azerbaijan, exports of metals
and articles of nonferrous metals (with the exception of
aluminum products) are subject to an export tax. Further,
25% of the difference between the export price and the
domestic wholesale price of products with regulated domestic
prices is to be transferred to the state budget. Kazakhstan
levies export taxes on a limited number of commodities when
they are exported to non-EAEC countries.6
While all the CARs prohibit or license exports
and/or imports of certain goods to protect national security,
public health, and environment, some of them do so also
for economic purposes. In particular, Azerbaijan prohibits
exports of scrap metals to ensure their availability for
domestic consumption. Uzbekistan prohibits imports of
packed tea in an effort to increase demand for domestically
produced packed tea. Uzbekistan also prohibits exports
of flour, meat, sugar, vegetable oil, and a number of
other—mostly consumer—products to ensure their
availability in the domestic market at relatively low prices.
For the same reason, Kazakhstan temporarily prohibits
exports of diesel fuel and fuel oil during harvesting and
heating seasons, respectively. Licensing of certain exports
and imports—such as imports of tobacco and alcoholic
beverages to Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, exports of scrap
of nonferrous metals from the Kyrgyz Republic, and
exports of precious metals and their scrap from
Uzbekistan—appears to be primarily intended to preserve
the existing monopolies.
In addition to taxes and quantitative restrictions on
imports and exports, some CARs use other policy tools as
an instrument of trade policy. Notably, Uzbekistan appears
to continue using restrictions on access to foreign exchange
in regulating imports even though it de jure introduced full
convertibility of its national currency for current international
transactions in October 2003. It is not always possible to
purchase foreign exchange through official channels even
for bona fide imports. And it is generally more so for imports
of consumer goods than for imports of capital goods.
Uzbekistan also uses restrictions on cross-border movements
of people and transport equipment to restrict imports. In
2002, for example, it tightened rules and procedures for
movements of people and vehicles across Kazakh-Uzbek
and Kyrgyz-Uzbek borders in an apparent effort to restrict
imports of consumer goods from Kazakhstan and the
Kyrgyz Republic.
3 The difference between the rates of these taxes on imported and domestically produced goods constitutes an implicit tariff.
4 In what appears to be a policy inconsistency, Uzbekistan tries to lower the domestic price for poultry meat by prohibiting its exports
and simultaneously attempts to raise its domestic price by levying a 50% excise tax on imported poultry meat.
5 In Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, some commodities are exempt from the VAT when they are imported, but subject to it when
produced domestically. This constitutes a negative implicit tariff on these commodities.
6 These include scraps of ferrous metals, whose exports to the European Union (EU) are also exempt from the export tax.
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Besides the trade barriers relating to trade policy in
the CARs, there are also significant barriers to trade in
Central Asia induced by trade policy of countries outside
the region. Most notably, exports of agricultural products
from the CARs to developed countries face relatively high
tariffs. Large export and other subsidies that developed
countries provide to their farmers further impede imports
of agricultural products to these countries. Cline (2005)
estimates that when both tariff and the tariff-equivalent of
domestic subsidies are taken into account, agricultural
protection amount to about 20% in the US, 50% in Canada
and EU, and 80% in Japan. Furthermore, countries outside
the region occasionally impose or threaten to impose
antidumping duties on imports from the CARs. The US,
for example, charges antidumping duties on imports of
silicomanganese from Kazakhstan and the EU imposes
quotas on imports of steel from Kazakhstan. All of the
CARs, with the exception of Kazakhstan, have a nonmarket
economy status in developed countries, which exposes their
exports to those countries to relatively restrictive anti-
dumping measures.
3.2 Barriers Pertaining to Transport and Customs
Transit
All the CARs are landlocked and situated far from
major international seaports and developed country markets.
In addition, the CARs have a difficult topography that
complicates their transport links with the other parts of the
world, particularly South Asia. The situation is exacerbated
by deficiencies of the CARs’ transport networks, high costs
and low quality of transport and logistics services in the region,
and difficulties with movements of goods and transport
equipment across borders and through the territories of the
CARs and neighboring countries. The result is generally
high transport costs and long and unpredictable transit times
for international shipments to and from the CARs.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 compare the actual transport
costs and transit times for shipments by road and by rail
between the four CARs (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and selected countries outside
the region with the corresponding transport costs and transit
times in the “ideal world” (i.e., a world with balanced
transport flows, competitive markets for transport services,
smooth border crossing, low transit fees, and no visa
problems and unofficial payments). The figures show that
the actual transport costs are much higher and the actual
transit times are much longer for shipments to and from
the CARs than those in the “ideal world.”7 Moreover,
transit times for international shipments by road for longer
distances (e.g., shipments from the Benelux countries) vary
more than those for shorter distances (e.g., shipments from
Istanbul). This indicates that transit times for international
shipments become increasingly unpredictable as the
distances involved increase.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 also demonstrate the significant
transport costs and transit time disadvantage faced by the
CARs compared with the Baltic States and Moldova.
Transport costs for shipment by road between the CARs
and the Benelux countries are 1.5–2.5 times as high as
those for road shipments between the Baltic States and
Moldova, on the one hand, and the Benelux countries, on
the other, while transit times are 2.0–3.0 times as long.
Even for shipments by rail between the CARs and Moscow,
transport costs are generally higher and transit times are
significantly longer than those for rail shipments between
the Baltic States and Moldova, on the one hand, and
Moscow, on the other.
Finally, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show that there is an
asymmetry in transport costs for international shipments
between Central Asia and Europe. For example, it costs
$8,500–$10,500 to ship a truckload of cargo from the
Benelux countries to Central Asia, and only $6,000–$7,000
7 Only for shipments by rail and by sea from Central Asia to the East coast of the PRC through Bandar Abbas, Iran, the actual transport
cost is lower than the transport cost in the “ideal world.” The reason is that transport flows from the PRC to Middle East, most of
which goes through Bandar Abbas, exceed transport flows in the opposite direction and transport costs for shipments from Bandar
Abbas to the PRC are relatively low.
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8 According to freight forwarders, only a small fraction of trucks carrying goods from the EU to Central Asia return with cargo despite the
relatively low costs of shipments from Central Asia to Europe. This is not only due to the relatively small amount of exports from Central
Asia to the EU that need to be transported by road, but also because many road transporters refuse to carry a less-than-truckload of
consolidated cargo to avoid excessive and cumbersome border crossing and transit procedures. As a result, a lot of cargo capacity is
wasted. The total loss due to this problem is estimated at around $300 million per year.
Asia to Europe consist mostly of primary commodities
transported by rail and through pipelines, while imports from
Europe to Central Asia consist mostly of manufactured
products transported by road and by air.8
to ship in the opposite direction. In the “ideal world,”
shipments would cost $5,500–$6,000 in either direction.
This is due to the particular commodity composition of trade
between Central Asia and Europe. Exports from Central
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Table 3.2 presents estimates of transport costs of
merchandise exports and imports of the CARs in 2003.
According to these estimates, transport costs in the value
of exports ranged from 8.0% in Azerbaijan to 14.0% in
Tajikistan, and the share of transport costs in the value of
imports ranged from 7.0% in Azerbaijan to 10.0% in the
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. Using reference values
for similar countries, it is estimated that total logistics cost
made up 16–19% of the total value of exports and imports
in the CARs. Excluding exports of primary commodities
and imports of heavy machinery and equipment, for which
transport costs are relatively low, transport costs comprised
an estimated 11–16% and logistics costs accounted for more
than 20% of the total value of exports and imports in the
CARs. By comparison, transport costs made up 8.4% of
the value of imports in Asia as a whole and 6.1% of the
value of imports in the world at large in 2001. In EU
countries, logistics costs in manufacturing generally
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comprise less than 10% of the value of products and transport
costs are only 1/3 of logistics costs.
3.3 Costs of Trade Barriers
The presence of the above trade barriers has
adversely affected the recent merchandise trade performance
of the CARs in several ways. First, they have constrained
growth of trade. Although in all the CARs exports and
imports expanded considerably in 2000–2004 and the
actual ratio of exports plus imports to GDP exceeded the
estimated potential level in 2004, cumulative growth of
exports in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
and the cumulative growth of imports in the Kyrgyz
Republic and Uzbekistan were lower than those in many
other countries, including the PRC and Mongolia (two
other CAREC member countries), and the world as a
whole (see Figure 3.4). Excluding exports of crude oil
and oil products and imports of capital goods for oil sector
development, growth of exports and imports in Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan were also relatively modest.
Second, trade barriers have adversely impacted on
the direction of trade in the CARs. In particular, relatively
high transport costs and long and unpredictable transit times
for international shipments to and from the CARs have
hindered reorientation of their trade from FSU to non-
FSU countries, which partly explains why the CARs
generally “overtrade” with other CIS countries but “under-
trade” with most East and South Asian and Western
European countries.
Third, trade barriers have had an adverse impact
on the composition of trade in the CARs. Notably, long
and unpredictable transit times have constrained exports
of time-sensitive goods and manufactured products with
relatively low profit margins more than exports of primary
commodities, which are not time-sensitive and can be
transported in bulk at relatively low costs. This is one
reason for the limited participation of the CARs in
GPNs and related international trade in manufactured
products, and for the domination of their exports by a
handful of primary commodities, such as crude oil,
cotton fiber, and metals.9
In addition to the adverse impacts on the trade
performance of the CARs, trade barriers have other
negative effects. In particular, they encourage illegal trade.
Faced with high trade taxes or restrictions, traders often
resort to illegal ways of conducting trade, such as smuggling
9 Raballand, Kunth, and Auty (2005) argue that high transport costs play a critical role in causing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to generate more trade with other countries of the CIS and less trade with the EU than
their relative location would suggest. In addition, high transport costs partly explain why exports of these countries are compressed
onto a handful of primary commodities.
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and under-invoicing.10 As a result, a substantial proportion of
trade in the region goes unrecorded and the governments lose a
considerable part of the proceeds from taxes on international
trade. It is estimated that unrecorded imports of consumer goods
from the PRC and Turkey to the Kyrgyz Republic exceeded
US$94 million in 2002 and unrecorded imports of gasoline
and diesel fuel from neighboring countries were almost US$31
million. Unrecorded exports of the small-scale sewing industry
were estimated at about US$45 million and the value of
reexported consumer goods (including the shuttle traders’
margins) at around US$70 million. The total value of these
unrecorded imports and exports was about US$240 million or
around a fifth of the value of recorded trade.
By increasing incentives for smuggling and under-
invoicing and creating opportunities for rent-seeking, high-
trade taxes and restrictions fuel corruption. Traders sometimes
bribe government officials to obtain licenses for lucrative
exports and imports. They often bribe border guards and
customs officials to turn a blind eye on smuggling or under-
invoicing. Not surprisingly, corruption is a particularly serious
problem in the CARs when it comes to international trade.
Trade taxes and restrictions lower domestic prices for
exportable goods and raise domestic prices for imported goods.
This generally worsens social welfare. Notably, import taxes
on consumer goods raise the domestic prices for these goods
and worsen consumers’ welfare. Although they also generate
revenue for the government and increase the income of domestic
producers, their net effect on social welfare is usually negative.
A typical example is the tariffs on colored TVs in Uzbekistan,
which raised the domestic price of colored TVs by about 82%
and caused a deadweight loss of between US$5.8 million
and US$16.6 million in 2004 (see Box 3.1).
10 There is a large body of theoretical and empirical literature showing that trade taxes and restrictions lead to under-invoicing,
smuggling, rent seeking and other forms of directly unproductive profit-seeking activities. See, for example, Anam (1982),
Bhagwati (1974), Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), Johnson (1974), Krueger (1974), Pitt (1981),
and Sheikh (1974).
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By lowering domestic prices for exportable goods
and raising domestic prices for imported goods, trade
barriers distort domestic relative prices vis-à-vis
international relative prices. A good measure of domestic
11 Although demand for colored TVs is considered to be relatively price inelastic in high-income countries (with -0.5 being a typical
estimate), it is likely to be more price elastic in middle-income countries, like Uzbekistan. Similarly, domestic supply of colored
TVs is likely to be more price elastic than 0.5.
12 The effective rates of protection for a particular product is the difference between value added (per unit of the product) at domestic
prices and value added at international prices expressed as a percentage of the latter.
relative price distortions resulting from taxes on
international trade are levels of and the variation in
effective rates of protection (ERP).12 Table 3.3 presents
the estimated ERPs for selected products in Kazakhstan,
Box 3.1: Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Welfare Effects of Trade Taxes: The Case of Import Tariffs
on Colored TVs in Uzbekistan
Trade taxes generally have a negative effect on social welfare. A typical example is the tariffs on colored TVs in Uzbekistan.
In 2004, Uzbekistan produced 53,345 units of colored TVs. Additional 70,000 units were imported legally and an
estimated 10,000 units imported illegally. Thus, the domestic consumption was 133,345 units. It is estimated that the
average domestic retail price was US$300 per unit. The explicit tariff on imported colored TVs was 30% and the implicit
tariff—that is, the difference between the rate of the excise tax on imported and domestically produced colored TVs—was
40%. Hence, the average domestic price would have been about US$165 per unit in the absence of the tariffs. Assuming
(conservatively) that the price elasticity of demand for a colored TV is -0.5 and that of supply is 0.5, the tariffs reduced the
domestic consumption of colored TVs by 68,450 units and increased their domestic production by more than 18,100 units
(see Figure B3.1).11 As a result, domestic consumers lost US$22.6 million (sum of areas A, B, C, and D on Figure B3.1), while
domestic producers gained US$6.0 million (area A on Figure B3.1). A total of US$10.8 million (area C on Figure B3.1) went
to the government (in the form of tariff revenues), corrupt border guards, customs and tax officials, police officers, etc. (in
the form of bribes) and illegal importers (in the form of extra profit), and was at least partly lost due to inefficiencies inherent
in smuggling. The net effect of the tariffs on social welfare was somewhere between minus US$5.8 million and minus
US$16.6 million depending on how much of US$10.8 million was lost due to inefficiencies in illegal imports of colored TVs.
This deadweight welfare loss was larger if the absolute
values of the price elasticity of demand for and supply
of colored TVs were greater than 0.5.
Accordingly, a reduction in the tariffs on colored
TVs would lower their domestic price, increase domestic
consumption and imports, and improve social welfare.
Policymakers may worry that it would also reduce
government revenue and cause a decline in domestic
production, which would increase unemployment. In
addition, the increase in imports of colored TVs may
lead to exchange rate depreciation. These are valid
concerns. However, international evidence suggests that
indirect effects of reducing tariffs are on balance positive
rather than negative. Apart from direct gains in
consumers’ welfare, reducing tariffs increase the variety
of goods and enhance competition in domestic markets.
This in turn stimulates domestic producers to improve
their own efficiency. As for the loss of government
revenue, taxes on income or general consumption are
less distortionary than taxes which discriminate against
imports.
Source: Authors
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Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. It indicates that there are
considerable variations in the ERPs and thus price distortions
in all three countries. Moreover, both levels of and the variation
in the ERPs in Uzbekistan are much larger than those in
Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, suggesting that price
distortions in the former are more severe than in the latter.
Price distortions resulting from trade barriers in turn
have many negative consequences. First, they often afford
import-competing products a much higher degree of effective
protection than the corresponding tariffs suggest. As shown
in Table 3.3, the estimated ERPs for cigarettes and a Daewoo
Nexia car in Uzbekistan are more than three times as high
as the ad valorem components of the combined  tariffs on
these products. Second, relative prices distorted in favor of
import-competing sectors shift resources from export-oriented
to import-competing sectors and redistribute income from
the general public and export-oriented sectors to import-
competing sectors. Since agriculture is a major export-oriented
sector in all the CARs, the majority of the poor live in rural
areas, and import-competing sectors are mostly located in
urban areas, the price distortions effectively redistribute
income from rural to urban population and from the poor to
the rich. Third, distorted relative prices result in sub-optimal
allocation of resources and inefficient utilization of scarce
factors of production. Fourth, price distortions may lead to
welfare-reducing economic growth, which occurs when output
growth is generated by inefficient import-competing sectors
that take away resources from efficient export-oriented
sectors.13 In the case of severe price distortions, highly
protected import-competing sectors may produce positive
value added at domestic prices but negative value added at
international prices.14 Growth generated by these sectors
would be spurious and reduce social welfare.
13 See Johnson (1967) for a discussion of the possibility of aggregate income losses from output growth in protected import-
competing sectors.
14 See McKinnon (1993) for an exposition of how a firm producing positive value added at distorted domestic prices may actually
be producing negative value added at international prices.
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Restrictions imposed by Uzbekistan on cross-border
movements of people and transport equipment in an effort
to restrict imports from neighboring countries obstruct
movements of people for purposes not relating to trade,
often forcing them to use more costly alternative routes.
The Tashkent-Samarkand highway offers a good example.
It is one of Uzbekistan’s key motor roads used extensively
in both domestic and international transportation. It was
built during the period of the Soviet Union and passes
through Kazakhstan. During the first 11 years after the
breakup of the FSU, Uzbek vehicles could, more or less,
freely pass through the Kazakh territory along the highway.
In 2002, however, Uzbekistan closed the Kazakh section
of the road for Uzbek vehicles.15 As a result, most Uzbek
vehicles now have to take a detour around the Kazakh
territory, which is 56 km longer than the direct route.
Moreover, the bypass is narrower and in worse condition
than the Tashkent-Samarkand highway.
According to a study commissioned by ADB, some
15,500 vehicles took the detour daily in December 2004.
With the detour, the vehicles spent 1.0–1.5 hours more to
get to the destination than if they had been allowed to use
the direct route. This is partly due to the stopping of many
of the vehicles at numerous stationary and mobile traffic
police posts along the bypass. In addition, each vehicle
spent 5–23 liters of fuel more than what it would have
spent if it had used the direct route. The total cost of extra
fuel spent by all vehicles taking the detour was estimated at
about 45.6 million soums or US$44,000 a day at
December 2004 prices. This means that the closure of
transit through Kazakhstan costs Uzbek drivers and
transport operators around 17 billion soums or US$16
million a year in terms of extra fuel needed to get from
Tashkent to Samarkand or vice versa.
The barriers to trade in Central Asia created by
countries outside the region also entails high costs for the
CARs. Most notably, farm subsidies in developed countries
cause an oversupply of agricultural products in these
countries, which are then dumped in the world markets.
This lowers world prices for agricultural products and
adversely affects exports of these products from the CARs.
It is estimated that without cotton subsidies in the EU and
the US, world cotton prices would have been 71% higher.
With higher world cotton prices, the gain in export revenue
would have added 6% to Tajikistan’s GDP and 3% to
Uzbekistan’s GDP. These substantial benefits would
accrue every year after abolition of the subsidies. Moreover,
with more attractive world prices, the quantity of cotton
exported would increase (by an estimated 5.8% in
Uzbekistan), adding to the potential benefits.16
3.4 Conclusions
There are significant barriers to trade in Central
Asia pertaining to trade policy, transport, and transit
systems in the CARs, their neighbors, and trading partners.
The more significant trade barriers pertaining to trade policy
in the CARs include a complex tariff schedule and relatively
high tariffs (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan); escalation of
tariffs (all the CARs); frequent and unpredictable changes
in the tariff schedule (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan); high implicit tariffs in the form of taxes
that are levied on imported goods but not on domestically
produced goods or have higher rates for imported goods
than for domestically produced goods (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan); explicit export taxes
(Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan); and prohibition and
licensing of exports and imports of certain commodities (all
the CARs). Uzbekistan appears to continue using
15 The restriction does not apply to trucks transporting goods under a Transport International Routier (TIR) Carnet and vehicles
with foreign and diplomatic license plates.
16 The estimated subsidies, their impact on world prices and Uzbekistan’s supply response are from Baffes (2004).  The increases
in GDP for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan even without any change in output are based on export volumes and GDP in 2000, reported
in Pomfret (2005).
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restrictions on access to foreign exchange in regulating
imports and imposes relatively tight restrictions on cross-
border movements of people and transport equipment in
an apparent effort to restrict imports from neighboring
countries. Large agricultural subsidies that developed
countries provide to their farmers also constitute a significant
barrier to trade in Central Asia.
Other significant barriers to trade in Central Asia
are high transport costs and long and unpredictable
transport times for international shipments to and from
the CARs. This is not only because of the landlocked
and remote location of the CARs and their difficult
topography, but also due to deficiencies of their transport
networks, high costs and low quality of transport and
logistics services in the region, and difficulties with
movements of goods and transport equipment across
borders and through the territories of the CARs and
neighboring countries.
The costs of these trade barriers for the CARs are
quite high. They have constrained growth of trade in
Central Asia and deprived the CARs of the benefits of
forgone trade. They have also limited the participation of
the CARs in GPNs and related trade in manufactured
products, skewed the structure of their exports towards
primary commodities, and hindered the reorientation of
their trade from FSU countries to the rest of the world. In
addition, trade barriers have encouraged illegal trade, fueled
corruption, caused deadweight welfare losses, and distorted
domestic relative prices. Distorted relative prices in turn
have provided a high degree of effective protection to import-
competing sectors and may have generated welfare-reducing
and spurious economic growth. They have also shifted
resources from export-oriented to import-competing sectors
and redistributed income from the general public and
export-oriented sectors to import-competing sectors and
from the poor to the rich. The restrictions on border crossing
imposed by Uzbekistan—in an effort to restrict imports
from neighboring countries—have obstructed the
movements of people and transport equipment for purposes
not relating to trade. This has resulted in considerable losses
for drivers and transport operators.
Improved regional cooperation in trade policy,
transport, and customs transit could help the CARs lower
the trade barriers, expand trade, increase the gains from
participation in international trade and reduce the
associated risks. Specifically, regional cooperation in trade
policy could help the CARs reduce trade barriers
pertaining to trade policy in the CARs and their trading
partners at relatively low costs, and expand trade
considerably. It could also help the CARs reduce the risk
of protectionist measures by trading partners. Regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit would help
the CARs reduce transport costs and transit times for
international shipments and make transit times for such
shipments more predictable. This would in turn help them
boost trade, especially with more distant countries, take
more active part in GPNs and related international trade
in manufacture products, and diversify trade both in terms
of geographical distribution and commodity composition.





As noted in Chapter 3, there are significant policy-
related barriers to trade in Central Asia, which have adversely
affected the recent trade performance of the CARs and
prevented them from fully realizing the gains from participation
in international trade. And as noted in Chapter 1, regional
cooperation in trade policy in the form of reciprocal trade
liberalization under an RTA can help the CARs reduce these
trade barriers at relatively low costs, boost intra-regional trade,
and facilitate broad-based trade liberalization. However, an
RTA not only creates trade between member countries but
also diverts trade between member and nonmember
countries. Therefore, its net effect on social welfare in
member countries and the world at large is theoretically
ambiguous. It can also give rise to vested interests in partial
trade liberalization and make broad-based trade
liberalization politically more difficult to carry out.
Another way for the CARs to reduce the policy-
related trade barriers at relatively low costs and expand trade
rapidly is to join the WTO. Since accession to the WTO
brings improved access to markets in other WTO member
countries, it enables a new member country to boost exports
and mitigate the initial adverse effects of trade liberalization
on employment and the balance of payments. And since
membership in the WTO requires according the most
favored nation (MFN) status to all member countries,
liberalization of trade policy in the process of the WTO
accession leads to little trade diversion and is likely to improve
social welfare in both the new member country and the
world as a whole. However, accession to the WTO is a
relatively long process since it involves negotiations with a
large number of member countries and requires the
implementation of a broad range of policy and institutional
reforms.
In an effort to expand trade and closely integrate
into the international trading system, the CARs have been
pursuing both membership in RTAs (regionalism) and
accession to the WTO (multilateralism). As noted in
Chapter 1, an RTA complements the multilateral trading
system represented by the WTO insofar as it promotes
broad-based liberalization in the member countries. In fact,
RTAs are legal under the WTO rules. However, their
discriminatory nature is contrary to the principle of
nondiscrimination on which the multilateral trading system
is based. Under certain circumstances, an RTA can even
weaken the multilateral trading system.  How a particular
RTA affects trade, social welfare, and political feasibility
of broad-based trade liberalization in the member countries
and the multilateral trading system depends on a number of
factors listed in Box 1.1.
This chapter analyses regionalism and multilateralism
in Central Asia. Specifically, it reviews RTAs involving
CARs and assesses their effects on the CARs. It then
reviews the status of the CARs’ accession to the WTO
and discusses the benefits and costs of WTO membership
for the CARs. The chapter also discusses the options for
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regional cooperation that the CARs can pursue within the
multilateral framework.
4.1 The “Spaghetti Bowl” of
the Regional Trade Agreements
The CARs have joined several regional organizations
that involve or seek to reach a multilateral RTA. In addition,
they have entered into numerous bilateral RTAs. A
combination of these—often overlapping, multilateral, and
bilateral RTAs—has resulted in what the trade literature
aptly calls the “spaghetti bowl effect” (see Figure 4.1).1
The CARs are all members of the CIS, which was
established by Belarus, Russian Federation, and Ukraine
in 1991 and is comprised of all FSU countries, except
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The overall objective of
the CIS is to contribute to “further development and
strengthening of the relations of friendship, good
neighbourhood, inter-ethnic harmony, trust, mutual
understanding and mutually advantageous cooperation”
among the member countries.2 In 1994, the CIS countries
signed an Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade
Area, but were not able to agree on a common list of
exemptions from the free trade regime. In 1999, they
amended the agreement, whereby the list of exemptions could
be agreed upon on a bilateral basis. However, not all CIS
countries were able to agree on the list of exemptions even
on a bilateral basis. Thus, the agreement has not been fully
implemented.
In 1992, the CARs—along with Afghanistan and
Turkmenistan—joined the ECO, which was set up by Iran,
Pakistan, and Turkey in 1985 to promote economic,
technical, and cultural cooperation among the member
countries. In 2003, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
and Turkey signed an ECO Trade Agreement (ECOTA),
which envisages a reduction of tariffs to a maximum of 15%
for at least 80% of the traded goods within eight years after
its entry into force. Almost three years since it was signed,
the ECOTA has not yet entered into force.
In 1994, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and
Uzbekistan set up the Central Asian Economic Union,
ostensibly modeled after the EU. The organization was
renamed the Central Asian Economic Community
(CAEC) when Tajikistan joined in 1998. The presidents
of the four countries proclaimed the Central Asian
Cooperation Organization (CACO) as the successor to
the CAEC in 2002. At the CACO summit in Astana,
Kazakhstan in May 2004, the Russian Federation joined
the organization and Uzbekistan proposed to set up a Central
Asian common market within the CACO framework.
However, at their meeting in St. Petersburg, Russian
Federation in October 2005, the presidents of the CACO
member countries decided to merge the organization with
the EAEC.
In late 1995, Kazakhstan joined the agreement on
the establishment of a customs union, signed by Belarus
and Russian Federation in early 1995. The Kyrgyz
Republic followed suit in 1996 and Tajikistan in 1999. In
February 2000, the five countries signed an agreement on
a common external tariff schedule (CETS), whereby they
committed themselves to adopt a CETS within five years
after the entry into force of the agreement.3 In October
2000, they signed a treaty establishing the EAEC, a
regional organization aimed at facilitating the creation of a
customs union and a common economic space of the member
countries. The EAEC treaty entered into force in May
2001 and superseded the customs union agreement between
its member countries. Following the decision of the
presidents of the CACO member countries to merge it
with the EAEC, Uzbekistan acceded to the EAEC in
January 2006.
1 Figure 4.1 does not include regional organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which at least some of the
CARs are members of but which do not involve and do not seek to reach an RTA.
2 Source: http://www.cis.minsk.by.
3 The agreement entered into force in 2000 for Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation, and Tajikistan and in 2001 for
Kazakhstan.
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with the EAEC, Uzbekistan acceded to the EAEC in
January 2006.
Although Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Russian Federation, and Tajikistan agreed in 2000 to adopt
a CETS by 2006, they were not able to do so. By the end
of 2005, they were able to agree on a CETS that consisted
of external tariffs common to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Russian Federation and which covered only 63% of the lines
in the EAEC commodity classification. The Kyrgyz
Republic and Tajikistan have not yet adopted even this
incomplete CETS of the EAEC. As of end-2005, only
18% of tariffs in the Kyrgyz Republic and 49% of tariffs in
Tajikistan were harmonized with the CETS of the EAEC.4
An alternative grouping among the CIS countries
emerged in September 2003 when Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Russian Federation, and Ukraine signed an agreement on
the creation of a Single Economic Space (SES).5 The
agreement envisages the establishment of supranational
institutions and a free trade zone with the ultimate goal of
creating an economic union of the member countries.
However, the future of the SES became uncertain following
the 2004 presidential election in Ukraine, which brought
to power a pro-Western government. In August 2005,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russian Federation pledged to
sign a package of 29 statutory documents of the SES by
December 2005 and an additional 15 documents by March
2006. Ukraine, however, indicated it would not sign any
SES document that envisions the establishment of a
supranational institution. The parties were not able to agree
on the 29 documents that were to be signed by December
2005. They postponed the signing to March 2006.
In addition to joining the regional institutions that
involve or aim to reach a multilateral RTA, the CARs have
signed a large number of bilateral preferential and free trade
agreements. But some of these bilateral RTAs have never
entered into force because they have not been ratified by at
least one signatory country. At the same time, the effectiveness
of those that have formally entered into force has been limited
due to a narrow coverage, complex rules of origin, and less-
than-full implementation. Often, exemptions include goods
that account for a significant proportion of bilateral trade
between the signatory countries and the rules of origin are
so complex that, for importers, preferential tariffs envisaged
in the RTAs are not worth claming.
The main reason many bilateral RTAs that have
formally entered into force are not fully implemented is
that, like multilateral RTAs, they lack effective enforcement
and dispute settlement mechanisms. Consequently, they
cannot prevent the signatory countries from taking actions
that are inconsistent with the agreements, and do not help
settle trade disputes that may arise from such actions.
Indeed, the free trade agreements that Kazakhstan signed
with the Kyrgyz Republic in 1995, Russian Federation in
1992, and Uzbekistan in 1997 did not prevent it from
introducing a temporary ban and a 200% tariff on certain
imports from those countries in the late 1990s. Similarly,
the free trade agreements that Uzbekistan signed with many
other CIS countries have not prevented it from imposing
high implicit tariffs on imports from those countries in the
form of excise taxes that are levied on imported but not on
domestically produced goods or have higher rates for
imported than domestically produced goods.
Despite their poor track record in implementing
RTAs, proposals for new RTAs involving CARs continue
unabated. At the eighth summit of the ECO held in
Dushanbe, Tajikistan in September 2004, Iran proposed
establishing a free trade zone within the ECO framework by
2015. In March 2005, the Presidents of Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan set up a working group on the creation of a free
trade zone between the two countries. However, there is no
reason to expect that the design of the proposed new RTAs
will be significantly different from that of the existing RTAs
and that, unlike the latter, they will be fully implemented.
4 The Kyrgyz Republic will need to renegotiate the commitments it made while acceding to the WTO to be able to adopt the
common external tariff schedule (CETS) of the EAEC, as many tariffs in the CETS of the EAEC are higher than the corresponding
tariff bindings with which the Kyrgyz Republic joined the WTO.
5 The Single Economic Space is also referred to as the Common Economic Space.
41Chapter 4 - Regionalism and Multilateralism in Central Asia
4.2 Effects of the Regional Trade Agreements
Since the RTAs involving CARs generally have a
narrow coverage and complex rules of origin and most of
them have remained agreements on paper only, their
impact on the trade policy regime and the pattern of trade
in the CARs has so far been limited. In part because of
the multilateral and bilateral RTAs signed by the CIS
countries, trade among them tends to be freer than trade
between CIS and non-CIS countries. And in part, for
this reason, the CARs “overtrade” with most other CIS
countries, as noted in Chapter 2. Likewise, trade among
the EAEC countries is freer than trade between them
and the other countries, although there is no indication
that they “overtrade” with each other more than with the
other CIS countries.
The EAEC customs union, however, may have
significant adverse effects on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
and Tajikistan if it is fully implemented. Table 4.1 compares
the actual shares of selected EAEC countries in
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan’s merchandise
imports with estimates of the corresponding bilateral import
supply capacity. It shows that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
and Tajikistan could have imported a much larger share of
their merchandise imports from each other and the Russian
Federation in 2004 (2000 in the case of Tajikistan) than
they actually did. This suggests that considerable trade
diversion is likely to occur and social welfare is likely to
worsen in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan if
these countries raise their external tariffs in an effort to
implement the customs union of the EAEC.
Using partial equilibrium analysis, Tumbarello
(2005) assesses welfare effects of implementing the customs
union of the EAEC on its member countries under two
scenarios: (i) prior to and (ii) following their accession to
the WTO.6 She finds that the net welfare effect of
implementing the EAEC customs union on Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan would be negative under
both scenarios (see Table 4.2). The implementation of the
EAEC customs union would increase tariff revenues in all
6 The first scenario assumes that the EAEC countries change their MFN tariffs to match the current CETS of the EAEC, and raise
their MFN tariffs on goods not covered by the CETS to the highest levels prevailing in the EAEC countries. The second scenario
assumes that the EAEC countries change their MFN tariffs to match the EAEC’s current CETS and lower their MFN tariffs on
goods not covered by the CETS to the lowest levels prevailing in the EAEC countries.
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three countries, but this would be more than offset by a
decline in consumer surplus. The net negative effect of
implementing the EAEC customs union on Kazakhstan
and Tajikistan would be much larger under the first scenario
than under the second.
The partial equilibrium analysis made by
Tumbarello (2005) captures only the direct welfare effects
of implementing the EAEC customs union on its member
countries. Yet, its indirect effects are likely to be as significant
as its direct effects. And if the indirect welfare effects of
implementing the EAEC customs union on Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan are positive, then they
can at least partly offset its negative direct welfare effects
on these countries.
For this reason, we reassessed the effects of
implementing the EAEC customs union on Kazakhstan by
using its CGE model, which enables to capture both direct
and indirect effects of policy changes on the economy.7 In
particular, we made a simulation of implementing the EAEC
customs union with a rise in Kazakhstan’s external tariffs. In
this scenario, Kazakhstan abolishes all remaining tariffs on
imports from the other EAEC countries (represented by
the Kyrgyz Republic and Russian Federation), effective 1
January 2006. At the same time, it retains the current tariffs
or adopts the Russian tariffs, whichever are higher, on imports
from the non-EAEC countries for the commodities not yet
covered by the CETS of the EAEC.  The current external
tariffs remain unchanged for the commodities already covered
by the CETS of the EAEC. As a result, Kazakhstan’s
nonweighted average MFN ad-valorem tariff rate rises from
7.4% to 10.8%.8
Like Tumbarello (2005), we found that
implementing the EAEC customs union with a rise in
external tariffs would have considerable adverse
macroeconomic effects on Kazakhstan. While tariff revenue
7 The computable general equilibrium model of Kazakhstan has been developed by ADB as part of its study on Central Asia regional
cooperation in trade, transport, and transit. The model has a relatively detailed structure, with 25 sectors, 16 regions, 30
household types, government, and five trading partners (the PRC, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, and the rest
of the world). It has been implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling System and calibrated to Kazakhstan’s social accounting
matrix for 2000. A detailed description of the model is given in Appendix 3.
8 The reason for considering such a scenario is that, if and when the member countries of the EAEC agree on common external
tariffs for the commodities not yet covered by its CETS, they are likely to choose the highest existing external tariffs.
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would grow much faster than in the baseline (“no-change”)
scenario, real GDP would grow significantly more slowly.
The cumulative shortfall in real GDP at 2002 prices over
2005–2015 would reach almost US$10 billion, an
equivalent of 31% of real GDP in 2005 (see Table 4.3).
By 2015, real GDP would be 20.8% smaller compared
with real GDP in the baseline scenario. Assuming that
policy barriers to Kazakhstan’s exports to the EAEC
countries remain unchanged, exports to both the EAEC
and the non-EAEC countries would expand less than in
the baseline scenario.9 Considerable trade diversion would
ensue on the import side, with imports from the EAEC
countries growing much faster and imports from the non-
EAEC countries growing significantly more slowly than
in the baseline scenario.
Chapter 1 argued that an RTA is more likely to
improve rather than worsen social welfare in member countries
if its implementation is accompanied by the lowering of
nonpreferential tariffs. To test to what extent this argument
applies to the EAEC customs union, we made a CGE
model-based simulation of a scenario in which implementing
the EAEC customs union is accompanied by a reduction in
Kazakhstan’s external tariffs. In this scenario, we assumed
that Kazakhstan abolishes all remaining tariffs on imports
from the other EAEC countries, effective 1 January 2006.
Simultaneously, it adopts the external tariffs it would have
under the previous scenario reduced uniformly by 50% across
all commodities and non-EAEC countries. As a result, its
nonweighted average MFN ad-valorem tariff rate falls from
7.4% to 5.4%.
We found that implementing the EAEC customs
union, even with a reduction in Kazakhstan’s external tariffs,
would cause substantial trade diversion and slow down real
GDP growth compared with the baseline scenario (see
9 The assumption that policy barriers to Kazakhstan’s exports to the EAEC countries remain unchanged is not restrictive given
that Kazakhstan’s exports are dominated by primary commodities, which are generally not covered by its RTAs with the Kyrgyz
Republic and the Russian Federation, and policy barriers to Kazakhstan’s other exports to the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian
Federation are already fairly low.
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Table 4.4). In addition, it would lead to a considerable
shortfall in tariff revenue. However, its adverse effects on
economic growth would be much smaller than in the
previous scenario. Furthermore, unlike in the previous
scenario, Kazakhstan’s exports to both the EAEC and
non-EAEC countries would grow faster than in the
baseline scenario.
Implementing the EAEC customs union is likely to
have greater adverse macroeconomic effects on the Kyrgyz
Republic and Tajikistan than on Kazakhstan. The reason
is that, as Table 4.1 suggests, further preferential trade
liberalization within the EAEC framework is likely to cause
greater trade diversion in these countries than in
Kazakhstan. Moreover, implementing the EAEC customs
union is more likely to lead to a rise in external tariffs in the
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan than in Kazakhstan.
Its effects on Uzbekistan are difficult to predict.
Uzbekistan at present imposes relatively high explicit and
implicit tariffs on imports from both EAEC and non-
EAEC countries. To join the EAEC customs union, it
will need to eliminate tariffs on imports from the EAEC
countries and, most likely, lower tariffs on imports from
non-EAEC countries. This will lead to considerable trade
creation and trade diversion, with an a priori ambiguous
net effect on social welfare in Uzbekistan.
4.3 Accession to the World Trade
Organization and Regional Cooperation in
Trade Policy within the Multilateral
Framework
In parallel with participation in various RTAs, the
CARs have pursued membership in the WTO, albeit with
a varying degree of success. While the Kyrgyz Republic
joined the WTO in 1998, the other CARs are at different
stages of the accession process (see Table 4.5). Kazakhstan
has made a considerable headway in revising its national
legislation in line with WTO requirements and is at an
advanced stage of the accession process, with an active
program of Working Party meetings in recent years.
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan’s accession process
are at an earlier stage than Kazakhstan’s, although the
process has speeded up for all three countries since 2002.
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countries and diversify trade in terms of geographical
distribution. Furthermore, WTO membership can help the
CARs reduce their vulnerability to possible protectionist
measures by trading partners and make trade liberalization
irreversible, which makes the policy environment more
predictable and conducive to trade, investment, and growth.
Accession to the WTO also strengthens the CARs’
bargaining power in trade negotiations, especially with
countries seeking the WTO membership. Finally, the
WTO accession can help the CARs strengthen their
capacity for policy management and improve the quality of
institutions.11
The potential benefits of the WTO membership
for the CARs will increase as more of their neighbors
and trading partners accede to the organization. One
reason the Kyrgyz Republic has not benefited much from
its accession to the WTO in 1998 is that none of its
immediate neighbors and a few of its key trading partners
were WTO members at the time. The Kyrgyz Republic
did not coordinate trade policy with its neighbors and
The potential benefits of the WTO membership for
the CARs are considerable. To join the WTO, a country
needs to implement a broad range of policy and institutional
reforms, including liberalizing trade policy and improving
the legal and regulatory framework for international trade.
Once it joins WTO, a country must conduct trade with
other WTO members in accordance with pre-agreed rules.
One of these rules requires that WTO members grant each
other an MFN status. The terms on which a country joins
the WTO and the rules in accordance with which its
members conduct trade with each other are based on
consensus and enforced through an effective dispute
settlement mechanism. This means that accession to the
WTO can help the CARs liberalize trade policy at relatively
low costs and expand trade rapidly due to improved access
to markets in a large number of countries that are already
WTO members.10 Since many countries with which the
CARs “under-trade” (including most developed countries
and emerging markets in East and South Asia) are WTO
members, accession to the WTO can also help the CARs
fully realize their bilateral trade potential vis-à-vis these
10 As of 11 December 2005, 149 countries were members of the WTO.
11 Several empirical studies have concluded that the relatively poor quality of institutions in the CARs has a significant adverse
impact on trade in Central Asia, especially trade between the CARs and Western European countries. See, for example, Babetskii,
Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Raser (2003), EBRD (2003), and Elborgh-Woytek (2003).
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acceded to the WTO with tariff bindings which were
substantially lower than tariffs prevailing in the region. In
response, some of its neighbors imposed tight restrictions
on imports from the Kyrgyz Republic in an effort to prevent
deflection of their trade with other countries through the
Kyrgyz Republic. Since those neighboring countries were
not WTO members, the Kyrgyz Republic could not use
WTO rules and procedures to have the restrictions
repelled. However, the situation has changed significantly
since 1998. Most notably, the PRC acceded to the WTO
in 2001 and the Russian Federation is likely to join the
organization in the near future. Continuing rapid economic
growth and the attendant increase in import demand in
these two large countries will create an opportunity for
the CARs to boost exports and economic growth. WTO
membership can help the CARs take this opportunity.
Since the WTO members conduct trade with each
other in accordance with pre-agreed common rules, an
increasingly large share of trade in Central Asia will be
governed by those rules, as more CARs accede to the
WTO. This will provide a more favorable environment
for both intra- and extra-regional trade. Sudden and
frequent changes in explicit tariffs and use of implicit
tariffs—two major barriers to trade in Central Asia
discussed in Chapter 3—will no longer be possible.
Customs rules and procedures will, at least, partly be
harmonized as they are made consistent with the WTO
requirements. Those CARs that will have joined the
WTO will be able to use its dispute settlement mechanism
to resolve trade disputes with each other, and there will
be no need for a separate dispute settlement mechanism
for intra-regional trade.
WTO membership also entails costs for the
CARs, but these are often exaggerated and
misinterpreted. For example, the costs of policy reforms
(such as liberalization of trade policy) that a country
implements in connection with the accession to the
WTO are sometimes interpreted as costs of the
membership in the organization. However, the country
would need to implement most of these policy reforms
anyway if it is to expand trade and integrate into the
global economy. WTO membership actually reduces the
costs of trade liberalization and makes it more difficult
to reverse. Likewise, the constraints that WTO
membership imposes on policy autonomy make the policy
environment more predictable and conducive to trade,
investment, and growth.
The real costs of the WTO membership are those
directly associated with the accession process. These
include the costs of preparing accession documents,
negotiating accession conditions with a large number of
existing members, and building institutions that are
needed to meet the requirements of the WTO
membership but otherwise have little significance for the
country.12 Nonetheless, the costs of WTO accession are
most likely to be less than the costs associated with the
preparation of the numerous RTAs that have been signed
by CARs but not implemented. Moreover, most bilateral
and multilateral donors are more willing to provide the
CARs with technical assistance in institutional building
for the accession to the WTO than for the preparation of
an RTA.
WTO membership does not preclude regional
cooperation in trade policy. In fact, several options are
there for such cooperation, which the CARs can pursue
within the multilateral framework. First, the CARs may
want to liberalize trade policy in a coordinated manner
and on a nondiscriminatory basis, as was done by many
APEC member countries. This would help them avoid
the bitter experience of the Kyrgyz Republic with
12 A good example is the cost to Cambodia of adopting and implementing legislation consistent with the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) code, which was signed as part of Cambodia’s accession to the WTO in 2004. The Government
of Cambodia spent much legislative time drafting laws, and lawyers, judges, law enforcement, and customs officials were taken
from other duties to be trained in TRIPS compliance. Given the low probability of Cambodia producing intellectual property that
can benefit from TRIPS protection, the net benefit from all these activities is unlikely to have outweighed the opportunity cost
of scarce human capital. For a more detailed treatment of these compliance costs, including a box on Cambodia’s experience,
see Hoekman (2005).
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uncoordinated trade liberalization, and use of restrictions
on cross-border movements of people and transport
equipment as a means to regulate imports. Second, the
CARs that are not yet WTO members may want to
coordinate their negotiating positions in the accession
process with each other and other countries seeking WTO
membership.13 This would strengthen their barging power
during accession negotiations, but most likely prolong the
process. Third, once they become WTO members, the
CARs may want to join issue-specific coalitions within
the WTO, such as the groups of developing countries
pressuring for changes in the WTO rules on agriculture
and elimination of agricultural subsidies in developed
countries (see Box 4.1).
4.4 Conclusions
Since 1991, the CARs have joined several regional
organizations that involve or seek to reach a multilateral
RTA. In addition, they have entered into numerous
bilateral RTAs with other CIS countries. Many of these
RTAs have not entered into force, while most of those that
have formally entered into force have not been implemented.
Consequently, their impact on the trade policy regime and
13 In fact, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Russian Federation have agreed to pursue a coordinated approach to the accession
to the WTO as part of their cooperation in trade policy within the framework of the EAEC.
Box 4.1: Coalitions within the World Trade Organization
Several coalitions of member countries acting together and supporting each other on a particular issue have recently
emerged within the World Trade Organization (WTO). Given the high costs for the Central Asian republics (CARs) of the
barriers to their agricultural exports to developed countries and of trade-distorting subsidies that those countries provide to
their farmers, the coalitions of developing countries that seek the reduction of barriers to agricultural imports to developed
countries and the elimination of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies in those countries, are of particular importance for
the CARs.
In the run-up to the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Cancun in September 2003, a group of 20 developing countries
formed a coalition (referred to as the “G-20”) with the aim of significant liberalization of trade in agricultural products under
the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. To this end, the members of the G-20 adopted a common position on
trade in agricultural products, which was circulated as their joint proposal during the Cancun Ministerial Conference and
became the platform of the group. The members of the group continued consultations on policy and technical issues relating
to trade in agricultural products after the Cancun Ministerial Conference. They also intend to maintain a common position on
agriculture during future trade negotiations under the Doha Round.
During the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, a group of West African cotton-producing countries (Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad, and Mali) presented the Sectoral Initiative on Cotton, which highlighted the damage to developing countries
caused by cotton subsidies in developed countries—particularly the US—and called for the elimination of these subsidies. In
March 2005, Brazil secured a final WTO ruling that most cotton subsidies in the US, including cotton export subsidies, were
illegal under the WTO rules. At the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong in December 2005, the WTO members
agreed to eliminate cotton export subsidies by the end of 2006.
On 1 February 2006, the US Congress approved legislation repealing a cotton support program known as Step 2,
effective 1 August 2006. The legislation both implements the WTO ruling on the case filed by Brazil against cotton subsidies
in the US and fulfills the commitment made by the US in Hong Kong with respect to cotton export subsidies. It marks a
significant change in US agricultural policies, which most likely would have not occurred without the pressure that the West
African countries and Brazil put on the US within the WTO. However, even if the US fully eliminates the cotton subsidies found
illegal by the WTO and all WTO members eliminate export cotton subsidies, considerable trade-distorting cotton subsidies
will remain in developed countries. Cotton-producing CARs could broaden the coalition against these subsidies and help
speed up their full elimination.
Source: Authors
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the pattern of trade in the CARs has so far been limited. If
fully implemented, however, the concluded and planned
RTAs involving CARs may cause considerable trade
diversion and have significant adverse effects on the CARs.
In particular, implementing the EAEC customs union is
likely to slow down economic growth in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, and Tajikistan significantly, unless it is
accompanied by substantial reductions in common external
tariffs of its member countries.
In parallel with participation in various RTAs, the
CARs have pursued membership in the WTO. The
Kyrgyz Republic has already joined the WTO. The other
CARs are at different stages of the accession process. The
potential benefits of the WTO membership for the CARs
are considerable. They have increased significantly with
the accession of the PRC in 2001, and will increase further
as more of the CARs’ neighbors (including the Russian
Federation) join the organization.
WTO membership also entails costs for the CARs,
but these are often exaggerated and misinterpreted. The
real costs of the WTO membership are those directly
associated with the accession process and not those
associated with policy reforms that a country often
implements in connection with the WTO accession.
Multilateral and bilateral development agencies can provide
technical assistance in building institutions and capacity
required for the WTO accession.
WTO membership does not preclude regional
cooperation in trade policy. In fact, there are several
options for such cooperation that the CARs can pursue
within the multilateral framework. These include
concerted but nondiscriminatory trade liberalization,
coordination of negotiating positions in the accession
process, and joint efforts with other developing countries
to push for the elimination of cotton subsidies in
developed countries.




The transport sector plays a relatively marginal role
in the CARs in terms of its contribution to aggregate output
and employment, accounting for 3–8% of GDP and 2–
5% of total employment. Yet, it is crucial for the participation
of the CARs in international trade and their integration
into the global economy. Moreover, the degree and nature
of participation of a CAR in international trade depends
not only on its own transport sector but also the transport
sector of its neighbors, including the other CARs, as well
as on the degree of compatibility and integration of its
transport sector with those of the neighbors. This is because
all the CARs are landlocked and heavily rely on
transporting goods by land through neighboring countries
in trade with noncontiguous countries, and—to various
degrees—serve each other as transit countries.1 Deficiencies
of the transport sector in one CAR are often compounded
by deficiencies of the transport sector in another CAR.
This largely explains why transport costs are high and transit
times are long and unpredictable for international shipments
to and from the CARs.
This chapter reviews the transport sector in Central
Asia and identifies deficiencies of transport infrastructure,
the legal and regulatory framework for the transport sector,
and transport and logistics services in the CARs that
contribute to high transport costs and long and
unpredictable transit times for international shipments to
and from Central Asia. The chapter then discusses the
benefits of regional cooperation in transport for the CARs
and reviews recent initiatives in this area.
5.1 Transport Infrastructure
The CARs inherited fairly extensive and highly
integrated transport networks from the FSU, which were
built with little regard for their then administrative borders
and mostly oriented towards the Russian Federation. There
were many examples of railways and roads crossing back
and forth over borders in Central Asia. At the same time,
their transport links with non-FSU neighboring countries—
such as Afghanistan, PRC, India, Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey—were poorly developed, with a few direct routes,
most of which were in very poor condition.
Since the break-up of the FSU, the CARs have
sought to improve their transport links with non-FSU
1 In particular, Azerbaijan serves as a transit country in trade between Kazakhstan and Turkey; Kazakhstan serves as a transit
country in trade between Azerbaijan and the PRC and between Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, on the one hand,
and the Russian Federation, on the other; the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan serve as transit countries in trade between
Uzbekistan and PRC; and Uzbekistan serves as a transit country in trade between Kazakhstan and Iran and between Tajikistan
and the Russian Federation.
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countries, often with the support of multilateral and bilateral
development agencies. Most notably, railway connections
between Azerbaijan and Iran and between Kazakhstan
and the PRC, and a road connection between Tajikistan
and the PRC have been established. Kazakhstan, Russian
Federation, and Turkmenistan have reached an agreement
to build a railway that would connect Russian Federation
with Iran via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan
is making efforts to build missing segments of a railway
that will link the PRC with Europe via Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Iran. A railway that would connect
Uzbekistan with the PRC through the Kyrgyz Republic
is under consideration, along with a railroad between
Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. With the financial and
technical assistance of ADB, the CARs have carried out
or are implementing several road projects to improve their
transport links with East and South Asia, a step towards
reestablishing themselves as a land bridge between Asia
and Europe. These projects include the rehabilitation of
the Dushanbe-Kyrgyz border, Osh-Irkeshtan, Osh-
Bishkek, Bishkek-Almaty, and Almaty-Astana roads. The
CARs have also been taking part in the TRACECA
(Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia) Programme
of the EU and in Asian Highway and Trans-Asian
Railway projects of the UN Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP)(see
Box 5.1). Overall, however, the lack of financial resources
and poor coordination of national transport infrastructure
projects have been slowing down progress in integrating
Central Asian transport networks into international
transport networks.
At the same time, the CARs have built a number
of new railways and roads primarily to avoid transit through
a neighboring country, as the emergence of national borders
increased transit costs and times. In particular, Kazakhstan
has built the Kyzylasker-Kirovskiy road to connect the part
of South-Kazakhstan Region located south of the Chardara
Reser voir with the rest of the countr y, bypassing
Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz Republic has upgraded the Jalal-
Abad-Uzgen road at a cost of about US$12 million to
link Osh and Jalal-Abad without passing through
Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has built the Uchkuduk–Misken–
Karauzak railway at a cost of more than US$10 million to
connect Bukhara with Nukus via Navoi, bypassing
Turkmenistan. While these new roads and railways have
had certain positive impact on the development of the
CARs that built them, it is not obvious that their
construction would have been justifiable if the use of existing
transport networks had not been beset by difficulties with
transit through neighboring countries. Better use of scarce
resources could have been the rehabilitation and
maintenance of existing transport networks.
The CARs now possess extensive transport networks
(see Table 5.1). Several transcontinental railway and road
corridors connect them with neighboring countries and the
rest of the world (see Figure 5.1). However, many segments
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Box 5.1: Participation of the Central Asian Republics in Major Regional Transport Infrastructure Projects
TRACECA Programme
The Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) Programme is a European Union-funded technical assistance
program that aims to develop a west-east transport corridor from Europe, across the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and
the Caspian Sea to Central Asia. The Programme was launched at a conference in Brussels in May 1993, which brought
together trade and transport ministers from the original eight TRACECA countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).
To date, the TRACECA Programme financed 39 technical assistance projects totaling Euro 57.7 million and 14 investment
projects totaling Euro 52.3 million. The technical assistance provided through the TRACECA Programme has helped attract
large investments to participating countries from international financial institutions. In particular, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development has extended loans to Kazakhstan (US$65 million) and Uzbekistan (US$40 million) for the
rehabilitation of railways on the basis of TRACECA projects, which have identified the condition of the rail systems in Central
Asia. The small-scale investment projects financed under the TRACECA Programme include the reconstruction of the rail
ferry ramp in Aktau, Kazakhstan; procurement of cargo and container handling equipment for container terminals in Aktau
and Chimkent, Kazakhstan, and Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic; establishment of container services between Baku, Azerbaijan,
and Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan; procurement of mobile equipment for a container terminal in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. In
addition, the TRACECA Programme is providing co-financing for the border crossing facilitation component of the Asian
Development Bank’s loans to Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic (totaling US$68 million) for the rehabilitation of the
Almaty-Bishkek road.
The Asian Highway and Trans-Asian Railway
The Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development project, which was endorsed by the UN Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific at its 48th session in 1992, has three pillars: the Asian Highway (AH), Trans-Asian
Railway, and facilitation of land transport projects.
The objective of the AH is to promote the development of international road transport in the region. The Intergovernmental
Agreement on the AH Network was adopted in November 2003 by the Intergovernmental Meeting and entered into force in
July 2005. The Agreement identified 55 AH routes with a total length of approximately 140,000 km, which crisscross the
Asian continent and reaches  Europe. These include four routes (1,670 km) in Azerbaijan, eleven routes (13,189 km) in
Kazakhstan, four routes (1,695 km) in the Kyrgyz Republic, three routes (1,925 km) in Tajikistan, and five routes (2,966 km)
in Uzbekistan.
The Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) was initiated in the 1960s with the objective of providing a continuous 14,000-km rail link
between Singapore and Istanbul (Turkey), with possible onward connections to Europe and Africa. Given the extent of the
territory covered, the differences in standards, and differences in the levels of technical development between railways in
the region, UN ESCAP adopted a step-by-step approach to define the TAR network. The network was initially divided into four
major components, which were studied separately:
(i) a northern corridor connecting the rail networks of the People’s Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Russian
Federation, and Korean Peninsula;
(ii) a southern corridor connecting Thailand and the southern Chinese province of Yunnan with Turkey through Myanmar,
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Islamic Republic of Iran with Sri Lanka also part of the corridor;
(iii) a network covering the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Indo-China sub-regions; and
(iv) a north-south corridor linking Northern Europe to the Persian Gulf through the Russian Federation, Central Asia,
and South Caucasus.
The next challenge is to move towards joint operationalisation of these corridors in a coordinated manner at financial,
operational, and commercial levels. In particular, institutional and technical bottlenecks have to be identified and specific
remedial measures have to be defined and implemented. The development of common information technology systems has
to be given proper attention as well as the development of efficient access to ports and inland container depots.
Source: http://www.traceca-org.org/ and http://www.unescap.org/
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of these corridors are still missing or in poor condition,
and many railways and roads the CARs inherited from the
FSU have deteriorated. Only a small proportion of Central
Asian roads included in the AH Network have been
classified by the UN ESCAP as “Primary” or “Class I,”
while a significant proportion of them have been classified
as “Class III” or worse (see Figure 5.2). It is estimated
that only 25% of roads in the Kyrgyz Republic and 20%
of roads in Tajikistan are in good condition. The reasons
are (i) the lack of maintenance due to inadequate financing;(ii)
the Soviet standards in accordance with which most of these
roads were built and which are inappropriate for the current
level of traffic and modern trucks; and (iii) the low quality of
maintenance due to corruption and limited use of modern
technology and equipment.
Many other elements of transport infrastructure are
also underdeveloped and in poor condition. Most notably,
multimodal transport infrastructure is underdeveloped. The
rolling stock in rail transport is of old technology and has
been cannibalized to avoid purchasing new spare parts and
units. The lack of locomotives and train paths at border
crossing points is a serious obstacle to cross-border
movements of trains.2 There is substantial overcapacity in
basic vehicles in road transport, but specialized vehicles—
such as temperature-controlled ones—are in short supply.
While Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have
recently bought or leased a number of modern airplanes,
the air fleets in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are
mostly obsolete. Many airports need reconstruction.
5.2 Legal and Regulatory Framework
Since independence, the CARs have made
considerable progress in establishing a legal and regulatory
framework for the transport sector, but much remains to
be done. The existing frameworks are weak and less than
transparent. In particular, the existing sector-specific
legislation on transport safety and security is often too
general, contradictory,  and complicated, which creates ample
possibilities for interpretations and corruption. Most
rules and regulations are prepared in a nontransparent
2 Due largely to these and other transport-related factors (such as the need for technical inspection of the trains and shunting of
damaged wagons), border crossing by a cargo train takes from several hours to several days in the CARs, compared with 30–40
minutes in Europe and 60 minutes recommended by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Europe.
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manner. Information on changes and amendments is often
limited and getting information on all relevant laws and
regulations can be quite difficult. Laws and regulations
concerning competition in the transport sector are generally
weak and in some cases, allow state-owned companies to
perform both regulatory and commercial functions.
The CARs have acceded to a number of basic
international transport agreements and conventions, but
many others are yet to be signed. In 2001, the UN ESCAP
identified seven international transport agreements and
conventions that it recommended all member countries to
sign. Of these, only one has been signed by all of the five
CARs (See Appendix 4). Even those international
agreements and conventions that the CARs have acceded
to are often not respected in practice and overridden by
domestic regulations and unofficial practices.
Cross-border and transit traffic are mostly governed
by multilateral and bilateral transport agreements that
CARs have signed with each other and with neighboring
countries.3 Although these agreements are generally better
implemented than international agreements and
conventions, they have resulted in a very complex regional
regulatory framework for the transport sector and, with a
few exceptions, have not been particularly effective in
facilitating cross-border and transit traffic. Furthermore,
there has been little harmonization of transport legislation
and regulations among the CARs.
Consequently, national transport legislation and
regulations currently in place in the CARs differ markedly
and create serious obstacles to cross-border and transit traffic.
A major problem is the availability and cost of transport
permits, which foreign transporters generally need to obtain
in order for their vehicles to be allowed to enter (and pass
through) the territory of a CAR. Such permits are usually
issued by government agencies on the basis of a bilateral
agreement whereby country A allows a certain number of
vehicles from country B to enter (and pass through) its
territory free of charge in return for country B allowing the
same number of vehicles from country A to enter (and pass
through) its territory free of charge. The problem with this
standard international arrangement is that the demand in
many foreign countries for permits to enter the CARs is
often greater than the demand in the CARs for permits to
enter those foreign countries. The result is a shortage of
permits for foreign vehicles to enter the CARs and a surplus
of permits for vehicles from the CARs to enter the foreign
countries. Consequently, in order for their vehicles to be
allowed to enter the CARs, foreign transport operators often
have to purchase nonreciprocal permits at a substantial cost.
In addition to the entry (and transit) fees, the CARs levy
other charges and fees, such as a road tax and an excess axle
load charge, on foreign vehicles (see Table 5.2). Combined
with entry (and transit) fees, these additional charges and
fees can make the cost of entering (and passing through) the
CARs quite high for foreign vehicles.
Another significant regulatory barrier to cross-border
and transit traffic is visa requirements for foreign drivers.
Citizens of most foreign countries need a visa to enter the
CARs. Even among the CARs, citizens of the Kyrgyz
Republic and Tajikistan need a visa to enter Uzbekistan and
vice-versa. In Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and
Uzbekistan, it is possible to obtain a visa at an airport upon
arrival, but even in these CARs countries, it is not possible for
foreign truck drivers to obtain a visa at border crossing points.
Consequently, if a foreign driver needs a visa to enter a particular
CAR, he has to obtain it in advance from an embassy of that
country. This can be time consuming and can cause delays,
particularly if the CAR concerned does not have an embassy
in the country where the driver resides. In addition, the cost of
an entry visa in the CARs is relatively high. For example, a
single-entry Kazakh visa can cost a citizen of a non-CIS country
as much as US$70, a single-entry Kyrgyz or Uzbek visa
US$75, and a single-entry Tajik visa US$60. The total cost
of visas for the driver and co-driver can increase transport costs
significantly if a foreign vehicle needs to pass through several
of the CARs and neighboring countries.
3 See Sims (2005) for a list of multilateral and bilateral regional transport agreements signed by CARs.
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5.3 Transport and Logistics Services
The availability, quality, and costs of transport
services in the CARs compare unfavorably with many
other countries.4 In particular, international rail services
for small cargo (i.e., cargo of less than one wagonload or
five-ton container-load) are either not available or very
costly with long booking and transit times. International
shipments by road are fairly expensive and unreliable.
Inter-modal piggyback operations (e.g., trailers on rail
wagons) are nonexistent. Air freight ser vices are
underdeveloped and expensive. Scheduled consolidated
services are unpredictable and among the most expensive
in the world.5
4 See, for example, Jenkins and Pezant (2003), Molnar and Ojala (2003), and World Bank (2005b) for an in-depth analysis of the
state of transport services in Central Asia.
5 In consolidated (or groupage) services, the capacity of a vehicle is filled with several individual shippers’ parcels. The consolidated
capacity is offered to a large number of customers typically according to a fixed schedule of departures and arrivals. This is
standard practice in international freight forwarding.
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Lack of competition is one of the main reasons for
the low quality and the high costs of rail and air transport
services. State-owned railways maintain monopoly positions
in rail transport and continue to perform both regulatory
and commercial functions, although restructuring of railways
has been underway in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and is
under consideration in Tajikistan. Likewise, state-owned
airlines dominate the market for air transport services in all
the CARs, including Kazakhstan, where there are 47 private
and only one state-owned air carrier (see Table 5.3). In
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, state-owned airlines
also effectively control major airports. The lack of competition
has resulted in inefficiencies in transport services, lack of
commercial management of operations, and underinvestment
in transport infrastructure, especially in rail transport.
Although state-owned enterprises in the road
transport have largely been privatized, competition remains
limited in the market for international transport services.
The need for expensive equipment and difficulties with
transit through neighboring countries give large foreign
transport operators a competitive edge and make it relatively
difficult for local companies to enter this market. The market
is therefore dominated by a small number of large transport
operators, mostly from Iran and Turkey. In contrast,
competition is stiff in the market for domestic road transport
services, which is mostly comprised of small and micro firms.
The cost of domestic transport services is relatively low—
due in part to low wages and operating costs, and oversupply
of old equipment not suited for international traffic—but
the quality of services is low as well.
The share of own account transport is very high,
especially for domestic road transport services. It is estimated
that almost 80% of domestic road freight in Uzbekistan
and over 50% in the other CARs is carried for own account.
This is typical in countries where there is overcapacity and
the level of sophistication of transport and logistics markets
is low. The high share of own-account transport effectively
hinders the development of domestic transport markets.
This situation is difficult to change in Central Asia since
many shippers prefer their own transport capacity, which is
often cheaper and deemed more reliable and flexible than
what can be bought in the market.
The limited availability of multi-modal transport
operations and relatively high costs of international transport
services for small cargo are due largely to the underdevelopment
of logistics infrastructure and services. There are no modern
logistics centers in any of the countries that could consolidate
freight for the international market in sufficient volumes and
allocate them to the most efficient transportation mode.6
6 World Bank (2005b).
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International logistics providers have largely stayed outside
the region, citing the small size of the market, unfavorable
regulatory environment, and corrupt practices. There has
been little FDI in logistics infrastructure and limited transfer
of know-how in logistics services. Local logistics companies
are mostly small, and lack the facilities and expertise to
provide quality services.
As part of the ADB study on Central Asia regional
cooperation in trade, transport and transit, a “logistics
friendliness” survey was conducted in the CARs in late
2004–early 2005. Companies involved in international
transportation and trade were asked to assess the
“friendliness” of the CARs and several comparator
countries in terms of affordability, speed, and reliability of
logistics services. Although the survey covered a relatively
small number of companies (about 10 in each CAR) and
its results need to be treated with caution, they indicate
that the CARs are much less “logistics friendly” than the
US and the EU countries, and somewhat less “logistics
friendly” than the Russian Federation. As compared with
the EU countries and the US, the CARs rank particularly
low in terms of reliability of logistics services. Among the
CARs, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic are most
“logistics friendly” while Tajikistan is least “logistics
friendly.”7
5.4 Regional Cooperation in Transport
Increased regional cooperation with each other and
neighboring countries in transport in the form of
coordinated development of national transport networks,
7 These results are broadly consistent with the results of a similar survey reported in Ojala, Naula, and Queiroz (2004).
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simplification, and harmonization of the legal and
regulatory framework, facilitation of entry and transit of
foreign vehicles, liberalization of trade in transport
services, benchmarking, and exchange of know-how in
restructuring of state-owned railways, airlines, etc. would
help the CARs reduce transport costs for international
shipments and make transit times for such shipments
shorter and more predictable. This would, in turn, help
the CARs expand trade, especially with distant countries,
take more active part in GPN and related trade in
manufactured products, diversify trade in terms of both
commodity composition and geographical distribution,
increase the gains from participation in international trade,
and reduce the associated costs.8 Facilitation of transit of
foreign transport equipment would also help the CARs
avoid the construction of new bypassing railways and
roads, allocate more resources to the rehabilitation and
maintenance of existing transport networks and their closer
integration with international transport networks, and
become a land-bridge for rapidly expanding trade between
East and South Asia, on the one hand, and Europe, on
the other. Thus, the benefits of regional cooperation in
transport for the CARs are substantial.
There have been a number of regional cooperation
initiatives pertaining to transport and involving CARs.
Apart from the three major regional transport infrastructure
projects described in Box 5.1, four other initiatives can be
highlighted. First, a Transport Sector Coordinating
Committee has been set up under the CAREC Program
to develop transport services in the member countries and
improve their transport links with each other and the rest
of the world. Second, the Central and South Asia Transport
and Trade Forum, which involves Afghanistan, Iran,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and
is also supported by ADB, seeks to facilitate movements
of goods and vehicles along two road corridors connecting
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan with seaports in
the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf via Afghanistan.
Third, transport is one of the focus areas of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, which consists of the PRC,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Finally, transport is one of the
priority areas of regional cooperation among Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan under the UN Special Programme for
the Economies of Central Asia.
Nevertheless, regional cooperation among as well
as between the CARs and their neighbors in the area of
transport, especially transport regulations and services, has
been less than satisfactory. The main reasons are: the lack
of political will, uncertainty about and unequal distribution
of benefits and costs of cooperation among and within the
countries concerned; opposition of vested interests that stand
to lose from improved regional cooperation in transport;
weak implementation capacity overstretched by numerous
national and regional initiatives; and security concerns,
which often prompt CARs to take measures that obstruct
entry and transit of foreign transport equipment.
The CAREC member countries have recently
agreed on the Regional Transport Sector Road Map, which
formulates the strategic priorities for regional cooperation
in the transport sector. The goal is to develop an integrated
and efficient transport system that will improve transport
links of the CAREC member countries, enhance their
access to outside large markets, reduce transport costs,
improve transport services, and facilitate cross-border and
transit traffic in the region. The five strategic priorities are:
(i) Harmonization and simplification of cross-
border transport procedures and
documentation among the CAREC member
countries to facilitate the movement of
passengers and freight across borders;
8 Moran (2002) finds that the benefits of trade liberalization that is accompanied by the establishment of international supply
chain arrangements [which often require inexpensive, fast, and reliable transport services] between developed and developing
countries can be 10–20 times larger than those accruing from trade liberalization alone.
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(ii) Harmonization of transport regulations among
the CAREC member countries to create a
level playing field for transport operators, and
promote efficiency and better services;
(iii) Development and improvement of regional
and international transport corridors to link
production centers and markets within the
CAREC member countries, and to enhance
CAREC member countries’ access to
neighboring regions and markets;
(iv) Restructuring and modernization of railways
to provide quality and efficient services
through private sector participation and
improved corporate governance; and
(v) Improvement of sector funding and
management to ensure that the regional
transport network is developed, and
maintained properly.
The Road Map addresses most of the deficiencies
of the transport sector in Central Asia discussed above. It
is, therefore, important that the Road Map be fully
implemented. To this end, the CAREC member countries
need to develop and carry out a detailed time-bound action
plan, which would include specific measures aimed at
implementing the Road Map. In addition, they should
consider extending the Road Map to address deficiencies
of air transport in Central Asia, and developing economic
corridors on the basis of selected transport corridors
connecting them with each other and the rest of the world.9
For their part, multilateral institutions need to make
adequate technical and financial assistance available to the
CAREC member countries for them to be able to
implement the Road Map and develop economic corridors
that would enable them to expand trade and establish
regional production networks along key transport corridors.
5.5 Conclusions
The CARs inherited highly integrated transport
networks from the FSU, which were built with little regard
for their then administrative borders and mostly oriented
towards the Russian Federation. At the same time, their
transport links with non-FSU neighboring countries—such
as Afghanistan, PRC, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey—
were poorly developed. Since the break-up of the FSU, the
CARs have sought to improve their transport links with non-
FSU countries, but a lack of financial resources and poor
coordination of national transport infrastructure projects have
been slowing down progress in integrating their transport
networks into international transport networks.
Simultaneously, the CARs have built a number of
new roads and railways primarily to avoid transit through a
neighboring country. While these new roads and railways
have had certain positive impact on the development of the
CARs that built them, it is not obvious that their
construction would have been justifiable if the use of existing
transport networks had not been beset by difficulties with
cross-border movements of people, transport equipment,
and goods. A better use of limited financial resources would
have been the development of international transport
corridors and rehabilitation and the maintenance of existing
networks. Central Asia now possesses an extensive transport
network, but much of it is in poor condition and requires
rehabilitation. Other elements of transport infrastructure—
with the exception of air transport infrastructure in
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan—are also
underdeveloped and in poor condition.
Although the CARs have made considerable
progress in establishing a legal and regulatory framework
for the transport sector since independence, much remains
to be done. The existing frameworks are weak and
nontransparent. National transport legislation and
regulations differ significantly and create serious obstacles
9 The concept of “economic corridors“ expands the concept of transport corridors to include a simultaneous focus on developing
associated production, investment, and trade linkages within a well-defined geographic area. For a more detailed explanation
of the concept, see Abonyi and Zola (2003).
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to cross-border and transit traffic. A major problem is the
availability and the cost of transport permits, which foreign
transport operators generally need to obtain in order for
their vehicles to be allowed to enter (and pass through) the
territory of the CARs. There is a shortage of reciprocal
(free) transport permits, while the cost of nonreciprocal
transport permits is high. In addition to obtaining a
transport permit, foreign transport operators need to pay
various taxes and charges, such as a road tax and an excess
axle load charge, to enter (and pass through) the territory
of the CARs. Furthermore, foreign drivers generally need
a visa to enter a CAR and have to obtain it in advance at
an embassy of that CAR. This often causes delays because
the CARs have cumbersome visa procedures and do not
have embassies in many countries.
The availability, quality, and costs of transport
services in the CARs compare unfavorably with many other
countries. Lack of competition is one of the main reasons
for the low quality and high costs of rail, air, and
international road transport services. Competition is stiff
in the market for domestic road transport services. The
cost of these services is relatively low, but the quality is not
high either. The share of own account transport is very
high, which is an impediment to the development of markets
for transport services. The availability of multi-modal
transport operations is limited and costs of international
transport services for small cargo are relatively high due
largely to the underdevelopment of logistics infrastructure
and services. This is a serious obstacle to the development
of small- and medium-sized enterprises, which have been
an engine of employment generation, export expansion,
and economic growth in many other countries.
There have been a number of regional cooperation
initiatives aimed at removing the deficiencies of transport
infrastructure and services and facilitating cross-border and
transit traffic in the CARs and neighboring countries.
Notably, the CAREC member countries have recently
agreed on the Regional Transport Sector Road Map, which
formulates the strategic priorities for regional cooperation
in the transport sector and addresses most of the deficiencies
of rail and road transport in Central Asia. The CARs
and other CAREC member countries now need to develop
and carry out a detailed time-bound action plan to
implement the Road Map. They should also consider
extending the Road Map to address deficiencies of air
transport in Central Asia.




A large share of international trade in the CARs
involves domestic customs transit—that is, transporting
goods from the point of inland customs clearance to the
point of exit (in the case of exports) or from the point of
entry to the point of inland customs clearance (in the case
of imports) without paying the duties and taxes due on
domestic consumption in the CAR concerned. This is
because goods being exported (imported) often undergo
customs clearance in one place but exit (enter) the country
in another place. A substantial proportion of international
trade in the CARs also involves external customs transit
through a neighboring country—that is, transporting goods
from the point of entry to the point of exit in the transit
country without paying duties and taxes due on domestic
consumption in that country. The reason is that the CARs
are all landlocked and most of their trade is with
noncontiguous countries (see Table 6.1). Moreover—as
noted in Chapters 1 and 5—the CARs, to various degrees,
serve each other as a transit country in international trade.
Even domestic trade between certain regions of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
involves customs transit through another CAR. This is
because the transport networks these countries inherited
from the FSU crisscross their national borders. The shortest
route connecting two parts of the same country often passes
through a neighboring country. Furthermore, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan each have exclaves
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in the territory of the other two. Domestic trade between
these exclaves and other parts of the country they belong to
inevitably involves customs transit through the country in
which the exclave is located.
Accordingly, the transit systems—i.e., sets of rules
and procedures in accordance with which customs transit
is carried out—that are in place in the CARs have
significant effects on both intra- and extra-regional trade
in Central Asia. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan’s transit systems also affect
domestic trade in at least one neighboring CAR. Indeed,
certain aspects of the transit systems currently in place in
the CARs do impose constraints on cross-border
movements of goods by rail and by road.1 These are,
however, not crucial for cross-border movements of goods
by rail, for which transport-related factors—such as the
need for technical inspection of the train and shunting of
damaged wagons and the lack of locomotives and train
paths at border crossing points—are a binding constraint.
Unless these transport-related constraints are removed,
improvements in the rail transit systems will do little to
facilitate cross-border movements of goods by rail. In
contrast, inadequacies of the road transit systems impose
a binding constraint on trade in Central Asia.
It is in part due to substantial outlays and delays
associated with road customs transit, especially external road
customs transit, that transport costs are high and transit times
are long and unpredictable for international shipments by
road to and from the CARs. And it is partly due to difficulties
with external road customs transit through neighboring
countries, some of the CARs have spent a considerable
amount of resources on the construction of new roads
primarily to avoid transit through a neighboring CAR. The
construction of these new roads would have been harder to
justify if the use of existing roads had not been beset by
difficulties with transit through neighboring countries.
This chapter reviews the road transit systems currently
in place in the CARs and identifies their weaknesses that
contribute to high transport costs and long and unpredictable
transit times for international shipments to and from the
CARs, prompting some of them to build new roads with
the primary aim of avoiding transit through a neighboring
CAR. The chapter then discusses how regional cooperation
could help the CARs reduce outlays and delays associated
with road customs transit in Central Asia.
6.1 National Transit Systems
Following independence, the CARs developed
national transit systems, which apply to customs transit not
covered by the international or regional agreements that
the CAR concerned has signed. Key features of these
transit systems, including acceptable forms of a guarantee,
are specified in the customs code of the respective CAR.
The design of the national transit systems has improved
markedly over the last several years, reflecting the
considerable progress the CARs have made in revising
their customs codes in line with the Convention on the
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures
(commonly known as the “Revised Kyoto Convention”)
and WTO standards.2
The main remaining problem with the national road
transit systems is that they cover only one country and do
not provide a “chain guarantee.” Consequently, a transport
operator undertaking customs transit under the national
road transit systems has to submit separate transit documents
and provide separate guarantees in the country of origin,
the country of destination, and each of the transit countries
(see Figure 6.1). The need to submit separate transit
documents in several countries can increase transport time
substantially. Providing a guarantee even in one country
can be quite costly, let alone providing separate guarantees
in several countries. Customs legitimately require that the
1 The transit systems are not important for cross-border movements of goods by air because goods in transit by air always remain
in a customs-controlled environment.
2 Kazakhstan enacted its Revised Customs Code in 2003 and the Kyrgyz Republic in 2004. Tajikistan is expected to do so in
November 2005. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are revising their customs codes.
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High costs of providing separate guarantees in
several countries explain why transport operators often clear
goods at the border instead of undertaking internal customs
transit by road and join a customs convoy when external
customs transit by road is required. A major advantage of
customs convoy is that it protects, to some extent, truck
drivers from attempts of corrupt traffic police officers along
the route to extract unofficial payments from them. The
latter is a serious problem for customs transit in the CARs
not only when it is undertaken under their respective
national transit systems, but also when it is undertaken under
international and regional transit systems.
6.2 TIR System
The most important international road transit system
used in the CARs is the so-called “TIR system”—that is, the
international transit system based on the Customs Convention
on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR
Carnets (often referred to as the “TIR Convention”).3 The
main features of the TIR system are as follows:
(i) Goods are transported in a customs-secure
vehicle or container. The TIR Convention sets
out standards and certification procedures for
the load compartment (i.e., the cargo carrying
area) of vehicles and for containers that can be
used in customs transit under the TIR system.
The standards are designed to ensure that the
interior of a load compartment or a container is
not accessible when it is sealed by customs and
any tampering would be clearly visible.
(ii) While goods are in transit, the duties and
taxes at risk are covered by a “chain
guarantee” provided by the national
associations of transport operators that control
access to the TIR system.4 If an irregularity
guarantee must cover not only the cost of the potential duty
and tax liabilities, but also the recovery costs and the amount
of the potential penalties. Hence, the amount required for
the guarantee can be substantially greater than the amount
of the potential duty and tax liabilities.
Although customs in the CARs accept a guarantee
in one of the several forms (e.g., a cash guarantee, a bank
guarantee or an insurance guarantee), there are difficulties
in providing a guarantee in any of these forms. The main
difficulty in providing a cash guarantee is that small transport
operators rarely hold large amounts of cash required for
such a guarantee. In addition, drivers are understandably
reluctant to carry large amounts of cash because not all
roads in the region are secure. Furthermore, in most of the
CARs, repayment system is slow and a cash guarantee
can only be recovered through the customs headquarters,
which is ver y inconvenient, especially for foreign
transporters. A bank guarantee is fairly expensive and only
available to large companies with a good “track record.”
Although an insurance guarantee is generally cheaper than
a bank guarantee, it is difficult to obtain in most of the
CARs because the insurance industry is still in its early
stage of development.
In the absence of a guarantee, convoying is usually
required for customs transit under the national road transit
systems. A major problem with convoying is that the fee for
the service is rather high in some of the CARs. It can be as
high as US$285 in Kazakhstan, US$100 in Tajikistan,
and US$245 in Uzbekistan. Another problem is that
accumulating sufficient vehicles to make up a convoy takes
time, that is, more than a day at light-traffic border crossing
points. Furthermore, all the vehicles in a convoy arrive at the
exit border crossing point together, thus creating an uneven
workload for customs at that point and causing significant
processing delays. That is why the variable costs of the
national road transit systems in the CARs are quite high.
3 All of the CARs are members of the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets.
4 The amount payable under the guarantee is up to US$200,000 for tobacco and alcohol and up to US$50,000 for all other
goods.
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occurs during a TIR transit operation and
the transport operator fails to pay the taxes
and duties that become due as a result of the
irregularity, then the national transport
operators’ association of the country where
the taxes and duties need to be paid pays
them. If a different national association has
issued the TIR Carnet for the transit
operation, that association reimburses the
expenses of the association that has paid the
taxes and duties. Since the national
associations are not financial institutions, their
guarantee obligations under the TIR system
are backed by insurance companies.
(iii) Goods are accompanied by a TIR Carnet,
which is an international customs document
issued in the country of origin and serves as
a customs control document in the countries
of origin, transit, and destination. A TIR
Carnet serves as a proof that the goods it is
accompanying are covered by a guarantee.
The International Road Transport Union
(IRU) prints TIR Carnets and distributes
them to the national associations.
(iv) Customs control measures taken in the
country of origin are accepted by the
countries of transit and destination. This
does not, however, preclude customs officials
in a transit country from undertaking spot
checks on the basis of an identified risk. If
they do so, then they must reseal the load
compartment or the container.
(v) National associations of transport operators
control access to the TIR system and issue
TIR Carnets. To obtain such rights, the
associations and their members need to meet
certain requirements. In particular, the
associations need to have an agreement with
the customs administration of their countries,
whereby they provide a guarantee for all
transit operations undertaken under the TIR
system in their countries, irrespective of where
the TIR Carnets are issued.5
Created more than 50 years ago, the TIR system
has proven to be very effective in facilitating customs transit
by road, especially when it involves crossing multiple borders.
Moreover, it remains the only universal transit system in the
world. However, the fixed costs of the TIR system—i.e., its
costs that do not depend on the number of transit operations
undertaken under the system—are too high for most transport
operators from the CARs. This is because the first two
features of the system have significant fixed-cost implications.
The first feature means a transport operator that wants
to use the TIR system has to purchase or lease a truck that
meets the requirements of the TIR Convention.6 Moreover,
the truck needs to be re-certified every two years for continued
use under the TIR system. The requirements are rather
stringent and can only be met by a high-quality truck. Since
customs transit under the TIR system often involves entry to
an EU member country, the truck used in such transit has
to comply also  with EU emission regulations. Hence, to be
able to use the TIR system, transport operators from the
CARs have to purchase or lease European-manufactured
trucks, which are very expensive by local standards.7
5 See Arvis (2005) for a detailed description of the TIR system.
6 Although the requirements of the TIR Convention apply to the compartment of a truck, they are effectively requirements for the
truck since a compartment can rarely be bought or leased separately from the rest of the truck.
7 Used trucks of EURO-3 class, for example, cost at least US$70,000 and new trucks of EURO-5 class cost more than US$100,000.
The high cost of trucks that meet the requirements of the TIR Convention and comply with the emission regulations of the EU is
the main reason for the relatively small number of such trucks in the CARs. The total “TIR fleet” of the CARs is estimated at around
3,000 units, which is small given that Uzbekistan alone has 190,000 freight vehicles. With around 1,600 TIR-certified units,
Kazakhstan has the largest “TIR fleet” of the CARs. By comparison, Tajikistan has no TIR-certified units and is not using the TIR
transit system in practice, even though it can theoretically issue TIR Carnets.
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The second feature of the TIR system means a
national association controlling access to the TIR system
needs to have an insurance that covers its guarantee liabilities
under the system. It then needs to recover the cost of such
insurance from its member transport operators through
various fees, such as entry and annual membership fees.
Since the amounts payable under the guarantee are quite
high by Central Asian standards, so is the cost of the
insurance. Moreover, most transit operations undertaken
by transport operators from the CARs involve crossing a
few borders. The amount of the duties and taxes at risk
during such transit operations are generally much smaller
than the amount of the guarantee under the TIR system.
Table 6.2 presents data on the costs of the TIR
system in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and
Uzbekistan. It shows that the cost of trucks that meet the
requirements of the TIR Convention and comply with the
emission regulations of the EU as well as the entry and/or
annual fees for membership in the national association that
controls access to the system, are indeed quite high in the
four CARs. Most transport operators in the CARs are
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, which cannot
afford using the TIR system at such high fixed costs. This
partly explains why—as noted in Chapter 5—the market
for international road shipments in the CARs is dominated
by a small number of large transport operators, mostly from
Iran and Turkey.
Although the fixed costs of the TIR system are high,
these can be offset by its benefits, which primarily relate to
faster border crossing and the exemption from a customs
escort. The processing of vehicles transporting goods under
a TIR Carnet (henceforth referred to as “TIR vehicles”)
at border crossing points should be significantly faster than
for non-TIR vehicles. Furthermore, TIR vehicles should
be allowed to pass through a transit country without a
customs escort.
These benefits of the TIR system are, however, not
always realized in the CARs due to border infrastructure
problems, noncompliance by customs, and corruption.
When a border crossing point becomes congested, the main
delay factor is the waiting time to reach the border control
zone rather than the actual processing time within the zone.
The approaches to most border crossing points do not allow
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traffic separation schemes that would prioritize TIR vehicles
over non-TIR ones. As a result, the former incur the same
preprocessing delays as the latter.
Furthermore, when a TIR vehicle reaches a border
control zone, customs officials should only check the TIR
Carnet and the customs seal on the vehicle. They are
allowed to break the seal and examine the contents of the
vehicle only on the basis of an identified risk. However,
customs officials in the CARs often require that drivers of
TIR vehicles produce a full set of documentation almost
identical to that required for drivers of non-TIR vehicles.
In some countries, seals are broken routinely rather than
on the basis of an identified risk, and customs officials often
demand that TIR vehicles be escorted. Unofficial payments
are usually needed to avoid excessive paper work and
physical examination of the cargo at border crossing points.
Combined with various official and unofficial
payments relating to the vehicle (e.g., an entry fee, a
charge for an excess axle load, and unofficial payments to
traffic police officers along the route), unofficial payments
to customs officials significantly raise costs of customs
transit and reduce the benefit of using the TIR system in
the CARs. As Table 6.3 shows, a Kyrgyz truck carrying
goods under a TIR Carnet has to make official and
unofficial payments totaling US$1,255–1,805 (17–20%
of the value of cargo) along the  Bishkek-Frankfurt,
Germany route, and US$1,740 (12–18% of the value
of cargo) along the  Bishkek-Istanbul, Turkey route. A
significant proportion of these payments have to be made
in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Even if the benefits of the TIR system had fully
been realized, it would have not been suitable for short-
distance customs transit due to its high fixed costs. The
benefits of the system increase with the number of countries
that need to be crossed during customs transit. The system
is, therefore, mostly used in long-distance customs transit
that requires the crossing of several countries. The fixed
costs of the system are too high for it to be used in external
customs transit that requires crossing of one country or in
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internal customs transit, which only requires crossing of
the border between two trading countries.
6.3 Regional Cooperation in Customs Transit
Given the high fixed costs of the TIR system and
the high variable costs of the national road transit systems,
the CARs have been trying to establish regional transit
systems that could be used for intraregional customs transit
by road and would be less costly than the TIR and national
road transit systems. To this end, the CARs—along with
the other CIS countries—have signed the Agreement on
Transit through the Territories of the CIS Member
Countries. Within the framework of the ECO, the
CARs—together with Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and
Turkmenistan—signed a Transit Trade Agreement, which
seeks to facilitate trade between two signatory countries
that involve external customs transit through the territory
of another signatory country. In addition, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan—along with
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Turkmenistan—
have signed the Transit Transport Framework Agreement,
which aims to facilitate customs transit along designated
routes through the territories of the signatory countries.
Within the framework of the EAEC, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, and Tajikistan—along with Belarus and the
Russian Federation—have signed the Agreement on
Transit through the Territories of the Custom Union
Member Countries. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic—
along with the PRC and Pakistan—have signed a regional
transit agreement. Kazakhstan has signed bilateral transit
agreements with Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz
Republic, which has signed a bilateral transit agreement
also with Tajikistan.
These agreements have, however, had a very limited
effect on customs transit in the CARs for a variety of
reasons. The ECO Transit Transport Framework
Agreement, for example, has not yet entered into force, as
only five countries have so far ratified it (six are needed for
it to become effective). Uzbekistan, a key transit country in
the region, has not even signed it. The ECO Transit Trade
Agreement and the bilateral transit agreement between
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have entered into force but
are not being implemented. The CIS and EAEC transit
agreements do not address issues relating to the provision
of a guarantee for customs transit. The bilateral transit
agreement between Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic
only applies to Kyrgyz trucks passing through the Kazak
territory. It stipulates that Kyrgyz transport operators
provide a bank guarantee to the Kyrgyz customs in return
for its letter of guarantee, which enables a Kyrgyz truck to
pass through the Kazakh territory without a customs escort.
As noted above, a bank guarantee is fairly expensive in the
CARs and is only available to large companies with a good
“track record.” This partly explains why a few Kyrgyz
transport operators are making use of the bilateral transit
agreement between their country and Kazakhstan.
Consequently, the need remains for the CARs and
their neighbors to put in place an effective and relatively
inexpensive regional transit system for short-distance
customs transit by road. Given the success of the TIR
system, its design could serve as a basis for the regional
transit system. However, the design of the TIR system
would have to be modified to make the fixed costs of the
regional transit system cheaper than those of the TIR
system. The main features of the regional transit system
could be as follows:
(i) The system would be based on a regional
transit agreement. The agreement would have
to be drafted in consultation with transport
operators and fully supported by the customs
of all participating countries.
(ii) A regional super visor y body would be
established to supervise the implementation
of the system in the participating countries.
The body could be set up as a separate
institution or within the framework of one of
the existing regional cooperation organizations
or programs.
(iii) Goods would be transported in a customs-
secure vehicle, but the requirements for such
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a vehicle would be less stringent than those
in the TIR system. The requirements as well
as certification rules and procedures would
need to be acceptable to the customs and set
out in the regional transit agreement. Actual
certification could be done by the same
national body that does certification of the
TIR vehicles.
(iv) A national guaranteeing body would be
established in each participating country to
control access to the system in their
respective countries. One of the existing
institutions, such as the national association
of transport operators, could serve as such
a body.
(v) While goods are in transit, the duties and taxes
at risk would be covered by a “chain
guarantee.” This would be an insurance
guarantee provided by the national
guaranteeing bodies and backed by insurance
companies. Therefore, the national legislation
would need to be amended accordingly in
those CARs where it currently does not allow
insurance companies to insure transit
operations. To make the guarantee cheaper,
maximum payments under the guarantee
could be set at lower levels than those under
the TIR system.
(vi) Goods would be accompanied by a regional
transit document issued by the national
guaranteeing body in the country of origin
and would ser ve as a customs control
document in the countries of origin, transit,
and destination. It would serve as a proof
that the goods it is accompanying are covered
by the insurance guarantee under the regional
transit system. The regional supervisory body
then would print regional transit documents
and distribute them to the national
guaranteeing bodies.
(vii) Customs control measures taken in the
country of origin would be accepted by the
countries of transit and destination. Breaking
of seals and physical examination of goods
would be allowed only under special
circumstances.
Both fixed and variable costs of such a regional
transit system would be relatively low. Its fixed costs would
be less than those of the TIR system because its
requirements for vehicles would be less stringent than those
of the TIR system and the maximum payments under the
“chain guarantee” it provides would be less than those
under the TIR system. The variable costs of the system
would be less than those of the national transit systems
because one insurance guarantee would cover the entire
transit operation and the transport operator would have
to fill out only one transit document (see Figure 6.2).
The benefits of the system would be even greater if the
participating countries has established, at their border
crossing points, separate lanes for vehicles carrying goods
under the regional transit system.
The development of such a regional transit system
requires concerted efforts by the CARs and their neighbors.
Many elements of the system, including transport inspection
mechanisms and organizations that could serve as national
guaranteeing bodies, are already present in the CARs and
in most of their neighbors. However, there is a lack of
capacity and the political will to combine these elements
into an effective regional transit system. Therefore, technical
assistance by multilateral institutions as well as lobbying
by firms that export and/or import goods by road, local
transport operators, and other parties that stand to benefit
from the establishment of the regional transit system are
needed for it to happen. Given the difficulties in negotiating
multiparty agreements, several bilateral transit systems could
initially be set up as an intermediate step towards the
regional transit system. However, these bilateral transit
systems would have to be compatible and similar to the
TIR system in order for them to serve as “building blocks”
rather than become “stumbling blocks” of the proposed
regional transit system.
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Parallel to developing the regional transit system,
the CARs need to ensure full implementation of the TIR
Convention on their territories to better utilize the
advantages of the TIR system in extra-regional customs
transit. Although the TIR Convention is a multilateral
agreement, the CARs could use regional cooperation
mechanisms to put peer pressure on those countries which
have signed the Convention but do not fully adhere to it.
They could also use regional cooperation mechanisms to
encourage the PRC to join the TIR Convention as soon
as possible. The PRC’s accession to the TIR Convention
would enable some of the CARs to use the PRC as a
transit country in trade with South and East Asian
countries and fully realize their bilateral trade potential
with those countries.
6.4  Conclusions
The transit systems in place in the CARs have a
significant effect on both intra- and extra-regional trade in
Central Asia, while the transit systems in place in
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
also affect domestic trade in at least one neighboring CAR.
Indeed, certain aspects of the transit systems in the CARs
impose constraints on cross-border movements of goods by
rail and by road. These are, however, not crucial for cross-
border movements of goods by rail, for which transport-
related factors are a binding constraint. In contrast,
inadequacies of the road transit systems impose a binding
constraint on trade in Central Asia.
The main deficiency of national road transit systems
of the CARs is that they cover only one country and do
not provide a “chain guarantee.” Hence, a transport
operator undertaking customs transit under the national
transit systems has to submit separate transit documents
and provide separate guarantees in the country of origin,
the country of destination, and each of the transit countries.
This can be time-consuming and costly. In addition, there
are difficulties in providing a guarantee in any form. In the
absence  of a guarantee, customs transit under the national
transit systems usually requires convoying which also can
increase transport costs and transit time substantially. That
is why the variable costs of the national road transit systems
in the CARs are quite high.
All CARs have acceded to the TIR Convention,
but the fixed costs of the TIR system are too high for most
transport operators from the CARs. Moreover, the benefits
of the TIR system are not always realized in the CARs
due to border infrastructure problems, noncompliance by
customs, and corruption. Even if the benefits of the TIR
system had fully been realized, it would have not been
suitable for short-distance customs transit due to its high
fixed costs.
The CARs have been trying to establish regional
transit systems that could be used for intraregional customs
transit by road and would be less costly than the TIR and
the national road transit systems. To this end, they have
signed numerous transit agreements with each other as well
as with other countries. These agreements have, however,
had a very limited effect on customs transit in the CARs
for a variety of reasons. Some of them have not entered
into force, while those that have entered into force have not
been implemented or have not reduced the costs of customs
transit significantly due to an inadequate design.
Consequently, the need remains for the CARs and
their neighbors to develop an effective and relatively
inexpensive regional transit system for short-distance
customs transit by road. Given the success of the TIR
system, it could serve as a blueprint for the regional transit
system. But the design of the TIR system would have to
be modified to reduce its fixed costs. Since negotiating
multiparty agreements is relatively difficult, several bilateral
transit systems could initially be set up, as an intermediate
step towards the regional transit system. However, these
bilateral transit systems would have to be compatible and
similar to the TIR system in order for them to serve as
“building blocks” rather than become “stumbling blocks”
for the proposed regional transit system.
The TIR system will be indispensable for long-
distance customs transit by road that involves crossing
multiple borders. The CARs, therefore, need to ensure
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the full implementation of the TIR Convention on their
ter ritories. Although the TIR Convention is a
multilateral agreement, the CARs could use regional
cooperation mechanisms to put peer pressure on those
countries which have signed the Convention but do not
fully adhere to it.
The establishment of an effective and affordable
regional road transit system and the full implementation of
the TIR Convention would help the CARs reduce costs
and delays associated with road customs transit in their
territories. This would, in turn, reduce transport costs and
make transit times shorter and more predictable for
international road shipments to and from the CARs, and
help the CARs expand trade and diversify it in terms of
both geographical distribution and commodity composition.
Easier customs transit by road through neighboring
countries would help the CARs avoid the construction of
new bypassing  roads and enable them to allocate more
resources for the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing
transport networks and their closer integration with
international transport networks. The establishment of an
effective and affordable regional road transit system and
the full implementation of the TIR Convention would also
boost transit trade in the region and increase revenues it
generates for the CARs.
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7
General Equilibrium Analysis
of the Effects of Regional
Cooperation in Trade Policy,
Transport, and Customs Transit
on the Kyrgyz Republic
The preceding chapters argued that the CARs
would reap considerable benefits from improved regional
cooperation in trade policy, transport, and customs transit.
In particular, Chapter 4 argued that by acceding to the
WTO and joining the coalition of WTO members pushing
for the elimination of trade-distorting cotton subsidies in
developed countries, the CARs could bring about a
reduction in these subsidies. This would in turn raise world
cotton prices and increase the CARs’ cotton export
revenues. Chapters 5 and 6 argued that the CARs could
reduce transport costs, make transit times shorter and more
predictable for international shipments through increased
regional cooperation in transport and customs transit. This
would in turn help the CARs expand trade, take more
active part in GPNs and related trade in manufactured
products, and diversify trade in terms of both commodity
composition and geographical distribution. The increase
in cotton export revenues and the expansion of trade would
improve social welfare and stimulate economic growth. And
the diversification of trade would make the CARs less
vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices and
possible swings in import demand in, and protectionist
measures by, trading partners.
This chapter presents quantitative estimates of the
likely effects of regional cooperation in trade policy within
the multilateral framework and increased regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit on the Kyrgyz
Republic, based on the countr y ’s CGE model.1
Specifically, the chapter presents the results of simulations
of a 70% and 35% rise in world cotton prices that the
CARs could bring about through regional cooperation in
trade policy within the multilateral framework and of
estimated reductions in transport costs that would result
1 Like the CGE model of Kazakhstan mentioned in Chapter 4, the CGE model of the Kyrgyz Republic has been developed by the
Asian Development Bank as part of its study on Central Asia regional cooperation in trade, transport, and transit. The model
includes 31 sectors, 8 regions, 16 household types, government, and one composite trading partner. The specification and
structural equations of the model are identical to those of the Kazakhstan’s model described in Appendix 3.
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from increased regional cooperation in transport and
customs transit. The chapter also compares the effects of
increased regional cooperation in transport and customs
transit with those of a 50% reduction in tariffs.
7.1 Effects of Regional Cooperation in Trade
Policy within the Multilateral Framework
One form of regional cooperation in trade policy that
the CARs could and need to pursue within the multilateral
framework is joint efforts with other developing countries to
push for the elimination of trade-distorting cotton subsidies
in the EU and the US. If successful, these efforts would
raise world cotton prices by up to an estimated 71% and
boost export revenue and GDP in cotton exporting
developing countries The Kyrgyz Republic, where cotton
accounts for more than 6% of merchandise exports and about
2% of GDP, would be one of the major beneficiary countries.
To assess the likely effects of regional cooperation
in trade policy within the multilateral framework on the
Kyrgyz Republic, we made simulations of a 35% and 70%
rise in world cotton prices in 2006. The results of the
simulations show that—as expected—a rise in world cotton
price would give a major boost to the Kyrgyz economy. If
world cotton prices rose by 35%, the cumulative increase
in real GDP in 2006–2015 would be more than US$0.6
billion (at 2002 prices) greater or 33.4% (relative to 2005)
higher than in the baseline (“no change”) scenario (see
Table 7.1). If world cotton prices rose by 70%, the
cumulative increase in real GDP would be US$1.2 billion
(at 2002 prices) greater or 61.3% (relative to 2005) higher
than in the baseline scenario. The value of exports would
grow substantially faster than in the baseline scenario, but
growth of the volume of exports would accelerate only
modestly, as the surge in cotton exports revenue would slow
down growth of non-cotton exports through appreciation
of the real exchange rate.2 Both the value and the volume
of imports would expand much more rapidly than in the
baseline scenario to keep the trade balance at zero, as
required by the model specification. Although aggregate
income of poor households would rise less than that of
nonpoor households in absolute terms, it would rise much
2 This is the phenomenon referred to as the “Dutch Disease.”
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more than that of nonpoor households relative to 2005 in
both scenarios.
However, the rise in household income would be
rather uneven across regions (see Figure 7.1). In particular,
household income would rise significantly more in the
Batken and Chui regions than in Bishkek city and the
Naryn region. Furthermore, poor households’ income
would rise more than nonpoor households’ income in the
Issyk-Kul and Batkek regions, but less than nonpoor
households’ income in all other regions.
7.2 Effects of Regional Cooperation in Transport
and Customs Transit
To be able to assess the effects of increased regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit on the Kyrgyz
Republic using its CGE model, we first estimated how
increased regional cooperation in the two areas would affect
the external transportation costs and domestic distribution
margins for the sectors included in the CGE model.3 We
did so in three steps.
First, representative export and import commodities
were selected for those sectors in the model for which the
external transportation costs and/or domestic distribution
margins were likely to be affected by increased regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit.
Second, interviews were conducted with Kyrgyz
firms to determine how improvements in transport
infrastructure, transport regulations, transport and logistics
services, and customs systems in the CARs would affect
the external transportation costs and domestic distribution
margins for the representative commodities.
3 The domestic distribution margin for a particular sector is the difference between the price received by producers and the price
paid by consumers in the case of a domestically produced and consumed product, the difference between the price received by
producers and the border price in the case of an exported product, and the difference between the border price and the price
paid by consumers in the case of an imported product. A major component of a domestic distribution margin is domestic
transportation costs, including costs of delays in domestic transportation of goods.
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Third, estimates of reductions in the external
transportation costs and domestic distribution margins (as
percent of border prices) for 17 sectors were made, based
on interviews with Kyrgyz firms and additional information
from other sources.4
The estimates are given in Table 7.2.
We then adjusted the border prices in the model in
2006 to reflect the estimated reductions in external
transportation costs and domestic distribution margins that
would result from increased regional cooperation in
transport and customs transit.5 The results of the simulation
indicate that increased regional cooperation in transport
and customs transit would have considerable positive effects
4 For the other 14 sectors included in the model (mostly services), it was assumed that increased regional cooperation in transport
and customs transit would have no impact on external transportation costs and domestic distributions margins.
5 The border price for exported goods were adjusted as follows:
( ) ( )1001*1001* DTPP iiiai ++=
where Pai is the adjusted border price for exported product i, Pi is the border price for exported product i in the baseline scenario,
Ti is the estimated reduction in the external transportation costs for exported product i, and Di is the estimated reduction in the
domestic distribution margin for exported product i.
The border price for imported goods were adjusted as follows:
( ) ( )[ ]1001*1001 DTPP jjjaj ++=
where Paj is the adjusted border price for imported product j, Pj is the border price for imported product j in the baseline
scenario, Tj is the estimated reduction in the external transportation costs for imported product j, and Dj is the estimated
reduction in the domestic distribution margin for imported product j.
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on the Kyrgyz Republic. The cumulative increase in real
GDP in 2006–2015 would be US$2.1 billion (at 2002
prices) greater or 112.3% (relative to 2005) higher than
in the baseline scenario (see Table 7.3). While both exports
and imports would expand faster than in the baseline
scenario, growth of real imports would accelerate more than
that of real exports to keep the trade balance at zero. This
is because improved regional cooperation in transport and
customs transit would raise border prices for exported goods
and lower border prices for imported goods. The cumulative
percentage increase (relative to 2005) in both poor and
nonpoor households’ aggregate income would be
substantial, although the former would be slightly lower
than the latter. Moreover, the increase in household income
would be fairly even across regions (see Figure 7.2).
We also made a simulation of the estimated
reductions in external transportation costs and domestic
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distribution margins (that would result from increased
regional cooperation in transport and customs transit) and
a 35% rise in world cotton prices (that regional cooperation
in trade policy within the multilateral framework could bring
about). We did so to assess how increased regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit combined
with regional cooperation in trade policy within the
multilateral framework would affect the Kyrgyz
Republic. The results of the simulation show that the
Kyrgyz Republic would reap substantial benefits from
increased regional cooperation in transport and customs
transit, and regional cooperation in trade policy within
the multilateral framework. If the estimated reductions
in external transportation costs and domestic distribution
margins and the rise in world cotton prices took place in
2006, the cumulative increase in real GDP in 2006–
2015 would be US$2.8 billion (at 2002 prices) greater
or 150.2% (relative to 2005) higher than in the baseline
scenario (see Table 7.4). The value of both exports and
imports would expand substantially faster than in the
baseline scenario, with the cumulative increase in the
volume of exports being 163.5% higher and that in the
volume of imports 429.1% higher than in the baseline
scenario. Growth generated by the reductions in
transport costs and the rise in world cotton prices would
be propoor. Specifically, the cumulative increase in poor
households’ aggregate income would be 153.9% higher
than in the baseline scenario whereas the increase in
nonpoor households’ aggregate income would be
136.6% higher.
For comparative purposes, we then made a
simulation of a 50% unilateral, nondiscriminatory, and
uniform (across products) reduction in tariffs in the Kyrgyz
Republic at the beginning of 2006. The results of the
simulation suggest that a tariff reduction is not a potent
growth stimulus for the Kyrgyz Republic, especially
compared with the reductions in transport costs that would
result from increased regional cooperation in transport and
customs transit. In particular, the 50% reduction in tariffs
would lead to a cumulative increase (relative to 2005) in
real GDP of 27.6% in 2006–2015, compared with
112.3% in the case of increased regional cooperation in
transport and customs transit (see Table 7.5). The reason
is that tariffs in the Kyrgyz Republic are already quite low,
and relatively high transport costs and long unpredictable
transit times are a more significant barrier to imports to the
Kyrgyz Republic than tariffs. Furthermore, economic
growth generated by the reduction in tariffs would not be
pro-poor. The cumulative increase (relative to 2005) in
poor households’ aggregate income would be 21.7%,
compared with the increase of 27.1% in nonpoor
households’ aggregate income. The increase in household
income would be uneven across regions, with nonpoor
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households in the Naryn region, for example, benefiting
much more than poor households in the Batken region (see
Figure 7.3).
7.3 Conclusions
Quantitative estimates based on its CGE model
suggest that the Kyrgyz Republic would reap considerable
benefits from regional cooperation in trade policy within
the multilateral framework and increased regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit. A reduction
in cotton subsidies and a resulting rise in world cotton prices
(that regional cooperation in trade policy within the
multilateral framework could bring about) and reductions
in transport costs (resulting from increased regional
cooperation in transport and customs transit) would
accelerate economic growth in the Kyrgyz Republic
substantially. If world cotton prices rose by 35% in 2006,
cumulative growth of real GDP in 2006–2015 (relative to
2005) would be 33.4% higher than in the baseline scenario.
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If the estimated reductions in transport costs due to
increased regional cooperation in transport and customs
transit took place in 2006, cumulative growth of real GDP
would be 112.3% higher than in the baseline scenario. If
both events occurred in 2006, cumulative growth of real
GDP would be 150.2% higher than in the baseline
scenario. By comparison, a 50% unilateral,
nondiscriminatory, and uniform (across products) reduction
in tariffs would speed up cumulative growth in real GDP
over the decade by a relatively modest 27.6%.
While similar estimates for the other CARs are
not yet available, some general qualitative assessments can
be made. In particular, one can expect unilateral
nondiscriminatory trade liberalization to have greater
positive effects on Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan
and, especially, Uzbekistan because their tariffs are, on
the average, higher than those of the Kyrgyz Republic.
Tajikistan is likely to benefit even more than the Kyrgyz
Republic from increased regional cooperation in transport
and customs transit. The reason is that high transport
costs and long and unpredictable transit times are a
particularly serious trade barrier for Tajikistan. Although
the benefits of increased regional cooperation in transport
and customs transit for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan are likely to be smaller than those for the
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, one can still expect them
to be considerable. This is because high transport costs
and long and unpredictable transit times are a significant
trade barrier for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan
as well, albeit not as significant as for the Kyrgyz Republic
and Tajikistan. Finally, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are
likely to gain more from a reduction in cotton subsidies in
developed countries than the Kyrgyz Republic since
cotton accounts for a larger share of their exports and
GDP than those of the Kyrgyz Republic. In contrast,
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan would benefit less than the
Kyrgyz Republic from a reduction in cotton subsidies in
developed countries because cotton accounts for less than
one percent of their exports and GDP.





Since the breakup of the FSU, the CARs have
made considerable progress in expanding market-based
trade with both FSU and non-FSU countries, and
integrating into the global economy. Their merchandise
trade grew rapidly in 2000–2004, and they all appear to
have fully realized their trade potential in 2004 in terms of
the overall level of trade. Nonetheless, the growth of trade
in the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan was
slower than that in many other countries. Excluding exports
of crude oil and oil products and imports of capital goods
for oil sector development, the expansion of trade in
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan was also relatively modest.
Moreover, a handful of primary commodities, such
as crude oil, metals, and cotton fiber, continued to dominate
the CARs’ exports. Indeed, the rise in world prices for
these commodities was a major factor that contributed to
the rapid growth of their exports. At the same time,
participation of the CARs in GPNs and related
international trade in manufactured products remained very
limited. Furthermore, the CARs’ exports and, to a lesser
extent, imports remained concentrated in a small number
of countries. An analysis based on the gravity model
suggests that the CARs “overtraded” with most other CIS
countries in 2004, but “under-traded” with most East and
South Asian and Western European countries as well as
the US.
Heavy reliance on exports of a few primary
commodities makes the CARs vulnerable to abrupt swings
in volatile world prices for these commodities and
complicates economic management. Their limited
participation in GPNs and related trade in manufactured
products means that the CARs derive relatively little
benefits from trade in terms of attracting foreign direct
investment, gaining access to advanced technologies, and
fostering sustained economic development. The
concentration of trade in a small number of countries makes
the CARs vulnerable to changes in imports demand in,
and possible trade sanctions by, those countries.
The presence of numerous trade barriers pertaining
to trade policy, transport, and transit systems in the CARs
their trading partners, and transit countries have constrained
the growth of trade in the CARs. It has also hindered
reorientation of their trade from FSU to non-FSU
countries, limited their participation in GPNs and related
trade in manufactured products, and skewed the structure
of their exports towards primary commodities. The more
significant trade barriers pertaining to trade policy in the
CARs include a complex tariff schedule and relatively high
tariffs (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan); escalation of tariffs
(all the CARs); frequent and unpredictable changes in
the tariff schedule (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan); high implicit tariffs in the form of taxes
that are levied on imported goods but not  on domestically
produced goods or have higher rates for imported goods
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than for domestically produced goods (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan); explicit export taxes
(Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan); and prohibition and
licensing of exports and imports of certain commodities (all
the CARs). Large agricultural subsidies that developed
countries provide to their farmers also constitute a significant
barrier to trade in Central Asia.
Other significant barriers to trade in Central Asia
are high transport costs and long and unpredictable
transport times for international shipments to and from the
CARs. This is not only due to the landlocked and remote
location of the CARs and their difficult topography, but
also due to the deficiencies of their transport networks, high
costs and low quality of transport and logistics services in
the region, and difficulties with movements of transport
equipment and goods across borders and through the
territories of the CARs and neighboring countries.
Although the CARs have considerably improved their
transport links with non-FSU countries since independence,
the lack of financial resources and poor coordination of national
transport infrastructure projects have been hindering the
integration of their transport networks into international
transport networks. At the same time, the CARs have built
a number of new roads and railways primarily to avoid transit
through a neighboring country. The CARs now possess
extensive transport networks, but many of them are in poor
condition and require rehabilitation. Other elements of
transport infrastructure—with the exception of the air
transport infrastructure in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan—are also underdeveloped and in poor condition.
The availability, quality, and costs of transport
services in the CARs compare unfavorably with many other
countries. Lack of competition is one of the main reasons
for the low quality and high costs of rail, air, and
international road transport services. Competition is stiff
in the market for domestic road transport services. The
cost of these services is relatively low but the quality is not
high. The availability of multimodal transport operations
is limited and costs of international transport services for
small cargo are relatively high due largely to the
underdevelopment of logistics infrastructure and services.
National transport legislation and regulations in the
CARs differ significantly and create serious obstacles to
cross-border and transit traffic. A major problem is the
availability and the cost of transport permits, which foreign
transport operators generally need to obtain for their vehicles
to be allowed to enter (and pass through) a CAR territory.
There is a shortage of reciprocal (free) transport permits
while the cost of nonreciprocal transport permits is high.
In addition to obtaining a transport permit, foreign transport
operators usually need to pay various taxes and charges,
such as a road tax and an excess axle load charge. Also,
foreign drivers generally need a visa to enter a CAR and
have to obtain it in advance at an embassy of that CAR.
This often causes delays because the CARs have
cumbersome visa procedures and do not have embassies in
many countries.
Certain aspects of the transit systems currently in place
in the CARs impose constraints on cross-border movements
of goods by rail and by road. These are, however, not crucial
for cross-border movements of goods by rail, for which
transport-related factors are a binding constraint. By contrast,
inadequacies of the road transit systems impose a binding
constraint on trade in Central Asia.
The main deficiency of the national road transit systems
of the CARs is that they cover only one country and do not
provide a “chain guarantee.” Consequently, a transport
operator undertaking customs transit under the national transit
systems has to submit separate transit documents and provide
separate guarantees in the country of origin, the country of
destination, and each of the transit countries. Providing a
guarantee even in one country can be quite costly, let alone
providing a guarantee in several countries. In the absence of
a guarantee, convoying is usually required for customs transit
under the national transit systems. A major problem with
convoying is that the fee for the service is rather high in
some of the CARs. Thus, the variable costs of the national
transit systems in the CARs are quite high.
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The TIR system—that is, the international transit
system based on the TIR Convention signed by all the
CARs—provides a “chain guarantee” and has proven to be
very effective in facilitating customs transit by road, especially
when it involves crossing multiple borders. However, the fixed
costs of the system (i.e., the cost of transport equipment that
meets the requirements of the TIR Convention and the cost
of the insurance guarantee that the TIR system provides)
are too high for most transport operators from the CARs.
Moreover, the benefits of the system are not always realized
in the CARs due to border infrastructure problems,
noncompliance by customs, and corruption.
Recognizing that their trade performance depends
not only on their trade policy, transport sector, and transit
systems but also on the trade policy, transport sector, and
transit systems of neighboring countries, the CARs have
actively pursued regional cooperation in these areas. In
particular, they have joined several regional organizations
that involve or seek to reach a multilateral RTA.
Additionally, they have entered into numerous bilateral
RTAs with other CIS countries. Many of these RTAs
have not entered into force, while most of those that have
formally entered into force have not been implemented.
Consequently, their impact on the trade policy regime and
the pattern of trade in the CARs has so far been limited. If
fully implemented, however, the concluded and planned
RTAs involving the CARs may cause considerable trade
diversion and have significant adverse effects on the CARs.
Notably, implementing the EAEC customs union is likely
to slow down economic growth in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, and Tajikistan significantly, unless it is
accompanied by a substantial reduction in common external
tariffs of its member countries.
In contrast, the potential benefits of WTO
membership for the CARs are considerable. They have
increased significantly with the accession of the PRC in
2001, and will increase further as more of the CARs’
neighbors (including the Russian Federation) join the
organization. Acceding to the WTO is, however, not
enough for the CARs to realize the benefits of WTO
membership. As the experience of the Kyrgyz Republic
shows, good transport links with other WTO member
countries and easy transit through neighboring countries
are also necessary.
WTO membership also entails costs for the CARs,
but these are often exaggerated and misinterpreted. The real
costs of WTO membership are those directly associated with
the accession process and not those associated with policy
reforms that a country often implements in connection with
WTO accession. Multilateral and bilateral development
agencies can provide technical assistance in building
institutions and capacity required for WTO accession.
WTO membership does not preclude regional
cooperation in trade policy. In fact, there are several options
for such cooperation that the CARs can pursue within the
multilateral framework. Of these, concerted but
nondiscriminatory trade liberalization and joint efforts with
other developing countries to push for the elimination of
cotton and other agricultural subsidies in developed
countries are of particular importance for the CARs. WTO
membership is also consistent with regional cooperation in
transport and customs transit.
There have been a number of regional cooperation
initiatives aimed at removing the deficiencies of transport
infrastructure and services and facilitating cross-border and
transit traffic in the CARs and in neighboring countries.
Notably, the CAREC member countries have recently
agreed on the Regional Transport Sector Road Map, which
formulates the strategic priorities for regional cooperation
in the transport sector and addresses most of the deficiencies
of rail and road transport in Central Asia.
In an effort to establish regional transit systems that
could be used for intraregional customs transit by road and
would be less costly than the TIR and national road transit
systems, the CARs have signed numerous transit
agreements with each other as well as with neighboring
countries. These agreements have, however, had a very
limited effect on customs transit in Central Asia for a variety
of reasons. Some of them have not entered into force while
those that have entered into force have not been implemented
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or have not reduced costs of customs transit significantly
due to an inadequate design.
Consequently, the need remains for the CARs and
their neighbors to develop an effective and relatively
inexpensive regional transit system for short-distance
customs transit by road. Given the success of the TIR
system, its design could serve as a basis for such a regional
transit system. However, the design of the TIR system
would have to be modified to make the fixed costs of the
regional transit system less expensive than those of the
TIR system. Since negotiating multiparty agreements is
relatively difficult, several bilateral transit systems could
initially be set up as an intermediate step towards the
regional transit system.
The TIR system will be indispensable for long-
distance customs transit by road that involves crossing
multiple borders. The CARs therefore need to ensure full
implementation of the TIR Convention on their territories.
Although the TIR Convention is a multilateral agreement,
the CARs could use regional cooperation mechanisms to
put peer pressure on those countries which have signed the
Convention but are not fully implementing it.
Quantitative estimates based on the CGE model of
the Kyrgyz Republic suggest that the CARs would reap
considerable benefits from increased regional cooperation
in transport and customs transit. If the estimated reductions
in transport costs that would result from increased regional
cooperation in these areas occurred in 2006, the cumulative
increase in the Kyrgyz Republic’s real GDP in 2006–
2015 would be US$2.1 billion (at 2002 prices) greater
or 112.3% (relative to 2005) higher than in the baseline
scenario. Although similar quantitative estimates for the
other CARs are not yet available, one can expect Tajikistan
to benefit from increased regional cooperation in transport
and customs transit more than the Kyrgyz Republic. The
benefits of increased regional cooperation in these areas
for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan would also
be significant, albeit somewhat smaller than those for the
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.
This means that deep regional economic integration
that involves not only preferential trade liberalization but
also increased regional cooperation in transport, customs
transit, and other areas of trade facilitation can be beneficial
for the CARs. The positive effects of increased regional
cooperation in transport and trade facilitation can more
than offset the negative effects of preferential trade
liberalization. This is more likely to be the case when
preferential trade liberalization is accompanied by broad-
based trade liberalization resulting in fairly low
nonpreferential policy barriers to trade.
8.2 Recommendations
The findings of this report suggest that it will
help the CARs increase the gains from participation
in international trade and reduce the associated costs
if they:
¾ Intensify efforts to join the WTO and further
liberalize trade policy on a nondiscriminatory
basis as part of the WTO accession process (in
the case of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan)
¾ Liberalize trade policy in a more coordinated
manner to avoid a situation in which  trade
liberalization by one country prompts its
neighbors with a more restrictive trade policy to
tighten restrictions on cross-border movements
of people and transport equipment in an effort
to counter the deflection of their trade with other
countries through the country, liberalizing trade
policy more rapidly;
¾ Join efforts with other developing countries to
gain better access to markets in developed
countries and push for the elimination of
agricultural subsidies in those countries;
¾ Rationalize the existing RTAs, broaden their
product coverage, and simplify the rules of origin
(in the case of PTAs and FTAs);
89Chapter 8 - Overall Conclusions and Recommendations
¾ Develop and carry out—together with other
CAREC member countries—a time-bound
action plan to implement the Regional Transport
Sector Road Map of the CAREC Program;
¾ Extend, in consultation with other CAREC
member countries, the Road Map to address
the deficiencies of air transport in Central Asia;
¾ Remove the infrastructure bottlenecks
constraining movements of goods across borders
by rail;
¾ Enhance competit ion in rai l ,  air,  and
international road transport—in particular, by
restructuring state-owned railways and
airlines, separating regulatory and commercial
functions in the transport sector, and creating
a level playing field for domestic and foreign
transport operators;
¾ Ensure full implementation of the TIR
Convention; and
¾ Develop an effective and relatively inexpensive
regional transit system for short-distance customs
transit by road.
Regional organizations and programs involving
CARs will help the CARs improve regional cooperation
in transport and trade facilitation and increase the gains
from participation in international trade if they:
¾ Ensure that the multilateral RTAs have a broad
product coverage, simple rules of origin (in the
case of PTAs and FTAs) and low external
tariffs (in the case of customs unions);
¾ Ensure that preferential trade liberalization
by the member countries under the multilateral
RTAs is accompanied by (i) broad-based
trade liberalization resulting in fairly low
nonpreferential policy barriers to trade and
(ii) increased regional cooperation in
transport, customs transit, and other areas of
trade facilitation;
¾ Intensify efforts to promote regional cooperation
among the CARs and their neighbors in the
areas of transport and trade facilitation;
¾ Help the CARs better coordinate national road
and rail transport infrastructure projects,
focusing them on improving the region’s
transport links with the other parts of the
world—in particular, through the TRACECA,
Asian Highway and Trans-Asian Railway
projects; and
¾ Set up a mechanism for monitoring the
implementation of the TIR Convention in the
CARs and their neighbors.
Multilateral and bilateral development agencies will
help the CARs closely integrate into the international
trading system, increase the gains from trade, and achieve
sustainable development if they:
¾ Help Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan join the WTO as soon as possible
by increasing and better coordinating technical
assistance for this purpose;
¾ Integrate technical and financial assistance in
the areas of trade policy, transport, and trade
facilitation, for example, by tying funding for
transport infrastructure projects to requirements
aimed at facilitating cross-border movements of
goods and transport equipment;
¾ Increase technical and financial assistance in
improving the quality of transport and logistics
services in the CARs;
¾ Provide technical assistance to the CARs and
their neighbors in developing—possibly under
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the auspices of one of the regional organizations
or programs—an effective and relatively
inexpensive regional transit system for short-
distance customs transit by road; and
¾ Undertake more analytical work that
demonstrates the benefits of improved regional
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Appendix 2
Models of Potential Openness
to International Trade
Appendix 2




This appendix describes Kazakhstan’s computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that has been developed
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as part of its study on Central Asia regional cooperation in trade, transport,
and transit and used to assess the effects of implementing the customs union of the Eurasian Economic Community
(EAEC) on Kazakhstan.
A3.1 Overview of the Model
Kazakhstan’s CGE model is a one-country dynamic CGE model, typical in most respects. The model has been
developed according to generally accepted specification standards and implemented in the General Algebraic Modelling
System. It includes 25 sectors (aggregated from 61 sectors in Kazakhstan’s social accounting matrix (SAM) for 2002),
16 regions, 30 household types, government, and five trading partners (People’s Republic of China, Kyrgyz Republic,
Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, and the rest of the world). As such, the model permits an assessment of both direct and
indirect effects of implementing the EAEC customs union on Kazakhstan. These include effects on the country as a
whole as well as individual sectors, regions, and population groups.
Technically, the model is a system of simultaneous equations that simulate price-directed interactions between
firms and households in commodity and factor markets. Commodity and factors prices are key endogenous variables,
with changes in prices inducing changes in the level and composition of supply and demand, production, and income;
and the remaining variables in the system. The equation system is solved for prices that correspond to equilibrium in
commodity and factor markets and satisfy the accounting identities governing economic behavior. It is then calibrated to
Kazakhstan’s SAM for 2002.
A3.2 Specification of the Model
Production
As with many applied general equilibrium models, the Kazakhstan model decomposes the production structure
into a series of nested decisions allowing for a wide range of substitution possibilities between various inputs. Figure A3-
1 provides a graphical depiction of the nested production structure used in the model.
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The top level of the production structure decomposes the production decision between aggregate inputs
(intermediate demand) and an aggregate value-added bundle. While there is a possibility to allow some substitution
between intermediate inputs and value added, for the examples considered in this report, it is assumed that the substitution
elasticity is zero or, in other words, the value added is always mixed in fixed proportions with intermediate inputs. It is also
assumed that all intermediate inputs are consumed in fixed proportion amongst themselves, though it is possible to
substitute between domestic and imported intermediate goods. The next level of the production structure decomposes the
aggregate value-added bundle into labor and capital components.
Consumption
The composite domestic household group is captured by a single representative consumer who allocates disposable
income across various commodities. The model uses an extension of the Stone-Geary consumer demand system, known
as the extended linear expenditure system (ELES). The ELES has several distinct advantages over other demand
systems. It allows for commodity-specific income elasticities, which can either be econometrically estimated or derived
from literature searches. In addition, the ELES integrates the household saving decision in the consumer optimization
process, and is easy to calibrate and implement. In the ELES, consumption is represented as the sum of two components:
(i) a subsistence minimum and (ii) a share of supernumerary income, which is the residual disposable income after
subtracting expenditures on the subsistence minimum. Household direct taxation is a fixed proportion of income.
Other Final Demand
There are three other domestic final demand accounts: government expenditures, investment expenditures, and
changes in inventory. Aggregate real government expenditure is assumed to be fixed while aggregate real investment
expenditure will depend upon the closure rule. The decomposition into demand for commodities is assumed to use fixed
shares in both cases.
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Trade
The model uses an extension of the Armington hypothesis to implement trade equations. The principle behind
the Armington assumption is that goods are differentiated according to region of origin. In practice this means that each
agent specifies a demand for a specific aggregate good (derived from maximizing utility for example). This good is a
constant-elasticity–of-substitution aggregate of imports and domestic products in each sector.  At this stage of the demand
system, agents decompose demand for the aggregate good into its domestic and (aggregate) import components based
on relative prices and (calibrated) penetration shares.
Export supply is treated symmetrically to import demand—i.e., domestic producers are assumed to differentiate
between domestic and export markets. A rise in export prices (relative to domestic prices) induces producers to shift
production resources towards export markets. The model implements a constant-elasticity-of-transformation curve to
capture this assumption.
Equilibrium
Production is modeled with a constant-returns-to-scale technology, which guarantees that supply equals domestic
plus external (export) demand for domestic output.  Factor prices, including wages and returns on capital, are generally
determined by equilibrium conditions. In both markets, there are a wide range of possibilities. We assume that aggregate
capital is fixed in supply and mobile between sectors.  We assume that labor of a specific skill is perfectly mobile across
sectors, which implies a single economy-wide average wage rate for each skill, assuming labor markets are competitive. A
number of authors have demonstrated, however, that significant and persistent wage differentials exist across sectors for
the same occupational groups.  To account for this, we calibrate a distribution of inter-sectoral wage differentials which
are held constant during the simulations.
Closure
There are three key macro-closure rules. The first concerns the government revenue-expenditure balance. For the
purpose of the simulations, we assume real government saving is fixed in each region. The instrument used to achieve the
balance is the household tax schedule which will shift either up or down to guarantee the budget balance holds.1
The second closure rule concerns the saving-investment balance. Domestic investment is determined by the stock
of domestic private and public saving, plus net foreign saving (which is exogenous).
The third and final closure rule governs the external account where we assume that the trade balance is equal to
the level of foreign saving. If foreign saving is fixed, the real exchange rate adjusts to keep the trade balance equal to
foreign saving. In the case of trade liberalization, this means that the real exchange rate must depreciate to cause an
increase in exports, which will finance the increase in imports resulting from trade liberalization. With scarce resources,
exports can only expand by taking resources from the production of goods whose relative prices have declined due to
structural adjustments. These include traded goods that are being displaced by new imports and nontraded goods, with
the decline in relative prices of nontraded goods causing a decrease in domestic resource costs and a depreciation of the
1 This is equivalent to a lump-sum tax or rebate.
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real exchange rate.  When foreign saving is endogenous, net flows of foreign investment will also exert an influence on
external adjustment, possibly causing appreciation of the real exchange rate and offsetting the export competitiveness
which would otherwise result from trade liberalization.
A3.3 Structural Equations of the Model
Consumer Behavior
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Commodity Demands, Supplies, and Allocation of Traded Goods
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Domestic Market Equilibrium
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Variable and Parameter Definitions
Price Variables
 e Exchange rate (domestic/foreign currency)
PDi
d Domestic purchaser prices- of domestically produced goods
PDi
f Domestic purchaser prices of imports from trading partner f
PSi
d Domestic producer prices of domestically consumed goods
PSi
f Domestic producer price of exports to trading partner f
PDi Purchaser price of composite domestic demand
PSi Producer price of domestic output
PWDi
f World price of imports from trading partner f
PWSi
f World price of exports to trading partner f
rDi Rental rate on capital




d Domestic demand for domestically produced goods
Di
f Domestic demand for imports from trading partner f
Di Composite goods for domestic consumption
KDi
d Domestic demand for domestic capital
KSi
d Domestic supply of domestic capital
LDi Demand for labor
Appendix 3
146 Central Asia: Increasing Gains from Trade Through Regional Cooperation  in Trade Policy, Transport, and Customs Transit
LS Aggregate labor supply
Si
d Domestic production for domestic consumption
Si
f Domestic production for export to trading partner f
Si Gross domestic output
Vij Demand for intermediate good i in sector j
Nominal Variables
B f Net foreign borrowing from trading partner f  (may be exogenous)
Y Nominal domestic income
YG Government income
Structural and Policy Parameters
aij Intermediate use coefficients (Leontief technology)
γi Subsistence consumption of good i
ηi Marginal budget share of consumption of good i
φi Elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in domestic production
σi Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods
τi Elasticity of transformation between domestic and exported goods
ζi ROW import supply elasticity
ξi ROW export demand elasticity
ADi Calibrated intercept parameter for composite product demand
ASi Calibrated intercept parameter for composite product supply
AMi Calibrated intercept parameter for ROW import supply
AEi Calibrated intercept parameter for ROW export demand
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β i
k Base share parameter of demand by origin in the composite demand
δ i
k Base share parameter of supply by destination in the composite supply
ρ i
f Ad valorem equivalent of nontariff barriers to imports from trading partner f
tDi
d Indirect tax rates on domestic production
tDi
f Ad valorem tariff rates on imports from trading partner f
tK Tax rate on capital income
tL Tax rate on labor income
tSi
d Producer tax or subsidy on domestic deliveries
tSi
f Tax or subsidy on exports to trading partner f
ωi Domestic expenditure shares
Indices
i, j : sectors
d = Kazakhstan
f = set of trading partners
k = d∪ f
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Appendix 4
Status of Accession of the Central Asian Republics
to Major International Transport Agreements
and Conventions
Note:
                Included in Resolution 48/11 of 29 October 2001 of the United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
Source:  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
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